

# Rethinking the War on Terrorism

## The Lessons of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

by **Kevin Croke**

Five years into the war on terrorism, Americans find themselves casting about for new ideas and new strategies. Republicans use the rhetoric of conventional war; some even talk in apocalyptic terms of “World War IV.”<sup>1</sup> Democrats offer an array of useful policy ideas but no competing analogy. Yet in light of America’s struggles in Iraq, a new paradigm has begun to emerge, one that could offer a rival framework for understanding the conflict: *the war on terrorism as counterinsurgency*.

An insurgency is an armed rebellion against an established government. Al-Qaeda’s tactics of mass slaughter may seem utterly nihilistic, but its main political goal—to topple Middle Eastern regimes by attacking their great power patron, the United States—is in many ways akin to that of a traditional insurgency. Al-Qaeda has transformed itself since 9/11 from a conventional, hierarchical organization to a geographically dispersed, ideological, and largely Internet-based movement. In other words, it now looks more like a kind of global insurgency than a single terrorist group. As in a traditional insurgency, there are a relatively small number of jihadists swimming in a “sea” of 1.4 billion Muslims. Just as traditional insurgents engage in guerilla warfare against stronger foes, the new jihadi insurgents use another

asymmetric tactic—terrorism—to compensate for their relative military weakness. And like national insurgents, transnational jihadists use violence to stimulate a harsh response from their enemies, in hopes of radicalizing Muslims worldwide and thereby broadening their base of support.

But there are also notable differences between insurgency and terrorism. Insurgents traditionally attack the forces of governments they seek to bring down, while jihadist terrorists deliberately target civilians to punish or influence governments’ behavior. Insurgencies take place primarily in a single country, while jihadist terrorism is almost by definition transnational. And while counterinsurgency is very difficult, counterterrorism can actually be easier, since terrorist groups typically have less popular support than insurgencies.<sup>2</sup>

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*“One person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine who have only interests.”*

—John Stuart Mill

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The global jihadist threat is something new: a hybrid of terrorism and insurgency. As the war in Iraq has brought counterinsurgency theory to the fore, leading

foreign policy experts have begun to consider the broader parallels between the strategic imperatives of counterinsurgency and the war on terrorism.<sup>3</sup> “Iraq

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is now a microcosm of the global struggle we face—a comprehensive insurgency inadequately described as the global war on terrorism,” argue counterinsurgency analysts Jonathan Morgenstein and Eric Vickland.<sup>4</sup> Even the final draft of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps’ field manual for counterinsurgency refers to “a new kind of global insurgency, represented by al-Qaeda.”<sup>5</sup>

The parallels are intriguing, to be sure. But what do they mean in practical terms? Answering this question requires a closer look at what counterinsurgency doctrine prescribes.

There is a huge body of literature on counterinsurgency theory and practice, with a well-known set of basic principles. The first and most important rule is that the struggle for hearts and minds—or “legitimacy”—is paramount. Insurgents must be separated from their base of support among the population. Only when they are exposed and shorn of their protection can intelligence be gathered, successful operations conducted, and the insurgents defeated. Second, force must be used in careful increments. Overuse of force can drive the wavering population right into the arms of the insurgency. Third, intelligence is critical. Without it, the counterinsurgency force cannot tell friend from foe, cannot target its use of force, and is generally likely to flail around shooting itself in the foot. The best intelligence comes from the population—thus reinforcing the first principle, the need to win its political allegiance. Finally, tactical efforts to win “hearts and minds” must

be combined with reforms aimed at addressing the broader political and economic conditions that lead ordinary citizens to sympathize with the insurgency.<sup>6</sup>

Recounting these principles makes clear their relevance to the war in Iraq.<sup>7</sup> But what might they imply for the broader war on terror? The following is an effort to examine the major principles of counterinsurgency doctrine in turn, and extract the lessons they hold for the war on terrorism.

## I. Winning Hearts and Minds

The history of counterinsurgency makes clear that the need to separate insurgents from their base of support should be the primary strategic objective, not an afterthought.

