

Defense in the Information Age

A New Blueprint

Progressive Policy Institute
Policy Report No. 26

Peter A. Wilson, Robert A. Manning,
and Col. Richard L. Klass, (ret.)

December 1995

Progressive Policy Institute

“One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests.”
—John Stuart Mill

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) is a center for policy innovation that develops alternatives to the conventional left-right debate. Founded in 1989, the Institute is fashioning a public philosophy for the 21st century by adapting America’s progressive tradition of individual liberty, equal opportunity, and civic obligation to the challenges of the Information Age.

PPI advocates growth-oriented economic policies designed to stimulate broad upward mobility and foster a more inclusive, more democratic capitalism; social policies that move beyond maintaining the poor to liberating them from poverty and dependence; and a foreign policy of resolve in defending America’s interests and promoting free institutions. The Institute also explores four issues that loom large on the public agenda of the 1990s: crime, health care, educational excellence, and environmental safety.

In addition to the original work of its own scholars, the Institute offers a platform to a new generation of progressive thinkers and writers around the country. Through its studies on public enterprise, PPI examines ideas for renewing the public sector by redesigning government along more entrepreneurial and less bureaucratic lines. Believing that effective governance also requires harnessing private energies and resources for public purposes, the Institute promotes creative ways to build America’s civic infrastructure and to cultivate the civic virtues necessary for self-government to work.

The Progressive Policy Institute is a project of the Democratic Leadership Council. For further information or to order publications, please contact the Institute at:

Progressive Policy Institute
518 C Street, NE
Washington, DC 20002
E-mail · info@dlcppi.org
WWW · <http://www.dlcppi.org/>
Phone (202) 547-0001
Fax (202) 544-5014

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the other members of PPI's Defense Working Group, whose expertise, insights, and critical comments were invaluable. The authors would also to thank Will Marshall, Steven Nider, and Chuck Alston for their help in the preparation of this paper.

About the Authors

Peter Wilson is a defense consultant whose clients include the RAND Corporation; the views expressed here are solely his own. Robert A. Manning is a senior fellow at PPI and Chair of PPI's Defense Working Group. Col. Richard L. Klass (ret.) is a vice-president of the International Planning and Analysis Center (IPAC).

Contents

What's Wrong with the BUR?, 8
The Two Regional War Scenario—False Assumptions, 9
The Edge of Chaos , 9
The Two MRC Scenario—Lesser Included Cases, 10
A Modernization Holiday, 11
Worldwide Capability?, 12
The Security Environment in the 21st Century , 13
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 14
A New Model, a New BUR, 18
Towards a New Model, 18
Resources Revisited, 20
Base Realignment and Closure Commission , 20
Commercial Practices, 21
Overhead and Oversight, 21
Conclusion—Let the Real Debate Begin, 21

Defense in the Information Age

A New Blueprint

To many Americans it must seem oddly out of joint that even after the cloud of Cold War Armageddon has lifted, Washington politicians are still competing over who can funnel more money into the defense budget, despite the lack of a discernible new threat or a compelling new rationale. Unfortunately, this is emblematic of the strange new defense debate that is under way in Washington—a debate propelled by politics and largely divorced from any long-term strategy. Missing is what’s needed most: an objective analysis of the security challenges of the next century and the military forces necessary to meet them.

Republican “defense hawks” want to spend more on defense than even the Pentagon has requested. Their desire is driven, in part, by the fear that the military will become “hollow” as it has in previous build-downs and, in part, by a Reaganesque theology that calls for more military spending including, of course, a national missile defense system. Meanwhile, the overlapping views of liberal Democrats and Republican “budget hawks” foreshadow a future defense-cutting coalition: Both seek deeper defense cuts—liberals to fund social programs, deficit hawks to help balance the budget and fund tax cuts. Yet both sidestep any serious discussion of current

and emerging national security needs. The idea of meeting the defense challenges of a transformed security environment is largely absent from their logic.

In the middle stands the Clinton Administration which promised to rethink the U.S. national security strategy in light of the Soviet Union’s demise. Instead, it produced the tepid results of the Bottom Up Review (BUR) and more recently, of the Commission on Roles and Missions. What could have been a road map to a force structure and strategy for the 21st century instead became a missed opportunity. The BUR produced a plan for maintaining a smaller, marginally more efficient version of the Cold War force structure that is tailored to budgetary constraints and concerns for the industrial base and inter-service consensus. While laudable as a transitional strategy, the BUR risks becoming an impediment to efforts to prepare for emerging challenges of a new era.

Let us be clear from the outset: This has not fundamentally been a debate about the quantity of defense spending, which today is about three-fifths of what it was at its peak during the height of the Cold War (see Exhibit 1). Nor is spending on readiness an issue of major dispute. For all the acrimonious rhetoric, the differences in proposed spending between the Republican Congress and

**Defense in the Information Age:
A New Blueprint**

the Administration were marginal—less than 3 percent. Concerned about funding for the Bosnia mission, the Administration dropped its objection to the congressional appropriation of \$243 billion dollars for the defense budget (\$7 billion dollars more than requested). In the end, both sides essentially bought into a defense budget based on the BUR (see Exhibit 2). We are now spending about 4 percent of GNP on defense, which is significantly down from the historic highs reached since World War II. We are proposing spending figures at the low end of historic patterns, yet which are adequate for the investments necessary to maintain our technological edge.

If the Clinton Administration can be summed up as BUR-minus, then the Republican posture amounts to little more than BUR-plus. Even so, the Administration’s Republican critics have magnified these marginal differences in an attempt to embarrass the President by portraying him as weak on defense. Beyond this, the Republican defense hawks offer no defense spending strategy substantially different from the Administration’s except in two areas: readiness and national missile defense. Even in these two exceptions, Republicans either lack clear strategic rationale or are engaging in partisan politics.

The “readiness gap” (reminiscent of the “bomber gap” and the “missile gap” of the Cold War) alleged by Republicans in late 1994 and early


1995 is a prime example of this. Once the full story was known—including the fact that spending for readiness is higher under Clinton than under Reagan—responsible Republicans backed off. Yet this has not stopped Republican defense hawks from using readiness as a primary rationale for increased defense spending.

As for missile defense, there is little dispute that there is a theater missile threat that justifies aggressive efforts to develop effective defenses to protect U.S. and allied troops in regional theaters. And it is certainly prudent to explore new capabilities for national missile defense on a limited basis. But neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) nor the Department of Defense (DOD) has identified any imminent threat requiring deployment of a national missile defense system by a certain date nor has an agreement been met on the best technical means to address such a threat should it arise sometime later in the next century. But even though there is no urgent security reason to deploy a national missile defense by a certain date, this idea and its corollary, abandoning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, has become an ideological litmus test for Republicans.

The issue must be quality, not quantity; not simply the level of defense spending but how wisely it is spent. Our concern is that what amounts to an establishment consensus on the BUR’s scaled down Cold War force structure does

not offer a compelling case to the American people that our current and planned defense programs are based on current and future security requirements. Defense spending based as much on partisanship, pork projects, and bureaucratic inertia as it is on real and emerging security threats carries considerable costs.

