

Growing the Vote

The Political Challenges and Opportunities in Fast-Growing Areas

by *Ed Kilgore*

Democrats are rightly optimistic about their prospects in the midterm elections of 2006. The poor record of the Bush administration at home and abroad; the inability of a Republican-controlled Congress to address any of the major challenges facing the nation; and the descent of the GOP as a whole into a downward cycle of extremism, corruption, incompetence, and fundamental dishonesty have all laid the groundwork for a political sea-change this November. This climate for change appears powerful enough to overcome the built-in Republican advantages created by partisan gerrymandering, the sheer number of "red states," and the ruthless exercise of the powers of incumbency.

But even if Democrats succeed in making major gains later this year, and even if they achieve such once-distant goals as the recapture of Congress and a clear majority of governorships, building an enduring Democratic majority will require a persistent and strategic effort, beginning with the presidential election of 2008.

There have been three distinct if non-exclusive schools of thought about how Democrats can break through the partisan parity of recent years and achieve that sort of long-term majority.

One theory is that demographic trends will ultimately produce a Democratic majority—a theory often associated with high expectations about Hispanic population growth, and an assumption that Republican

policies will continue to keep minority voters, unmarried women, and socially moderate professionals disproportionately in the Democratic column.

A second theory is that perfecting state-of-the-art voter mobilization techniques and making heavy investments in the infrastructure for maximizing "base" turnout can boost the Democratic vote sufficiently to create a national majority. This theory is typically associated with the belief that Republican victories in 2002 and 2004 were primarily attributable to superior GOP mobilization efforts.

And a third theory is that Democrats must increase their geographical and demographic reach, particularly in fast-growing areas of the country, through

message-based persuasion, expanding the Democratic base.

The DLC undertook the present study in order to test these three theories against recent voting trends as exhibited in the past two presidential contests, with a special emphasis on rates of growth in the voting-age population, and the partisan distribution of votes in fast- and slow-growing areas of the “battleground” states.

Our major findings are:

1. There is a very strong correlation nationally and in many states between Republican voting performance and voting-age-population (VAP) growth rates, in large and small counties, suburbs, exurbs, “fringe” areas, and small towns. To put it simply, and with some important exceptions, Republican areas are growing rapidly while Democratic areas are not. In 2004, Republicans benefited crucially from an expanding pool of potential voters in their base areas, while Democrats suffered from a shrinking or stagnant pool of potential voters in their base areas. For the immediate future, demography will not of itself create a Democratic majority.
2. The evidence from 2004 shows that voting-age-population growth in Republican areas, not voter mobilization, was the single most important factor in helping the GOP boost its vote from four years earlier. Conversely, Democratic turnout efforts, especially in large cities, were very successful, often producing sharp increases in total votes and Democratic votes despite reductions in the VAP.
3. Successful Democratic mobilization efforts, given prevailing growth trends, may soon reach the point of diminishing

returns if not combined with broader geographical voter targeting and a message-driven effort to hold down or eclipse Republican margins in fast-growing areas.

4. To win close national elections in the future, Democrats must expand their base with outreach and persuasion to voters in fast-growing areas. Otherwise, even the most exceptional Democratic voter mobilization techniques and investments will struggle to produce more votes from fewer potential voters.
5. It is not hard to find examples of “success stories” in which non-presidential Democratic candidates have performed well in Republican-tilting high growth areas through a combination of strategic targeting and a message congenial to voters in such areas. Ken Salazar’s 2004 Senate campaign in Colorado, Mike Easley’s gubernatorial re-election campaign in North Carolina that same year, and Tim Kaine’s 2005 gubernatorial victory in Virginia are all good examples of Democrats who were able to expand the party base in fast-growing areas.

The bottom line is that Democrats should not rely solely on demography or mobilization to win close elections at the national level and in many states. Later this year, the DLC will release new public opinion research examining the characteristics and views of persuadable voters in high-growth areas, and the progressive messages and policies best suited to reach them. But for the moment, we believe it is important that Democrats look at the country as it is, and as it is likely to be, and dedicate themselves to an effort to expand their ranks into what has previously been considered “enemy territory.”

A Total Look at Growth Patterns and Partisan Performance

The distinctive approach of this study is to look at *all* cities and counties (other than, for technical reasons, those in Alaska), not just those ranking high on some arbitrary list, or those following some particular classification, and correlate recent voting trends with growth trends in the eligible voting population.