***Punishing the perpetrators of these abuses, outlawing torture, and establishing a legal regime for detainees becomes not just a matter of upholding American values, but a vital strategic measure.***

To that end, counterinsurgency theory offers several guiding principles:

*Use measured force.* A major, if not publicly emphasized, administration rationale for the Iraq war was the idea that a decisive show of force in the Arab world would cow anti-American states and groups, and belie the “paper tiger” image of America that, as Osama bin Laden’s statements attest, had taken root in the jihadist worldview.<sup>8</sup> This psychological blow would be a “game changer,” according to President Bush.<sup>9</sup> But this was a state-centric view of a non-state problem. States can be deterred by conventional military power, but non-state groups usually cannot.<sup>10</sup> State sponsors of terror can be attacked, as the Taliban was. But unless it can be very carefully targeted, the use of conventional force on non-state

groups will often backfire. After all, all signs indicate that the jihadist movement has enjoyed a recruiting boom since the start of the Iraq war.<sup>11</sup>

*Hold the moral high ground.* Arguments for abusive interrogation techniques, or unlimited extralegal detention, are arguments for tactical, battlefield advantage. But the history of counterinsurgency shows that such tactics are always counterproductive at the strategic—that is, political—level. For an example, look no further than Iraq: As Tom Ricks’ account of the Iraqi occupation, *Fiasco*, documents, the widespread “Abu Ghraib culture” played a major role in fueling the Iraqi insurgency.<sup>12</sup> Seen in this light, punishing the perpetrators of these abuses, outlawing torture, and establishing a legal regime for detainees becomes not just a matter of upholding American values, but a vital strategic measure. As the Field Manual draft warns in its discussion of interrogation tactics: “Lose moral legitimacy, lose the war.”<sup>13</sup>

*Support political reform.* The United States is currently so unpopular in the Arab world that the Bush administration’s pro-democracy rhetoric is automatically viewed with suspicion. Iraq has vividly shown the extreme difficulty of promoting democracy by force. And Hamas’ electoral victory shows that elections could even aggravate terrorism in the short term by fostering instability or by bringing radical Islamist parties to power.<sup>14</sup>

Nonetheless, abandoning democracy would be short-sighted. It may be the only major issue on which the United States can hope to eventually align itself with Muslim majority opinion.<sup>15</sup> And over the long term, progress toward economic and political openness will be necessary for the Middle East to emerge from its developmental stagnation. The way forward is a more patient, multilateral, and long-term strategy, based on support for local reformist groups and efforts to build up the liberal institutions

of governance that underpin electoral democracy.<sup>16</sup> The goal should not be an overnight transition to democracy, but a gradual political evolution and a recognition on the part of Arab publics that America genuinely shares their aspirations for political change.

*Pay attention to soft power.* Any effort to win hearts and minds will have to make use of America's tools of soft power — economic aid, trade preferences, diplomatic leverage, public diplomacy, and the attractive

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power of American ideals, domestic political institutions, and international alliances. President Bush's one nod in this direction has been to extol the benefits that his democracy agenda will bring to the Middle East. Most Muslims don't seem convinced, to put it mildly. America's image in the Middle East has declined precipitously in recent years, as numerous opinion polls attest.<sup>17</sup>

Economic aid can be an important tool of soft power, but a "new Marshall Plan" is not the answer for the Middle East. Few countries have the strong political institutions that effective aid requires. But creative use of U.S. aid can help—witness the unexpectedly sharp drop in support for al-Qaeda among Indonesians after the provision of tsunami aid.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, better public diplomacy would not change the minds of committed enemies, but it would help on the margins. The jihadists understand

this; they put much of their effort into making videos, publishing magazines, and running websites. The United States apparently does not. Counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes "information operations," yet America's flagship efforts to reach Middle Eastern publics—the al-Hurra television network and Radio Sawa—have been widely panned, and their ratings have been lackluster.<sup>19</sup> A better approach might be to engage more with the hugely influential new Arab satellite television networks, such as al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya. They constitute a "new Arab public sphere," according to political scientist Marc Lynch.<sup>20</sup> Yet America's viewpoint is rarely represented.