In the near-term, the BUR consensus risks a political backlash against military spending at current levels. A budget that cuts domestic accounts while defense spending rises—absent an ominous new threat—will almost certainly foster isolationist political backlash and further at-



tacks on spending for other international programs. Finally, it misallocates precious defense resources to projects with political patrons or to higher levels of funding for the misdirected BUR strategy.

In the long-term, the cost may still be greater. We could end up with a military equipped, trained, and structured to fight the last war rather than one geared up to address the contingencies we are most likely to face in the 21st century. If present trends continue, we will have too much capacity for wars we are not likely to fight and not enough for military scenarios with which we could be confronted.

The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) supports a U.S. defense capability second to none to safeguard our interests and underpin American global leadership; one that maximizes technological advances and spends not more or less, but smarter. Our hope is that by presenting a more detailed critique of the current debate and offering a coherent view of the challenges facing this nation, we can begin to move toward a new consensus on how to meet security challenges in the 21st century.

This paper offers a rough outline of a “New Model” national military strategy to guide defense spending based on the principle of *trad- ing the inherited mass of the Cold War for prudent modernization*. We envision a defense investment strategy designed to result in high-tech force projection capabilities able to, 1) fight one major regional conflict with little strategic warning and, 2) to respond collectively with allies and the wider international community to several smaller, lower-intensity operations (e.g., peacekeeping or, higher on the spectrum of conflict, Bosnia-type military action) at the same time as one major contingency.


We recommend a shift in spending priorities that could take place within politically sustainable funding levels—about 3 percent of GNP—barring unanticipated threats (e.g., Russia or

China emerging as global adversaries) that demand larger force structures and operations levels.

The New Model considers our national defense needs as we enter the 21st century; what levels of risk are prudent amid an uncertain security environment and how best to defend the nation and our interests in this milieu. It is based on an internationalist definition of interests: that the security of Europe, Southwest Asia, and East Asia, and the prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition in these regions, remains a vital U.S. interest. While emphasizing robust non-nuclear deterrent capabilities, the United States would retain a credible nuclear arsenal and take appropriate measures to protect our society from new strategic threats. We propose a four-part defense strategy:

- exploit our comparative advantage in technology, capitalizing on the military-technical revolution to build a silicon-based, qualitatively superior force during this interim when there is no inherent conflict among major powers and no apparent rival-competitor on the horizon;
- begin fashioning such a force by pursuing investment choices that trade off Cold War mass for modernization;

Exhibit 2. DOD Outlays as a Percent of GDP, FY 1974-1994



Source: DOD budget estimates, 1995

Defense in the Information Age: A New Blueprint

- redefine deterrence so that the burden is on high-tech conventional capabilities rather than nuclear weapons;
- renew the impetus of the Base Realignment and Closure Commission to bring the downsizing of infrastructure more into line with the restructuring of forces.

In regard to the New Model force, it must be a high-tech power projection force designed to counter likely *capabilities* of future adversaries and geared to unpredictability rather than to specific threats. The New Model must:

- be smaller and more flexible, emphasizing mobility, speed, and agility;
- utilize technological superiority in stealth, precision weapons, surveillance, and dominant battlefield awareness;
- develop defensive and reconnaissance strike capabilities (command, control, communications, and intelligence, plus missile defenses and airpower) to meet the challenge of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

To move defense planning in this direction, PPI proposes that the President task the Secretary of Defense to reassess the BUR. At the same time, the Administration, in consultation with Congress, should create a "Team B," a commission on 21st century national military strategy. This Team B would be comprised of bipartisan, experienced, and prominent defense specialists offering an alternative approach to defense planning and budgeting. During the 1970s, amid a raging debate about Soviet military capabilities, a Team B of independent experts was assembled to challenge the official intelligence estimates. Our proposed commission is modeled on this idea.

What's Wrong with the BUR?

Two years into the implementation of the BUR, many of the flaws in its approach to national security planning have become increasingly self-evident. Even within the Administration, some have suggested a new defense blueprint in 1997, an idea quickly repudiated by the Pentagon. Several analyses by defense policy organizations such as the Defense Budget Project and the Center for

Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have highlighted the multidimensional nature of the looming "train wreck" that will occur by the turn of the century.¹ Their critiques have focused on all aspects of the BUR-strategic policy, forces, and budgets. Indeed, even inside the Administration some have suggested a new BUR in 1997. Overall, these critical analyses have highlighted several major problems:

- Doubts have been raised as to whether the BUR force posture, even if new money is spent on modernization, is viable to deal with the plausible threats we are likely to face in the early 21st century. The BUR is designed to fight a Gulf War and a Korean War nearly simultaneously. Yet it assumes U.S. military technological, doctrinal, and operational superiority over future regional opponents can be achieved at modest investment costs.
- The conscious decision to take a "modernization holiday," sacrificing procurement of most next-generation weapons platforms in favor of maintaining the force structure and readiness of the BUR.

The decision to downsize the four services more or less symmetrically, (although with the largest number of personnel, the U.S. Army would suffer the heaviest blow) rather than restructure on the basis of post-Cold War security needs.

The BUR, as it is currently constituted, is underfunded during out years of the five year defense planning cycle, as Republican critics have charged.

It is fair to say that the BUR was a useful initial device for trimming the Cold War force structure in a planned and consensual manner. In many ways, the BUR can be seen as a guide to the initial downsizing of the industrial base to keep some essential capabilities (tank, submarine, and nuclear carrier industrial base) until and unless a careful look at the future deems them unnecessary. The BUR can also help provide the framework for defense industry downsizing and some consolidation will maintain key areas of competition (two warm tactical aircraft lines at Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas and consolidat-

ing major missile producers in Hughes, Loral, Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin, etc.).

The danger in clinging to the BUR as the template for the defense budget is embodied in the question: ready for what? The risk is that in planning to fight the last war, the United States will be ill prepared for the new threats and security challenges in the new millennium. Current defense budgets and planning reflect a strategy with an anti-evolutionary bias that presumes the future global security environment will be quite similar to that of the recent past. This could lead to the rapid obsolescence of a still too large active military establishment which would provide a future administration with a flawed military instrumentality that is either unusable or fraught with the risk of catastrophic failure.

The Two Regional War Scenario—False Assumptions

The BUR assumes that we will have 14 days warning during which we could act. An analysis of all previous post war crises—the Korean invasion, the 1967 Middle East War, the Tet Offensive, the invasion of Kuwait, etc.—indicates that such a 14-day warning period during which required action could be taken would be a unique event. Such a warning simply cannot be assumed. Indeed, a prudent planning assumption would be a cold start conflict.

Further, with the warning period, the BUR assumes unrestricted access to the region of conflict and unchallenged entry. Again, this assumption is contradicted by history: Difficulties with en route airlift bases to resupply Israel in 1967 and 1973, and the recent obstacles to conducting F-117A operations out of Italy for the Bosnia mission clearly call these assumptions into question. Even the difficulty in getting Saudi permission for the initial Desert Shield deployments should caution against assuming early and unencumbered access to the region prior to hostilities.