We decided to take this approach because so much publicity has been devoted to fragmentary and anecdotal evidence of growth patterns and party performance.

It is especially well known that George W. Bush carried 97 of the 100 fastest-growing counties in America in 2004. But ranking counties by growth percentages and then just analyzing those at the top is misleading because it conflates large and small counties and confuses percentages with actual raw vote totals. A small percentage increase in the vote of a large county produces far more votes than a large percentage increase for a small county, and votes, not percentages, win elections.

Similarly, there has been a raging debate among political analysts recently about how to define and weigh various categories of high-growth areas, with competing typologies of exurbs, emerging suburbs, mature suburbs, and so forth, and competing arguments for targeting one “silver bullet” area or another. While such debates have value, it is useful to first look at all areas in terms of actual growth rates and partisan performance across state lines without regard to fixed categories.

Another fundamental precept of this study is simply that *a vote is a vote*, wherever it is cast. There is a strong tendency among some partisans to forget that reducing the

opposition’s margin in its “base” areas is just as effective in producing victory as boosting the margin on its own home turf. In reality, the only “wasted” votes are those cast in uncontested states in presidential elections, thanks to the electoral college system. Moreover, “turning” swing votes carries an important multiplier effect, since it adds to one candidate’s column while subtracting from the other’s.

The study examines demographic and electoral trends between the presidential elections of 2000 and 2004, which in turn help explain why George W. Bush was able to turn a popular vote loss to Al Gore into a majority over John Kerry. With the exception of a separate section on the 2005 Virginia governor’s race, and 2004 down-ballot contests in Colorado and North Carolina, it is limited to these two presidential races (along with a tentative projection of eligible voter growth patterns between 2004 and 2008) in order to provide apples-to-apples comparisons. And while the trends exhibited by this comparison may seem relatively small, their decisive character is likely to expand in future presidential elections.

Special emphasis has been placed on 17 battleground states from 2000 to 2004, not only because of their enduring importance in presidential elections for the foreseeable future, but also in order to assess the impact of major investments by both parties in voter mobilization strategies.

Methodological Note

For purposes of this analysis, “growth” is defined as an increase in VAP between 2000 and 2004.

To create an accurate comparison of 2000-2004 trends, the Gore 2000 vote was adjusted to offset the distorting effect of Ralph Nader’s third-party candidacy. This study uses a very conservative estimate of

where the Nader vote would have gone had it been a two-party race (one-quarter would not have voted, and Gore would have won two of three of those voting).

As noted in the text, we also made projections of VAP growth to the next presidential election year, 2008, based on existing trends.

As an additional step to provide clarity, the study broke out “large counties” (those with 2004 VAP exceeding 50,000), where 82 percent of the total national vote was cast, from “small counties” (those with 2004 VAP under 50,000), representing 18 percent of the national vote.


Both large and small counties were divided for analytical purposes into three categories: those where the Democratic share of the 2004 vote was 45 percent or less; those where the Democratic share of the 2004 vote was between 45 percent and 55 percent; and those where the Democratic share of the 2004 vote was over 55 percent. And as noted above, the study looked both at the entire country, and then at 17 battleground states (Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia).

Central Findings

As *Figure 1* (showing national totals) and *Figure 2* (focusing on the 17 battleground states) illustrate, there’s a strong relationship between Democratic and Republican performance and county growth in VAP.

Among large counties nationwide, VAP in Democratic-tilting counties grew 2.2 percent between 2000 and 2004, marginal counties grew 6 percent, and Republican-leaning counties grew 9.8 percent. The same pattern prevailed among small counties, with VAP rising 2.3 percent in Democratic

FIGURE 1: County VAP Growth vs. Partisan Leaning (Nationwide)




Source: NCEC Services

counties, 3.7 percent in marginal counties, and 4.9 percent in Republican counties.

For the seventeen battleground states, the results are largely the same. In large counties, VAP went up 1.7 percent in Democratic counties, 6.3 percent in marginal counties, and 9.5 percent in Republican counties. In small counties, the VAP growth was 3.7 percent in Democratic counties, 4.9 percent in marginal counties, and 5.4 percent in Republican counties.