Finally, no discussion of hearts and minds can avoid the Arab-Israeli conflict. One should not be naïve about the prospect of major progress in the aftermath of the Lebanon war and with Hamas in power. Yet whenever the conflict intensifies, moderate forces throughout the region are weakened. It is true that the conflict is used cynically by Arab regimes, but the reality is that it matters to millions of Muslims around the world. As Francis Fukuyama argues, "When Arabs say that they like the United States but do not like American foreign policy, it would seem both prudent and minimally respectful to take them at their word, rather than putting on a psychiatrist's couch and telling them that they could not possibly mean what they say."<sup>21</sup> The United States cannot impose a solution on either party, but it can and should reprise its past role as an active sponsor of the peace process.

The partially declassified National Intelligence Estimate from September 2006 makes clear that while America is extremely unpopular in the Muslim world, bin Laden is also failing to win support.<sup>22</sup> Muslims do not have to love the United States, but it is crucial that they see the United States as part of a

better future than bin Laden's vision of an existential clash between Islam and the West.

## II. Targeting the Enemy

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***Breaking up future plots, whether they are hatched in London or Lahore, will be a job for police and spies rather than conventional armies. In policy terms, this suggests giving far greater priority to intelligence reform.***

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In Gillo Pontecorvo's classic 1966 film about the Franco-Algerian War, *The Battle of Algiers*, French colonel Philippe Mathieu has this to say to his elite, gung-ho unit of

paratroopers: "The military aspect is secondary... More immediate is the police work involved. I know you don't like hearing that, but it indicates exactly the kind of job we have to do."<sup>23</sup> So it is with the war on terrorism. Here again, counterinsurgency theory offers several guiding principles:

*Prioritize intelligence and police work.* Attacking al-Qaeda and its off-shoots will at times require conventional military force, but the simple operational reality is that counterterrorism is mostly police and intelligence work. Outside of Iraq, would-be jihadists are scattered throughout the Muslim world, and increasingly, in Western Europe. They simply are not military targets. It is often said that the "law enforcement" is the wrong model for terrorism. This is very true in the sense that a reactive approach—where a crime is followed by an investigation and then prosecution—cannot be the model. Authorities must aggressively seek to break up plots and arrest militants before attacks take place. In some situations—pre-9/11 Afghanistan, for example—this could call for conventional military force. But breaking up future plots, whether they are hatched in

London or Lahore, will be a job for police and spies rather than conventional armies. In policy terms, this suggests giving far greater priority to intelligence reform. While the intelligence community has gone through a major reorganization, it is far from clear that it is now capable of the extremely difficult work of penetrating jihadist groups and breaking up plots. The short-term solution entails better cooperation with foreign intelligence services, which often have the local knowledge and networks of agents that the U.S. needs.<sup>24</sup>

*Build anti-terrorism coalitions.* Because breaking up terror plots usually requires the cooperation of foreign authorities, the United States must make the maintenance of good international intelligence and law enforcement working relationships an even higher priority than it already is. This underlines the importance of adhering to the rule of law, so that liberal democratic allies are not reluctant to work with America. It also means that America's collapsing global reputation is a major problem, not a badge of honor. Countries with anti-American populations will be under growing pressure not to cooperate in fighting terrorism. Finally, the United States should have a more realistic approach to intelligence cooperation with unfriendly regimes that

nonetheless share an interest in fighting al-Qaeda. So far, an all-stick, no-carrot approach has gotten the United States nowhere with

countries like Syria and Iran. Engagement might not work, especially with Iran. But as Fareed Zakaria has argued, "You cannot get a government to make a big

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policy reversal if you aren't talking directly to it and if it believes that you are simultaneously attempting to overthrow [it]."<sup>25</sup>

*Avoid civil liberties absolutism.* The primacy of police and intelligence work in counterinsurgency also means that Americans will have to make new tradeoffs between

their security and their civil liberties. So far the Bush administration has helped progressives avoid hard choices by taking extreme

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positions. The National Security Agency wiretapping issue is a good example: By insisting that the president must have absolute freedom of action, the administration shifted the debate away from the difficult question of exactly where to draw the line between privacy and security to more fundamental questions of checks and balances and Congressional oversight. But the first the debate is the one that the country must have, with the recognition that the fight against jihadism is being largely fought in the shadowy world of phone intercepts, financial record searches, and passenger manifests.