This problem of forward bases and/or reliable access arrangements to foreign facilities cannot be understated and should be a high priority policy issue. Yet the BUR scenarios require and merely assume an extensive overseas basing struc-

ture. In addition to their political implications, this poses several practical problems: crises may occur in nations without the sophisticated ports, airfields, and other logistic support facilities that we need; bases are targets, particularly when many regional adversaries are likely to have at least short-range ballistic missiles. A more realistic balancing of overseas basing and force projection capabilities needs to be undertaken. Do we need 100,000 forward-deployed troops in Europe? Can adjustments be made in the U.S. military presence in Japan to focus on post-Cold War threats and to minimize the political impact in Japan? How many U.S. forces should be forward-deployed in Asia after Korea is reunified and for what purpose? The BUR does not address these key questions.

Finally, no future enemy is likely to allow an unchallenged buildup such as Desert Shield. It would be difficult to find a worse model for incompetence than that of Saddam Hussein during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. It is highly unrealistic to use the Gulf conflict as a planning model for future major regional adversaries.

The Edge of Chaos

No one can predict what the world will look like a generation from now, and betting on specific predictions as the BUR does, is dangerous. Rather, we should bet on likely circumstances (e.g., will U.S. forces be forward-deployed, what length of warning time will we receive, what will the need for flexibility and adaption be, will there be ethnic conflicts and regional aggressors, etc.). In doing so, we will highlight our differences from the current approaches.

Regardless of how the fates of Russia and China unfold, the more proximate challenge of the strategic landscape over the coming two decades is the threat to stability from failed or disintegrating states due to religious, ethnic, and tribal conflicts rather than from the consolidation of power by a regional rogue posing a direct military threat to the security of its neighbors. The model for the possible circumstances where the United States would be called upon to use its military capabilities in the next century is unlikely to be a Desert Storm-like two major regional conflict

Defense in the Information Age: A New Blueprint

(MRC) scenario. As mentioned above, the unique features of Desert Shield—a passive enemy and unlimited access to an over-built infrastructure with virtually unlimited fuel—cannot be assumed in a future conflict. While a major regional crisis—from Iran or Iraqi, aggression to implosion, or explosion on the Korean Peninsula—is conceivable, it is virtually certain that more situations such as Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda will occur. A primary mission of the United States and its allies will be to prevent such situations from creating regional instability or national chaos. The location could be central Africa or central Asia. The size could be small or large, but they will occur.

At least one lesson is clear from the sad plight of the former Yugoslavia. Early intervention may be able to preclude the necessity for large-scale intervention later—not to mention untold suffering and destruction. The United States, its allies, and where appropriate, the United Nations will be faced with these situations and must be prepared to act quickly to preclude local chaos from spreading to a larger area and escalating to higher levels of violence.

This does not mean that the United States should not have the capability to deal with at least one major regional conflict, simply that these lower intensity scenarios should not be treated as simply lesser included cases of the major regional conflict and that the major regional conflict should not be assumed to look like those of the recent past.

The Two MRC Scenario—Lesser Included Cases

Another fundamental flaw in the BUR is its assumption that the capabilities required to respond to these lesser cases are inherent in its two “near simultaneous” regional conflict planning. Apart from the unacknowledged variety of major contingencies that could unfold, during the past five years it has become increasingly apparent that the current security environment is far more likely to be characterized by very different challenges: missions of lower intensity on the spectrum of conflict, peacekeeping operations, and operations

other than war. The BUR seems to assume that these conflicts can be dealt with as lesser included cases under the major regional conflict rubric. Both history and recent experience disprove this assumption.

During the Cold War, the United States built a military designed to meet the challenges of defending Europe against a massive Soviet invasion and defending Korea against a similar repeat of the 1950 invasion. The emphasis was on early warning, heavy equipment, and quality over quantity reflecting geographical realities. The quality substitute during the early Eisenhower Administration included a reliance on nuclear weapons, including tactical and battlefield weapons, rather than ground troops. This shift was also urged by some so as not to have the capability to fight another ground war on the Asian mainland. Even when ground forces were beefed up in the Kennedy Administration, the military emphasis was on designing forces for a NATO scenario notwithstanding the new President’s fascination with Special Forces.

While early U.S. entry into Vietnam was based on the use of Special Forces (Green Berets, Air Commandos, SEALs), after the Marines staged an amphibious landing at Da Nang in 1965, the regular military took over. The doctrine, equipment, and tactics—technology and firepower—soon came to dominate the war. While new tactics and equipment were improvised during the conflict (Airmobile Division, smart weapons), it was not until the political situation in the United States forced the Vietnamization of the war that the main thrust of the U.S. effort returned to a counterinsurgency effort. And as soon as possible after U.S. withdrawal, the military proceeded to abolish the counterinsurgency capabilities and return to the mainstream of conventional war capabilities oriented toward Europe—capabilities that proved inadequate to the demands of the lesser included case of Vietnam.

The U.S. experience since the BUR confirms this lesson: forces must be tailored to the mission. The requirements of Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti demonstrate that the force structure needed to handle such operations is not the same as a major regional conflict. The operational tempo in these lesser conflicts and peace-

keeping scenarios has stressed selective capabilities such as engineers, military police, command and control assets (ground and air), airlift, and other specialized segments of the force. If, as we believe, these are the more likely forms of U.S. involvement, the force has to be specifically structured for these capabilities. No less important, as many of the challenges such as Rwanda, threaten not vital security interests, but moral and humanitarian interests of the international community, we must decide how to utilize American assets in conjunction with other actors as a matter of collective responsibility. This will be a key issue in obtaining political consensus for the use of U.S. military force in situations where U.S. vital interests are not directly at risk.

One consideration is delicate: It is clear that the military establishment is less than eager to get involved in operations other than war. The JCS and the Services prefer more conventional and clear-cut cases such as Desert Storm. The development of these nontraditional capabilities requires a political decision by the President and Congress, taking full account of the position of the JCS. If the political decision is that these are necessary capabilities, however, the military should be tasked and funded to develop them. Whether or not they are used should also be a political decision with full advice from the JCS and regional commands. The U.S. should not be in a position where it must face the choice of deploying an unsuitable force or no force at all. The country shouldn't be in a position where we cannot exercise military force to protect vital or important interests because we do not have the needed capability; but neither should the military be asked to use that capability simply because it exists.