FIGURE 2: County VAP Growth vs. Partisan Leaning (Battleground States)



Source: NCEC Services


Looking more closely at the large county numbers in battleground states shows some interesting variations (*Figure 3*):

FIGURE 3: Large County Numbers in Battleground States



Source: NCEC Services

FIGURE 4: Anticipated Trends in VAP from 2004 to 2008




Source: NCEC Services

And based on future estimates, here are the anticipated trends in VAP from 2004 to 2008 (Figure 4):

Looking at all these numbers, it is clear growth trends are not necessarily hurting Democratic prospects in Florida, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, or West Virginia. But the trend lines in Colorado, Minnesota, Missouri and Wisconsin are much more troubling.

To give a sense of where these various communities fit on the traditional range of demographic categories, Appendix 1 shows Democratic, Republican, and marginal counties nationally as separated into exurbs, large cities with inner suburbs, metropolitan and suburbs (including mature and emerging suburbs outside large cities), micropolitan areas (small towns), rural areas, and urban areas (largely independent cities).

FIGURE 5: 2000-2004 Growth Rates by Partisan Character




Source: NCEC Services

It is especially interesting to note the 2000-2004 growth rates for these categories by partisan character (*Figure 5*):

Another finding of interest is the extent to which each category contributed to the 4.2 million vote drop-off between the (adjusted)

FIGURE 6: Vote Drop-off Between the Gore Winning Margin and Kerry Losing Margin



Source: NCEC Services

Gore winning margin and the Kerry losing margin (*Figure 6*):

Finally, *Appendix 1* also shows key racial and ethnic trends that Democrats and Republicans should take into account: Republican high-growth areas are slowly but steadily becoming more diverse. Between 2000 and 2004, African-American VAP grew by 14 percent in Republican-tilting exurbs and by 13.8 percent in Republican-tilting metropolitan/ suburban counties (mostly counties often called mature suburbs). The growth in Hispanic VAP is even more dramatic: 32.5 percent in Republican-tilting exurbs, and 29.5 percent in the metropolitan/suburban counties. While the raw numbers of minority voters in these areas are still relatively small, the growth trends will significantly help Democratic prospects over time.

Turnout Findings

A second category of findings in the study focuses on Democratic turnout patterns. To a remarkable extent in 2004, Democratic counties and cities with low-growth, stagnant, or declining VAP trends still produced significantly higher total votes and Democratic margins than in 2000.

Nationally, large Democratic counties produced a 1.3 million increase in VAP. But the total vote in these counties increased by 4.1 million, and the Democratic margin rose by 890,000.


Large Republican counties produced a VAP increase of 5.6 million. This created a total vote increase of just a bit higher, 5.7 million, and an increase in the Republican margin of 2.9 million.

In the 17 battleground states, large Democratic counties produced a VAP increase of 315,000. But the total vote rose by nearly 1.6 million, and the Democratic margin by 570,000.

Among large Republican counties in the battleground states, VAP rose by 1.6 million, producing a 2 million increase in total votes, and a increased Republican margin of 846,000.


As *Figures 7a and 7b* shows, looking at the ratio of VAP increase to total votes, and VAP increase to partisan margins, it is

FIGURE 7a: Total Turnout Increase to VAP Increase Ratio (In Large Counties)



Source: NCEC Services

FIGURE 7b: Total Turnout Increase to VAP Increase Ratio (In Small Counties)



Source: NCEC Services

clear that Republican margins owed relatively more to population growth, while Democratic margins owed relatively more to turnout efforts.

A glance at large cities around the country, and especially in battleground states, shows the pattern of heroic Democratic turnout efforts in 2004 even more dramatically.

- ❑ Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio, lost 22,000 in VAP between 2000 and 2004. But the total vote rose by 105,000, and the Democratic margin by nearly 55,000.
- ❑ Denver County, Colo., lost 11,000 in VAP. But the total vote rose by 43,000, and the Democratic margin by nearly 32,000.
- ❑ Philadelphia City, Pa., lost 36,000 in VAP. But total votes were up 116,000, and the Democratic margin by 61,000.
- ❑ Milwaukee, Wis., lost 6,000 in VAP. But the vote rose by more than 51,000, and the Democratic margin by 25,000.
- ❑ Detroit, Mich., lost 26,000 in VAP. But total votes went up by 96,000, and the Democratic margin by 32,000.
- ❑ In state after state, however, higher Democratic base turnout was offset by VAP growth in Republican counties.
- ❑ In the ultimate battleground state of Ohio, as noted above, Cuyahoga County boosted its Democratic margin by 55,000, despite declining VAP. Just as impressively, the far more marginal Franklin County (Columbus), produced a 41,000 improvement in the Democratic margin despite a VAP increase of only 13,000. But this net gain of nearly 100,000 Democratic

votes was more than offset by a 137,000 boost in GOP margins in Republican-tilting counties, produced by a VAP increase of 190,000.