*Invest in area and language knowledge.* Historians emphasize that if the counterinsurgent force does not have an intimate knowledge of the language, culture, and history of the host population, there is little hope of winning its political allegiance. Absent such understanding, it is very difficult to glean intelligence about insurgent activity, or to exploit rifts between different insurgent groups. The scale of this problem was made clear by the 9/11 Commission Report's

observation that American universities graduated a total of six students with Arabic majors in 2002.<sup>26</sup> The administration took a step to rectify this problem in early 2006 by introducing the National Security Language Initiative. But both the scale and the urgency of this effort must be greater.

### III. Supporting Reform

Finally, counterinsurgency doctrine stresses the need for reforms designed to undercut popular support for the insurgency. Some will argue that any policy reform undertaken in response to terrorism is simply appeasement. But the idea is not to address the terrorists' often absurd and illegitimate grievances, but rather the broader conditions that drive average Muslims to sympathize with the jihadist cause. In a traditional counterinsurgency, reform often takes the form of public works, social welfare spending, and land reform. But what reforms would work against the global jihad?

*Promoting political and economic modernization.* In a series of United Nations reports, leading Arab scholars have underscored the link between extremism and the Middle East's lagging economic, political, and social development.<sup>27</sup> If jihadism ultimately arises from the Muslim world's troubled relationship with these aspects of modernity, then countervailing strategies must take a very long-term view. Political modernization will require the kind of patient support for liberal institutions and democracy discussed above. Economic development is equally important, not because poverty directly causes terrorism, but because the long-term economic stagnation of the region has provided a hospitable environment for radicalism. As PPI's Edward Gresser has observed, the greater Middle East has undergone a generation-long economic crisis, with incomes and shares of world trade

shrinking dramatically as populations have exploded. Reversing this trend is an enormous task. Economic development is always extremely difficult for outsiders to bring about, especially given the poor quality of governance in the Middle East. Yet Gresser argues that a plausible strategy for near-term

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***Concerted diplomatic efforts are needed to defuse the various Islamist insurgencies that rage around the borders of the Muslim world, which currently provide both motivation and training grounds for terrorists.***

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and North African agricultural products.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, the United States must reduce its dependence on oil, to break the “resource curse” that distorts the political economy of much of the region.<sup>29</sup>

*Dividing the enemy.* In an insightful paper about the application of counterinsurgency doctrine to the war on terrorism, Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz note that insurgencies are often wracked by internal conflict. Exploiting these splits can be the best way to strike at an elusive enemy. It can also provide a stream of critical “inside” intelligence.<sup>30</sup> Campbell and Weitz argue that al-Qaeda’s ability to unite Islamic insurgencies around the world under their banner is their most important achievement. Reversing it should be a major priority. What is needed is a concerted diplomatic effort to defuse the various Islamist insurgencies that rage around the borders of the Muslim world, which currently provide both motivation and training grounds for terrorists. Just as American policymakers overreached during the Cold War by seeing Moscow or Beijing’s hand behind virtually any third world political

dispute, they are likely to do the same if they decide that every Muslim insurgency is al-Qaeda’s fight. Most Islamist insurgents in Indonesia, Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, or the Caucasus are primarily motivated by local and nationalist concerns, not hatred of the United States. By intervening everywhere, America would make enemies of groups that are not its natural foes, lending support to al-Qaeda’s contention that Islam is under attack.<sup>31</sup> This does not mean that the United States should not help governments targeted by al-Qaeda affiliates, or that it should not unequivocally condemn terrorist tactics. But it must be able to draw distinctions between groups bent on global jihad and those with predominantly local grievances.

Dividing the Islamist threat also means that America must be attentive to groups that are Islamist in ideology but peaceful in intent. Given the “re-Islamization” of the Muslim world that has been underway for the past 30 years, America simply cannot oppose all Islamist groups. Rather, it should be U.S. policy to seek out groups and clerics who can play the buffer role that Western European social democratic parties played in channeling the aspirations of the democratic left during the Cold War.