A Modernization Holiday

Another faulty assumption of the BUR is that the U.S. can afford to live off the capital investments of the Reagan buildup and therefore make major cuts in the procurement accounts. This assumption has major problems. It mirrors what was attempted unsuccessfully in the aftermath of Vietnam. That exercise led to the “hollow mili-

tary” of the late 1970's. Moreover, despite repeated promises, modern weapons are more expensive than those they replace and the promised lower costs are illusory as shown in *Anatomy of Decline*, a presentation by Franklin C. Spinney, an in-house analyst and gadfly to defense policymakers.²

The modernization holiday assumption did not solve the defense budget problem, it merely postponed it, trading off the future for the present in deference to the “here and now” preferences of the commanders-in-chief (CINC). This historic transition period, in which the United States has technological superiority and no peer competitors, should be viewed as a window of opportunity to ensure our advantage in next-generation weapons systems. The central political fact is that barring a major change in the security landscape, the defense budget will not grow and if anything, it will almost certainly feel increasing pressure to shrink. At the same time, even with manpower cutbacks, daily operating costs continue to consume an increasing percentage of the budget. The demands of minicrises (e.g., Bosnia, Somalia) have added to the burden and make it still more difficult to compensate for this under-investment in the future.

Spinney's analysis also shows that Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs are currently underestimated. In addition to larger than expected O&M costs for new systems (e.g., Aegis ships) and increasing O&M costs for aging systems (e.g., B-52), the technicalities of budgeting and spending dictate that unplanned operations such as Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia can only be funded from the O&M accounts or from other agencies. The raiding of the O&M budget triggered the “readiness” debate of 1994-95 and led to a mostly unfounded Republican charge of a return to a hollow military (readiness spending is 10 percent higher than during the Reagan buildup). The fact is that O&M accounts are better funded today than during the Reagan years (see Exhibit 3). However, this plus the two major regional conflict force structure, has crowded out funding for future modernization, thus creating a bow wave of increased procurement needs for the late 1990's. This procurement deficit is much larger than the Administration is willing to admit and

willing to fund in the planned turn up in procurement accounts at the end of the current five year planning period.

A further consequence of the planned procurement holiday is the adverse impact on the defense industrial base. While the BUR did spur the needed consolidation of the defense industry, the modernization holiday may destroy some of those positive results. The restructuring of prime contractors appears to be nearly complete, although two or three major moves probably remain. But there has been a major erosion of smaller contractors and subcontractors which could threaten capability and increase costs when and if the procurement accounts are restored. Further, without an apparent plan for future production, Congress has added procurement dollars largely on a political basis with no overall military rationale. Without DOD leadership guiding procurement, the military will be forced to go to war with whatever Congress issues them.

Worldwide Capability?

The BUR appears to be restricted to regional contingencies convenient not only to a friendly nation or allied territory but also to sea power. While a Korean or Persian Gulf scenario may be the most probable, these are not the only possibilities. Desert Storm showed the limitations on range of the current generation naval aviation. The new

improvements in capability will not be available in large numbers for many years. Even so, carrier-based air will be in limited range until a Joint Air Strike Technology replacement for the A-6, the workhorse of carrier-based attack aircraft, is available after 2010. In the meantime, an Iranian or central Asia scenario would severely strain air capabilities. Yet this was not given serious consideration in the BUR.

The BUR never scrutinized the capabilities of the forces it advocated in scenarios other than the Gulf-Korea models in order to see if the U.S. could deal with seeming fringe cases. Instead, it merely asserted that lesser contingencies could be handled. However, this glosses over two large and related questions for the next century. First, while the former Soviet republics and Russia will hopefully evolve into market-oriented democracies, the central heartland of Eurasia will remain a volatile region for some years to come. Second, despite this instability and the presence of powerful military forces, the United States has insufficient conventional military capabilities to support foreign policy in this region, which includes the second largest oil and gas deposits in the world. Scenarios such as a Turkey-Iran conflict are not far-fetched.

Nowhere is this deficiency more evident than in the BUR treatment of bomber forces. Making a convenient assumption of 14 days warning time, the BUR calls for a 1999 force structure of 184 heavy bombers. Yet the BUR is silent on how to get the 184 bombers it requires. The current bomber force is well below 184, and the BUR fails to address a host of problems such as bomber attrition and additional B-2 production beyond the 20 now contemplated. Nor does the BUR examine longer-term possibilities such as developing long-range unmanned air strike systems, or converting new or existing aircraft or ships to carry large numbers of missile systems (the so-called B-3 "truck" or arsenal ship). This is one of many examples of how the BUR has become dogma and no deviation, however justified, can be allowed for fear of call-

**Exhibit 3. 10-Year Budget Forecast
(In billions of dollars)**

	1995	2005	% change
Mil personnel	72.1	56.0	(22%)
O&M	94.9	74.7	(21%)
Procurement	45.9	48.6	6%
RDT&E	36.3	25.7	(29%)
Other	10.4	8.9	(14%)
Total	259.6	213.9	(18%)

ing the entire set of conclusions into account. The more important point however, is that the BUR did not examine the most troublesome major regional conflict scenario. It is time to move beyond it and examine the security needs of the nation with a fresh eye.

The Security Environment in the 21st Century

It is far easier to criticize the rigidity that the BUR has imposed on the Administration's defense policies and the Republican approach to the issues than to offer a positive alternative. The prerequisite to developing such an alternative is to sketch the national security challenges facing the United States and its allies in the 21st century. Only when the threats, the dangers, and the challenges are examined can a set of defense spending and force structure priorities be set.

The starting point is to define the scope of American interests. Our assumption is a national strategy defining a post-Cold War deterrence built on the enduring strategic assumption that stability of the Eurasian landmass (Europe, Mideast/Persian Gulf, and East Asia) and prevention of its domination by any hegemon or hegemonic coalition, is a vital national interest. U.S. leadership, military strength, and a system of collective security, global open trade, and rule of law building outward from the community of democracies are the necessary elements of such a strategy. As a continental power, air and naval force projection, a network of alliances, and base access agreements in Europe and Asia remain key fundamentals of U.S. strategy.

Central to this strategy is curbing the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This requires that the United States be prepared to risk blood and treasure to provide those major industrial powers which have given up the nuclear weapon option with a credible bilateral and collective security guarantee against future regional predators.

Many political commentators on the left and right now oppose these central strategic assumptions, preferring to shed the burdens of global

leadership and concentrate resources on domestic problems. A return to political-military isolationism during the formative years of the 21st century will likely set the stage for tragedy reminiscent of those preceding the two great global wars of the 20th century. The idea that the United States could remain aloof from the consequences of the new "high technology dark age" of international anarchy is the height of hubris. Our laudable and heretofore remarkably successful attempt at containing the diffusion of nuclear weapon arsenals would surely collapse. The United States could not avoid being placed at risk by future state and nonstate predators armed with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

There is the fact that relative insulation provided by the geography of being surrounded by two oceans has been rendered irrelevant by the realities of the Information Age. All physical boundaries are collapsed with the construction of a global "cyberspace" or global information network—the product of an information technology revolution affecting all aspects of production, commerce, trade, entertainment, and culture. Already, global financial markets have outstripped the ability of the United States and the major industrial powers to control the fate of their currencies.

These new and old global realities point to the continued need for the United States to act as "sheriff" to help organize and sustain a planetary security environment that fosters open international trade, the flourishing of democratic societies, and international norms of behavior. International systems are not self-sustaining mechanisms; they do not work like a legal system—file a complaint, accept binding arbitration. Rather, they are a blend of power and principle requiring credible military capabilities to underpin diplomacy and political leadership on the part of major powers.

The two largest factors shaping the security environment of the next century are the fate of Russia's democratic transformation and the emergence of China as a major regional and global economic and military power. It will probably not be possible to determine whether either or both become adversaries of a regional or global nature before the second decade of the next century. In

any event, neither are likely to become global ideological rivals like the Soviet Union was. But as major powers, there may be issues and areas where their respective interests and those of the U.S. are in conflict, and, in the interim, which capabilities they develop and how they define their respective interests may offer signposts of their future direction that affect U.S. defense investment decisions.

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

An important factor behind the idea of a New Model for defense planning is the fact of an unfolding RMA. Simply put, it is the notion that the information revolution, which has transformed civilian life and work, is beginning to have a similar impact on the future conduct of warfare. This military-technical revolution is not just about technology any more than the Blitzkrieg was about Stukas and Panzers. The RMA describes how new technologies, equipment, and operational concepts (doctrine and organization) fundamentally change the conduct of major wars. The B-2 by itself is only an element of this transformation of warfare. The B-2, equipped with precision weapons and connected to satellite or other real-time sensors placed into a reconnaissance-strike (air power married to advanced command, control, and communications) complex, would dramatically alter future battlefields. When combined with new doctrine and organizational structures such as constellation of force and technology offers a glimpse at how the nature of war might be changed. For example:

Stealth and Precision

The technologies that could lay the basis for a true military revolution are stealth, precision and surveillance, command, control, and intelligence systems. Stealth and precision have finally fulfilled the promise of an earlier era of air heroics, providing a bomber that will always get through and weapons that can be delivered with precision to key military targets. Future stand-off stealth weapons will provide similar capability,

albeit with more limited coverage, to nonstealth platforms. Targets that required several thousand bombs in WWII, hundreds in Korea, and dozens in Vietnam—all in clear weather—will be able to be destroyed with a single bomb in any weather in the very near future.

Lifting the Fog of War

In addition to the capability to strike targets with precision in any weather, new technologies of surveillance will allow targets to be seen from air- and space-based sensors and their location transmitted in real-time directly to the strike forces. This capability will first be available for fixed targets, with the promise of future capability in also detecting moving and even buried targets. The experience of the Gulf War should give a pause to those who promise to completely lift the fog of war since much of that fog is on the friendly side of the lines where misunderstandings and mistakes under the pressure of combat are unlikely to ever be eliminated. But the new sensor and communications systems do promise a vast expansion in the ability to find, fix, and kill targets with great speed and efficiency.

Concept of Operations

In order to turn these technologies and the new equipment they spawn into a full-fledged military revolution, new concepts of operations must be implemented. These include a close integration of all involved offensive and defensive systems (perhaps even beyond jointness), including space-based systems and unmanned air vehicles (UAV).

The precise concept of operations to achieve the promise of a silicon-based battlefield will take perhaps a decade or more to develop as new technologies come on line and their capabilities are exploited. Fortunately, no peer competitor is likely to emerge in that time period although niche competitors—local aggressors in regional scenarios—could arise. Such niche competitors are unlikely to challenge the U.S. in a classic military battle as Saddam did. Rather they are likely to take actions to disperse or hide fixed targets, establish redundant command and control and

logistic systems, and try to inflict maximum casualties on U.S. forces or civilians in order to achieve their objectives by raising the political cost to unacceptable levels.

Proliferation

The 21st century will almost certainly see the spread of weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, and nuclear—and the means to deliver them to regional neighbors. In addition to all supply-side diplomatic efforts to slow the sale of technologies allowing this spread and demand-side efforts to persuade nations to forego such capability, militarily effective systems must be developed to find, fix, and destroy such weapons and the development and production sites which support this capability.

The Gulf War demonstrated how exceedingly difficult it is to locate mobile missile launchers even when there is absolute air superiority. The availability of short-range ballistic missiles and cruise-missiles is increasingly a political-military reality. Since the end of the war we have learned how little we knew about the location and size of the Iraqi industrial complex supporting developments of these capabilities. Fortunately, we also learned that the threat of nuclear retaliation for the use of chemical or biological weapons was effective even against a type of adversary some have dubbed “undeterrable.”

We now have the ability if not the imperative to achieve our deterrence and defense tasks largely by non-nuclear means. Sustaining a clear technological edge with weapons based upon silicon while continuing to delegitimize nuclear weapons as a flagship event of national security is an integral part of our long-term strategy. This means moving toward further radical reductions of the active arsenals of the five declared nuclear weapon states, strengthening non-nuclear norms, and high-priority “demand side” initiatives to address the sources motivating potential proliferators.

Counter-Proliferation

Yet we must prepare to address cases of proliferation. We cannot rely on the nuclear threat to be

available or effective in every situation. In addition to improving our ability to detect and monitor proliferation of such weapons, we need to have the capability to attack the development and production capabilities—including on a preemptive and deniable basis.

Several years of the RAND Corporation “Day After” policy exercises strongly suggest that nuclear weapons provide opponents of the United States with a powerful equalizer to our superiority in non-nuclear combat forces. It is useful to recall that when asked what the lesson of the Gulf War was, India’s former Chief of Staff reportedly remarked, “Never fight the United States without nuclear weapons.”

The extensive U.S. exploitation of technologies associated with the RMA concept, most notably advanced command, control, communications, and intelligence, provides regional-strategic opponents with a new strategic and military operational rationale for acquiring a small but hard-to-kill nuclear arsenal. Specifically, the limited use of nuclear weapons on a future battlefield, especially employed as an information warfare weapon, (i.e., High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse shots to cripple our information systems), presents the U.S. military with a number of planning dilemmas. Thus, the same information revolution that opens new possibilities for transforming the nature of warfare also opens up new vulnerabilities.

First, there is the risk that reliance on advanced command, control, communications, and intelligence systems—especially those acquired by more “efficient” commercial off-the-shelf procurement procedures—will set the stage for a catastrophic failure on a future battlefield. Second, there is the problem of the “American way of war,” which relies on the deployment of massive quantities of logistics support to sustain future interventions in major regional conflicts. Finally, there is the prospect that a small nuclear or larger biochemical weapons arsenal can be exploited by a regional predator to prevent a U.S.- sponsored regional coalition.

At present, senior U.S. military officials prefer not to stare into this pit. It is an article of faith among many American military and civilian planners that a nuclear armed predator would not dare use its small nuclear arsenal fearing U.S. nuclear

retaliation. Further, there is renewed hope that with the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other measures strengthening the nonproliferation norms, that the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation can be contained by diplomatic and economic means. Examples of this laudable strategy are our full court press to deny Iran access to civilian nuclear power technology from Russia and China (sanctioned under Article IV of the NPT), the recently negotiated Agreed Framework designed to “buy out” the North Korean nuclear weapons program, new impetus to complete a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and a move towards a cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Prudent defense planning must assume that these efforts at non-proliferation will not be totally successful.