*Helping Europe integrate its Muslims.* The degree to which Europe has become a jihadist center of gravity over the past several years is a stunning and widely underappreciated development. In addition to the major attacks on Madrid and London and the recent attempt on U.S.-bound flights from Britain, there have been an alarming number of disrupted plots in Europe, many of which have barely registered in the American media.<sup>32</sup> It has been clear for some time that many European Muslims are deeply alienated from their host countries. And it has become increasingly apparent that European Muslim communities are also especially fertile ground for bin Laden’s ideology—perhaps

because, as Olivier Roy argues, this neo-fundamentalism emerges from the disorienting clash between Islamic traditions and Western modernity.<sup>33</sup>

The obvious solution is better social and political integration, which in many cases will entail a re-imagining of what European citizenship means. This will require major changes that are completely out of American hands. European governments know that reform is necessary, but it gets tangled up in the knotty politics of identity, immigration, and even economic insecurity—given the high levels of unemployment in Muslim communities. But given the gravity of the threat, it needs to be a major priority on the transatlantic agenda. Public hectoring of European governments would backfire. But there should be a major push to stress the importance of this issue from the U.S. perspective, to share practices that have enabled America's relative success with immigration, and to help raise public awareness among Europeans that anti-Muslim nativism will be directly counterproductive to both European and U.S. security.

## Conclusion

Viewing the war on terrorism through the lens of counterinsurgency can help policymakers refine U.S. strategy and tactics, but it is no panacea. After five years, Americans have learned that there is no anti-terrorism magic bullet waiting to be discovered.

More than anything else, understanding the logic of counterinsurgency provides a way to think about the relative weight of military versus non-military tools in the war on terror. The administration has relied excessively on military force. This is partly

a structural problem—the military is by far the best-funded and most operational tool of foreign policy—and partly ideological, based on an inflated belief in the efficacy of force on the part of influential policymakers like outgoing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney. One can safely predict that a switch to the counterinsurgency paradigm will be criticized by those who believe that the only way to be “serious” about a foreign policy question is to use conventional military force, regardless of the strategic reality. It may even give many Democrats pause, eager as they are to burnish their national security credentials by appearing “tough” in the war on terrorism. Finally, many will point out that 9/11 was planned and carried out before America's aggressive forays into the Arab world—indeed, at a time when the Clinton administration was devoting major resources to Middle East peace.

Nonetheless, to argue that U.S. actions and reactions can inflame terrorism is in no way to argue that our policies are responsible for al-Qaeda's murderous actions. The logic of counterinsurgency is simply that, given a pre-existing, unrelated condition (a relatively small number of murderous fanatics), a strategically unsound response can make the problem worse.

In the end, the war on terrorism is too important to let unclear thinking or political posturing get in the way of sound strategy. The jihadist threat is real and growing, but our understanding of the threat is growing too. America needs a redoubled commitment to win the war on terrorism. But it first needs to understand what kind of war it is fighting.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> The first use of this term seems to have been in Cohen, Eliot, “World War IV: Let’s Call This Conflict What It Is,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 20, 2001, <http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=95001493>. It was elaborated at much greater length by Podhoretz, Norman, “How to Win World War IV,” *Commentary Magazine*, February 2002; and “World War IV: How it Started, What it Means, and Why We Have to Win,” *Commentary Magazine*, September 2004. Newt Gingrich described the conflict as World War III on Meet the Press, July 16, 2006 and in a subsequent paper for the American Enterprise Institute, “Lessons From the First Five Years of the War: Where Do We Go From Here?,” [http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25002/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25002/pub_detail.asp).

<sup>2</sup> Differences between terrorism and insurgency are discussed in Morris, Michael, “Al-Qaeda as insurgency,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, October 2005 as well as at the website “Arms and Influence,” <http://armsandinfluence.typepad.com/armsandinfluence/2006/02/counterterrorism.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Among the foreign policy experts who have described jihadism as a global insurgency are Clinton NSC officials Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon; international relations scholars Francis Fukuyama, John Ikenberry, and Daniel Byman; Peter Beinart of *The New Republic*; State Department counterterrorism advisor David Kilcullen; former CIA bin Laden unit chief Michael Scheuer; James Dobbins of RAND; Nicholas Gvosdev and Alexis Debat of *The National Interest*; Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute; Kurt Campbell of CSIS; Jarrett Brachman of the West Point Combating Terrorism Center; and Steven Metz and Raymond Millen of the Army War College. The Princeton Project on National Security calls the jihadist movement “a global insurgency with a criminal core.”