Fortunately, an investment in countermeasures to future long-range missile and weapons of mass destruction threats is not an either/or proposition. There is the opportunity to rationalize many plausible counterproliferation initiatives, (e.g., advanced sensors, new counterforce ordnance, hardening design requirements against nuclear weapons effects discussed above, and antimissile defenses as part of a larger strategy to more fully exploit the concepts of the RMA. This is part and parcel of the New Model.

Information Warfare

At the heart of information warfare is the recognition that the acquisition and use of information are central to any combat activity; those who control information can control the battle, and that nonmilitary communication technology has proliferated to the point where it equals, and in many cases surpasses, military technology.

Information warfare can span a spectrum from a Tomahawk missile taking out the Baghdad Radio Tower, to clandestine radio transmissions inside enemy territory, and feeding false information into an enemy command and control system, to setting off a high-altitude nuclear blast which blacks out a major portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, thus crippling a communications network.

The implications of the information revolution for war fighting are sweeping. As we move to a Global Positioning System (GPS)-based air traffic control and maritime navigation system, how can we also use GPS for military purposes without having potential enemies also using the system for their purposes? Anyone can go into their local Radio Shack and buy a GPS receiver for about \$200. What happens if a potential enemy gains the capability to disrupt or destroy a significant portion of the GPS satellite constellation? How can we destroy the command and control system of a potential enemy if he has access to the new mobile satellite communications systems such as Iridium and Globalstar?

Our technical dominance in information systems and increased use of the capabilities they provide is a two-edge sword. On the one hand, they permit our advantages in reconnaissance and strike but they also make us more vulnerable to enemy counter action. This requires redundant systems, multiple backups and, most of all, protection of the space-based assets which are central to the bulk of the capabilities. The BUR doesn't fully take into account such factors.

Coalition Wars

There is remarkably little in the BUR about possible allied contributions to the major regional conflict efforts other than the indigenous forces (the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Middle East, and the Korean in East Asia). Yet both the Gulf War and Bosnia show the important contributions made by others. While the United States must retain the capability for unilateral action, it should also consider the contributions of NATO and other allies as well as ad hoc partners in chaos prevention and military operations.

The Administration's Coalition Force Enhancement (CFE) initiative, which provides U.S. equipment such as used USAF F-16s and USN F/A-18s to allies who cannot afford new equipment is a useful concept but the terms are so unattractive as to blunt its value. Just as excess U.S. equipment was provided to Europe after WWII under the Military Assistance Program, a more generous program than CFE should be structured for Central Europe (i.e., Hungary and Poland) and

selected other countries such as the Philippines. This equipment can allow closer military-to-military training and operational relationships, and allow the recipients to contribute during future contingencies.

Interoperability—compatible weapons systems, command, control, and intelligence systems—with NATO allies has, as a U.S. policy objective, shrunk to mere lip service. The Administration’s commitment to a renaissance in armaments cooperation has almost totally failed at the implementation level. European industry (under the same budget pressures as U.S. industry but less able to adjust), views U.S. policy as trying to put them out of business. It is unrealistic to expect NATO and Japan (or Russia) to be able to sustain significant military forces that could assist in future operations without vital defense industries. Just as the United States should consider allied forces when structuring future force levels, so also should consideration be given to allied industrial and technological capabilities. In short, if the United States does not want to take on the role as the world’s policeman, it must work with its future coalition partners to ensure their continued capability and desire to bear their share of the responsibility.

Coalitions in the future will likely be less broad and unified than in the Gulf War, and perhaps more like the current Bosnia situation. Yet while they may be ad hoc, their foundations will be laid during the years preceding and the United States must operate now to lay a solid base for the future. In the interim, this reality underscores the importance of firming up key alliances in Europe and Asia and moving our partners along the road to the New Model.

Jointness

The domestic equivalent to coalition war is jointness—coordination of doctrine, training, operation concepts, logistics, and weapons systems among the four services. The emphasis on jointness in the United States applies to both hardware programs (Joint Primary Training System, Joint Stand Off Weapon, Joint Direct Attack Munition, Joint Advanced Strike Technology, and Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-Off Missile) as well as

training and operations. Jointness has become both a political necessity (Congress is more likely to fund programs beginning with “J”) and a fiscal necessity (scarcity of development funds, promises of logistic savings). The recent Commission on Roles and Missions recommended modest but useful moves in this direction. But resistance in the military services to more far-reaching efforts that get closer to the heart of service missions and capabilities remains.

Jointness will remain both an opportunity and a danger to future U.S. military operations. There are serious opportunities for savings in removing some redundancy by specialization (e.g., letting the Marine Corps manage Army and Marine pre-positioning afloat while the Army manages ashore assets and the planned joint Air Force and Navy primary pilot training). In structuring forces for the future, however, it would be a mistake to eliminate all redundancy rather than strive to optimize the savings of joint programs and the synergy of complementary capabilities.

There are also dangers if jointness is reduced to assuring that each service gets a piece of the action. A case can be made that the Marines Corps’ diversion threatening an amphibious invasion of occupied Kuwait was an important contribution to the effort. One can also make a case that the failed 1980 Iranian Rescue operation was delayed, and perhaps did not use the most appropriate assets, in order to allow all services to get a piece of the action.

Bureaucratically, there may be another set of problems in forgetting the statutory responsibilities of the service chiefs to organize, train, and equip their forces while relying on the JCS to sway procurement priorities. There are a number of dangers here. First, the Commanders’ perspective emphasizes ready combat capability, not future capability, while the service chiefs must take into account a longer-term perspective. Second, the shift in emphasis to asking what the Commanders think has begun to take on a manipulative quality as congressional members are writing directly to them to ask their views (as in the recent case of MEADS, the cooperative development of missile defenses with NATO allies) along with the Pentagon asking for their endorsement of specific

Defense in the Information Age: A New Blueprint

courses of action. Our view is that the CINC's views should be internal, not public, on key issues and must not be the dominant factor. That the jointness issue will dominate U.S. military investments and operations in the future is certain. The question is whether the dangers can be minimized as the opportunities are exploited.

A New Model, a New BUR

Already there have been rumblings from Pentagon planners about rethinking the assumptions of the BUR. The current force structure, based on the two major regional conflict scenarios can and should be revised in the near-term to pay for much needed modernization. The New Model strategy would entail: fighting one major regional conflict with little strategic warning; and, that we (collectively with allies and the wider international community) have the capacity to respond to several smaller, lower-intensity operations (e.g., peacekeeping, or higher on the spectrum of conflict, Bosnia-type military action) at the same time as one major contingency.

The emphasis in our response to likely capabilities of future adversaries should be on the design and implementation of a high-performance power-projection force designed to fully exploit the technological and doctrinal attributes of the revolution in military affairs. Further, this power-projection capability would be designed so as to be very robust against plausible future opponents armed with long-range missiles, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and a capacity to conduct radio-electronic combat at the regional and global levels. Inherent in this smaller but higher technology force would be enhanced capabilities to support high performance special operations against lesser-state and nonstate threats. Enhanced continental defense capabilities would be given greater emphasis. Finally, this smaller but modernizing military establishment would be in better shape to respond to the appearance of a serious rival or "peer competitor" that might arrive on the Eurasian scene by 2010-15.

The advanced technologies of 21st century warfare—communications, advanced computer software-hardware, sensors, advanced conventional munitions, unmanned vehicles, en-

hanced soldier systems, and high performance fighting vehicles—do not come cheaply. To afford them, difficult choices will need to be made in such areas as the size of the active force, the degree of reliance on reserves, the number of older technology platforms to be bought, and the kinds of consolidation and restructuring needed in defense O&M to provide resources of the New Model strategy. A rough, notional sketch of the recommended differences is outlined in Exhibit 4.

While the number of Army divisions would be reduced, the ratio of heavy to light would be 50/50 with the balance allowing active heavy forces to be available for one major regional conflict and active light forces being ready for a lesser contingency, and with increased combat support for enhanced readiness for a major regional conflict scenario. In addition, four Trident ballistic missile submarines would be converted to cruise missile carriers, a precursor to a new Arsenal Ship, which, if and when deployed, could also reduce the requirement for carrier task forces.

Towards a New Model

Basing a force structure on the two conflict model, even if a non-Desert Storm scenario were used, is inadequate to the times. Instead, the focus should be on the capabilities needed for the next decade. We would propose the following principles for moving the U.S. force structure and investment priorities towards a New Model:

- The objective of U.S. forces should be to project power and presence worldwide and quickly. For combat operations this should be done to inflict enough damage on the enemy to achieve political objectives with minimal U.S. casualties. For military presence and peacekeeping operations, it should be done as inexpensively as possible. These conditions appear necessary to gain and maintain public acceptance.
- We should look at the unique capabilities possessed by the United States and acknowledged by our adversaries and not unnecessarily erode them unless and until we are sure their utility has passed. These include strategic bombing, air superiority, strategic airlift, heavy armor

combat, amphibious assault, carrier aviation, surveillance, and command and control. In particular, we should capitalize on our precision and stealth technologies. There is a troubling 10- to 15-year lag in stealth strike aircraft production between the now planned end of the B-2 production and the first Joint Advanced Strike Technology aircraft entering service.

- While maintaining these capabilities, we should not hesitate to sacrifice some force structure now to attain new capabilities, this means making asymmetrical cuts at the expense of ground forces. As a continental power, air and naval forces have historically been important. Nor should we keep the same means to achieve these capabilities. New concepts such as arsenal ships, commercial aircraft-based airlift, non-nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines, UAV-based surveillance and lethal systems, and airborne lasers should be actively explored. Further, the capabilities presented by new technology, such as precision weapons, may well justify reduced platforms.
- Special emphasis should be placed on systems for smaller regional conflicts, peacekeeping, and operations other than war. This includes a high performance power projection capability to get combat forces to an area sooner. While “firstest with the mostest” may be ideal, “firstest with enough” is adequate when third class opponents are the target. This may require procurement of more mundane items such as trucks, logistics vehicles, radios, and other communications equipment as well as stockpiling basic equipment for peacekeeping forces from the former Soviet Union and third world countries. Coalition warfare may require our equipping our ad hoc coalition partners.

For a major regional scenario, but also for lesser conflicts, we must be able to ensure early entry even if opposed. This requires the ability to react to a cold start scenario to blunt an initial attack and protect the early entry forces, most likely the United States Marine Corps in a littoral case and light Army forces in a Eurasian interior contingency. This requires strategic strike and lift forces as well as refueling capability for tactical air forces. The tragic human and environmental damage in Kuwait underscore the consequence of not being able to stop an aggressor before he takes territory. An inability to protect an endangered ally or friend is likely to make them more willing to accede to the demands of an adversary.

Exhibit 4. Recommended Changes in Defense Systems

	BUR	New Model
Ground Combat Forces		
Army Divisions		
Active	10	6-8*
Reserve	14	8
Marine Divisions		
	3	2*
	1	1
Naval Combat Forces		
Carriers Active	11	9*
Carrier Air Wings	12	10
Major Surface Warships	100	100
SSNs	50	50
SSBNs	14	18
Amphib Ships	36	50
Air Combat Forces		
Marine Air Wings		
Active	3	3
Reserve	1	1
USAF TFW		
Active	13	10
Reserve	7	8
Strategic Bombers	100	150*
Air and Sea Lift		
Airlift Wings		
Active	8	10
Reserve	10	8
Sealift		
RRF Ships	150	150
MPF Ships	13	16

*denotes possible alteration depending on technological development of alternative new weapons systems.

Defense in the Information Age: A New Blueprint

Priority should be given to flexible systems because the future may prove as unpredictable as the past and the specific challenges may not be one dimensional. For this reason we would give precedence to multi-role tactical aircraft, dual purpose air-missile defense systems, and multiple load lift capability. We would also prefer prepositioning at sea over land prepositioning except in key strategic areas. Capabilities to operate without the necessity of overseas bases should have priority.

Continued emphasis needs to be placed on antiproliferation. This includes priority deployment of advanced theater missile defense systems for both littoral and landmass deployments and major new investments in protection, both active and passive, against chemical and biological weapons. Stocks of antidotes and protective clothing must be kept current at sufficient levels for our forces and our coalition partners. Chemical and biological attacks are still the most appealing way for potential adversaries to level the playing field.

Finally, while we must leverage our advantage in space-based surveillance and communications assets, we must not pursue information warfare at the expense of doing war the old-fashioned way. Our advantage still lies in our current superiority and we should not instigate others to pursue strategies where we may not have such a large comparative advantage.

The above considerations, as to the capabilities needed and the objectives to be reached, take precedence over the specifics of the force structure noted above. The objective is to reduce structure while maintaining or increasing readiness and using the freed-up resources to begin force modernization sooner than currently planned. In addition, we would fund some gaps that currently exist in such items as trucks, communications, and chemical-biological defense equipment, and certain personnel categories such as military police, airlift crews, and communicators.

Resources Revisited

A revolution in the management of national defense is needed as much as a revolution in the

conduct of warfare. To its credit, the Administration has addressed a major aspect of this problem—acquisition reform. Another positive development is that both parties have attempted to connect government labs and the private sector.

The revolution in management that has unfolded over the past several decades in industry worldwide faces the DOD with a real dilemma. Government is in fact different than the private sector and rightfully needs to focus on issues important to long-term national security, the taxpayer, and the social fabric of the nation. However, like the DOD in its adherence to old Cold War scenarios of the BUR, the government has to dispense with decades-old modes of operation. Taxpayers cannot benefit if their dollars are being inefficiently applied because competition is being set aside at every turn to benefit narrow special interests. National security is not strengthened if inefficient facilities are allowed to drain funding from sustaining today's, and developing tomorrow's, forces. The social fabric does not benefit by shielding large numbers of people from learning to compete in an increasingly global economy.