<sup>4</sup> Morgenstein, Jonathan and Eric Vickers, “Strategies for a Global Counterinsurgency,” *Boston Globe*, March 28, 2006. For another military perspective, see Barno, David, “Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency,” *Parameters*, Summer 2006, 15-29.

<sup>5</sup> The new Field Manual has not yet been released but a draft can be accessed online at <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf#search=%22counterinsurgency%20field%20manual%22>. The al-Qaeda reference is on p. 1-4.

<sup>6</sup> Other principles of counterinsurgency—the need to cut insurgents off from foreign support; the advantages of unity of command; and the need to create enclaves of security for the host population—are more specifically applicable to insurgencies in a single country, rather than a transnational, global insurgency, and thus are not discussed here. For a summary of counterinsurgency doctrine that discusses these principles, see Cohen, Eliot; Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, U.S. Army, retired; Lieutenant Colonel Jan Horvath, U.S. Army, retired; and Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,” U.S. Army; *Military Review*, March/April 2006.

<sup>7</sup> The U.S. military has moved to apply counterinsurgency principles in Iraq just as the conflict there has shifted from a traditional insurgency to a hybrid of insurgency and civil war. See Biddle, Stephen, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2006.

<sup>8</sup> See Vice President Cheney’s frequent refrain that “terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of force. They are invited by the perception of weakness,” see: “Vice President’s Remarks in Dayton, Ohio,” Office of the Vice President, August 12, 2004, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040812-3.html>. For Rumsfeld’s view that “weakness is provocative,” Remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 4, 2004, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20041004-secdef0801.html>. Other influential advocates of this relationship between terrorism and American power include Bernard Lewis and Reuel Marc Gerecht. See also Suskind, Ron, *The One Percent Solution*, Simon & Schuster, 2006, p. 123; Goldberg, Jeffrey, “Breaking Ranks,” *New Yorker*, October 31, 2005; Beinart, Peter, *The Good Fight*, Harper Collins, 2006, p. 148. On bin Laden’s “paper tiger” view of the United States, see, among others, Lewis, Bernard, “A War of Resolve,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 26, 2002.

<sup>9</sup> Suskind, *op cit*.

<sup>10</sup> This show of force was aimed not only at al-Qaeda but also at other states considering the pursuit of WMD or support for terrorists. Had the Iraq war been successful, this concept might have been vindicated. However, there is also evidence that it had the opposite effect, by convincing rogue states like Iran and North Korea to speed up their WMD programs, to avoid meeting the same fate as Iraq.

<sup>11</sup> Estimating al-Qaeda’s numbers is notoriously difficult, but the most authoritative source for this contention is the National Intelligence Estimate partially declassified in September 2006, [http://www.dni.gov/press\\_releases/Declassified\\_NIE\\_Key\\_Judgments.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf). Other sources that provide evidence for al-Qaeda’s increased numbers are Suskind, p. 276; International Institute of Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2003/04*, London, Routledge, 2005; Scheuer, Michael, *Imperial Hubris*, DC, Brassey’s, 2004; and Benjamin, Daniel and Steven Simon, *The Next Attack*, Henry Holt, 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Ricks, Thomas E., *Fiasco*, Penguin, 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual Draft, chapter 7, p. 8.

<sup>14</sup> On the belligerence of unconsolidated democracies, see Snyder, Jack and Edward Mansfield, "Prone to Violence," *The National Interest*, Winter 2005/2006. The case that liberal institutions must precede elections is made by Zakaria, Fareed, *The Future of Freedom*, Norton, 2003. For an argument that democratization could increase terrorism in the short term, yet is still worth promoting, see Fukuyama, Francis, *America at the Crossroads*, Yale University Press, 2006, p. 186.

<sup>15</sup> See Ingelhart, Ronald, "The Worldviews of Islamic Publics in Comparative Perspective," in Mansoor Moaddel, ed., *Worldviews of Islamic Publics*, Palgrave, 2005.

<sup>16</sup> As Larry Diamond and Michael McFaul propose in PPI's *With All Our Might*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, such a policy would entail support for political parties, trade unions, and NGOs, increased aid for reformist governments, greater inter-societal and educational exchanges, and the sponsorship of a multilateral regional security and human rights architecture along the lines of the Helsinki process.

<sup>17</sup> A number of reports from the Pew Global Attitudes Project chart the decline in America's image in the Middle East, including "America's Image Slips, but Allies Share Concern over Iran, Hamas," "U.S. Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative," "A Year After the Iraq War," and "America's Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties," <http://pewglobal.org/reports/>. For a conservative argument that the United States should not worry about Muslim public opinion, see Gerecht, Reuel Marc, "Selling Out Moderate Islam: Washington's Misbegotten Campaign to be Loved in the Middle East," *Weekly Standard*, February 20, 2006, as well as Muravchik, Joshua, "Hearts, Minds, and the War Against Terror," *Commentary*, May 2002.

<sup>18</sup> In polling done by the group Terror Free Tomorrow, support for bin Laden in Indonesia dropped from 58 percent in May 2003, to 23 percent in 2004, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=56>.

<sup>19</sup> See Ungar, Sanford, "Pitch Imperfect," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2005 and Government Accounting Office reports at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06762.pdf> and <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06535.pdf>.

<sup>20</sup> Lynch, Marc "Taking Arabs Seriously," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003.

<sup>21</sup> Fukuyama, Francis, *op. cit.*, p. 76-77.

<sup>22</sup> The declassified portion of the September 2006 National Intelligence Estimate can be accessed at [http://www.dni.gov/press\\_releases/Declassified\\_NIE\\_Key\\_Judgments.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf).

<sup>23</sup> This is quoted in Hoffman, Bruce, "A Nasty Business," *Atlantic Monthly*, January 2002.

<sup>24</sup> For detail on the degree to which the war on terror is dependent on cooperation with foreign intelligence services, see Suskind, *op. cit.*, as well as Priest, Dana, "Foreign Network at Front of CIA's Terror Fight," *Washington Post*, November 18, 2005, A1, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/17/AR2005111702070.html>.

<sup>25</sup> "Let Them Eat Carrots," *Newsweek*, October 23, 2006.

<sup>26</sup> *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, W.W. Norton, p. 92.

<sup>27</sup> The 2002 and 2003 Arab Human Development Reports, published by the United Nations Development Program, can be accessed at [http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail\\_reports.cfm?](http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail_reports.cfm?) and [http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail\\_reports.cfm?view=712](http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail_reports.cfm?view=712).

<sup>28</sup> "Reviving Muslim Economies," *With All Our Might*, chapter 4.

<sup>29</sup> The "resource curse" refers to the phenomenon of poor developmental performance on the part of many natural resource-rich countries. See Sachs, Jeffrey, and Andrew Warner, "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth," NBER Working Paper No. 5398, 1995; and Busby, Gwen, Jonathat Isham, Lant Pritchett, and Michael Woolcock, "The Varieties of Resource Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth," Middlebury College Discussion Paper No. 2003-08, 2003, <http://www.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/vhil/research/woolcock.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup> Campbell, Kurt and Richard Weitz, "Non-Military Strategies for Countering Islamist Terrorism," Princeton National Security Project paper, <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/counterinsurgency.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup> Dobbins, James, "America Needs to Pick its Fights Carefully," *International Herald Tribune*, May 2, 2006.

<sup>32</sup> Benjamin and Simon cite a 2004 study counting over 30 disrupted major attacks in Europe since Sept. 11. The number today is much higher, considering that in a 6 week period during the drafting of this paper, there was a foiled plot against U.S.-bound British flights, a subsequent unrelated series of arrests in Britain, a failed attempt on German railways, and the arrests of members of an accused terror cell in Denmark.

<sup>33</sup> Roy, Oliver, *Globalized Islam*, Columbia University Press, 2004.



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