The investment strategy suggested here should be accommodated within the parameters of currently planned expenditures—a range of about 3 percent to 3.5 percent of GNP. We do believe that we should start with needed capabilities and then see the budget impact. We would certainly be willing to advocate a modest budget increase if that were needed to achieve critical capabilities. And we would not hesitate to apply savings to deficit reduction if that was the result of restructuring.

We do believe, however, that certain resource issues should be examined.

Base Realignment and Closure Commission

It is a measure of the forces of bureaucratic inertia and local politics that we are politically unable to make decisions clearly in the national interest. Domestic benefits of military spending can not be the imperative driving the defense budget issue. This must be addressed as a national

security issue not as a jobs issue. We must renew the impetus of the base closing commission to bring the downsizing of infrastructure more into line with the restructuring of forces.

It may well be that the current process and procedure has caused so much turmoil and pain that another round cannot be endured. Yet it seems likely that the promised savings, savings earmarked for modernization, are not going to be realized. It also seems clear that the base infrastructure is still too large and costly for the BUR forces, let alone the ones advocated here. The 1995 list of base closings submitted by the Pentagon—which was supposed to be the largest—was smaller than that in 1993. After a pause, perhaps in 1998, another round of closures and consolidation will be justified and needed. Our preference would be for allowing the Services to take the closure realignment actions that they deem most supportive of their mission on a one-time basis without congressional review.

Commercial Practices

In some ways the recent base closing problems and the resultant efforts to privatize the work of the San Antonio and McClellan Air Logistic Centers may have been a blessing in disguise. It broke, at least partially, congressional obstacles to privatizing major portions of the services depot networks. Recent studies have indicated that billions of dollars could be saved by doing such work in private industry. This would have the added value of strengthening the defense industrial base.

Similar privatization and commercialization could be used to save funds on other programs. While the Navy has accepted commercial standards (Coast Guard, American Bureau of Shipping, etc.) for noncombat ship specifications, it still continues to insist on standard Navy procedures in managing their procurement, thus wasting valuable funds. A major overhaul of the Services' acquisition systems is needed to take advantage of the move to commercial standards and practices and reflect the reduction in procurement activity. While procurement funding is down 30 percent since 1989, personnel involved in procurement have decreased by only 4 percent.

Overhead and Oversight

The above-mentioned increase in overhead per procurement dollar has also been reflected in Congress and the Pentagon. There are too many congressional staffers and Pentagon officials involved in a vicious circle of oversight testimony and reports. At least a 30 percent reduction in congressional committee staffers and a similar elimination of layers in the Pentagon would help the slimmed-down procurement system function better.

At the same time, consideration should be given to a new top-level oversight body. The recommendations of Spinney's *Anatomy of Decline* for an independent Defense Evaluation Board may be the only way to ensure that accurate cost and budget information gets to the Secretary of Defense and Congress. But the proposal raises serious questions concerning interference with the authority of the Secretary unless carefully crafted. Given Spinney's analysis—as opposed to his rather extreme rhetoric—some mechanism seems required to provide more realistic program cost assessments.

As it is, the effectiveness of the oversight process seems to be inversely related to the number of people involved per dollar. Further, a bow wave of investment needs for optimistically projected future programs threatens to become a train wreck later in this decade.

Conclusion—Let the Real Debate Begin

The Clinton Administration has rightly demanded that the rest of the federal government go through a "reinvention" process which involves both downsizing, restructuring, and "new ways of doing business." The Republican Congress seeks to radically downsize much of the federal government, including large reductions in many of the nonmilitary resources deployed to promote American influence and interests abroad. Curiously, the DOD appears largely exempt from this process. We believe that congressional Republicans are more interested in scoring political points on the defense issue and spending funds on principle, not

Defense in the Information Age: A New Blueprint

need, to present a coherent defense strategy.

Both the Administration and Congress are mindlessly clinging to the BUR which, no matter how useful as a transition tool, no longer reflects the needs of the future.

The capabilities required to meet the real and potential threats to vital U.S. national security interests in the 2005-15 time frame will not exist unless we begin to work towards them today. Neither the Administration's BUR or the Republican version is adequate. Both look backward instead of forward and appear based on the belief that the challenges of the new millennium will be essentially the same—if on a smaller scale—than in the past. No less of an impediment to national defense planning is the political force of pork, bureaucratic inertia, partisan posturing, and a quest for absolute security that is unattainable.

To be sure, there are large uncertainties in the two decades ahead—the political direction of Russia and China chief among them. But the sources of human conflict that have produced only rare and short periods of peace over the past 2000 years have not disappeared. Indeed, it would be sheer folly to exit a century of the most savage human destruction in history—destruction increased in direct proportion to technological advances—and presume otherwise.

The absence of a new identifiable global threat offers a precious window of opportunity to invest in and perfect new technologies likely to be necessary to prevail in future conflicts. We believe that the challenges ahead will require a smaller active force structure and a capability to meet numerous smaller local challenges in the near-term. The military strategy suggested herein is based on the assumption that the U.S. will have to remain a global leader in shaping and maintaining an international order if we are to safeguard life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This requires maintaining a global power-projection capability, including the use of space and

the denial of space to our adversaries. We cannot merely focus on littoral capability and dismiss the heart of the Eurasian land mass. Finally, we believe that an investment strategy is needed now to realize the possibilities of the RMA opened up by the advent of stealth, precision strike, and information warfare.

The inadequacies of the BUR, and more recently, the short-comings of the RMC report released earlier this year, in failing to raise basic questions about force structures and the limited reception of its recommendations both suggest a more radical approach may be useful.

PPI recommends that the President order the Secretary of Defense to do an assessment of the BUR. At the same time, the Pentagon's conclusions would be measured against those of a Team B. This would be a commission on 21st century National Military Strategy appointed (in consultation with Congress) and comprised of bipartisan, experienced, and prominent defense specialists to offer an alternative approach to defense planning and budgeting.

No doubt the New Model strategy will be vigorously challenged on both its central assumptions and major courses of action. It is within the spirit of stimulating a debate about a new U.S. national security strategy that a national military strategy beyond the BUR is offered. Nor do we think that the debate should focus on the details of another carrier or fighter wing. Rather we hope to turn the debate to the nature of the security challenges that we face, the capabilities we need to meet these challenges, and then the level of resources needed to secure those capabilities.

We offer the above analysis and suggestions in the hope of moving the debate back to the capabilities the United States will need to deal with the defense challenges of the next century and the considerations that should guide our investment decisions and force structure changes.

End Notes

¹ See “The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment,” Andrew F. Krepinevich, Defense Budget Project, February 1994, and “Defense in the 1990s: Avoiding the Train Wreck,” CSIS, 1995.

² Spinney is a controversial DOD institution and in-house critic. The document cited is in the form of an audio-visual presentation on defense planning and budget choices dated September 14, 1995.

**Defense in the Information Age:
A New Blueprint**