- ❑ In Pennsylvania, where the statewide Democratic margin dropped by 86,000 between 2000 and 2004, Philadelphia and Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) added a total of 61,000 to the Democratic margin despite a combined VAP loss of 53,000. Republican-tilting Pennsylvania counties produced an increase in Republican margins of 127,000, thanks to a VAP increase of 151,000.
- ❑ In Minnesota, Hennepin County (Minneapolis) increased its Democratic margin by 37,000 votes despite a VAP growth of less than 9,000. Republican-tilting Minnesota counties boosted Bush's margin by 44,000, based on VAP growth of 116,000.
- ❑ And in Colorado, the two big Democratic base counties of Denver and Boulder increased their combined Democratic margins by 63,000 despite losing about 20,000 in VAP. But three fast-growing Republican counties—Douglas, Weld, and El Paso—offset 42,000 of those marginal gains thanks to an aggregate VAP increase of 81,000.

Looking at the earlier projections of VAP trends between 2004 and 2008 (*Figure 4*), Democrats may be nearing the point where they can no longer wring ever-higher margins out of declining VAP in reliably Democratic cities and counties, despite even the best base voter mobilization efforts. To reiterate the lessons of *Figures 3 and 4*, there are some states where Democrats are holding their own in VAP growth, most notably

Florida and New Mexico. But elsewhere, it is becoming critical for Democrats to cut into Republican margins in Republican-tilting counties. Fortunately, they can.

Success Story #1 - Salazar 2004

Centrist Attorney General Ken Salazar of Colorado took away a Republican Senate seat in 2004, winning 52.4 percent of the vote against GOP nominee Pete Coors, even as John Kerry, in a performance that exceeded Al Gore's, won just 47.6 percent of the vote.

Salazar's win was clearly not attributable to better performance in Democratic base areas.

His total vote exceeded Kerry's by 79,456; the two big Democratic base counties, Denver and Boulder, contributed only 4,362 votes to that margin. Heavily Republican and incredibly fast-growing Douglas County, with 39 percent VAP growth from 2000 to 2004, alone contributed 5,764 votes.

Appendix 2 divides Colorado's counties into five groups based on VAP growth rates between 2000 and 2004. The first quintile (11 percent VAP growth) produced 46,832 more votes for Salazar than Kerry, well over one-half of his statewide margin. The second quintile produced another 17,371 votes.

In percentage terms, the same picture is evident. In large Colorado counties, Salazar's percentage of the vote exceeded Kerry's by 2.7 percent in Democratic counties, by 5.3 percent in marginal counties, and by 4.2 percent in Republican counties. In smaller counties, he improved on Kerry's vote by 3.6 percent in Democratic counties, by 5.8 percent in marginal counties, and by 8.3 percent in Republican counties.

Ken Salazar's advantage over Kerry in large Republican and marginal counties was really the difference, since together they

gained 169,000 in VAP, even as large Democratic counties lost 20,000 in VAP.

Salazar's campaign placed special emphasis on his law enforcement experience, his national security views, and his mainstream cultural values, helping him address several persistent voter concerns about the Democratic Party. This strategy paid off in significantly lower Republican margins in fast-growing counties.

Success Story #2 - Easley 2004

Another 2004 candidate who ran far ahead of ticket-mate John Kerry was North Carolina Gov. Mike Easley, who won reelection with 56 percent of the statewide vote, as compared to Kerry's 44 percent.

Appendix 3 divides North Carolina's counties into five categories based on 2000-2004 VAP growth. Of Easley's 413,305 vote margin over Kerry's performance, nearly one-half was produced by the first quintile (8.7 percent VAP growth). It is especially noteworthy that Easley won majorities in both the second and third growth quintiles, in which Kerry won 37.9 percent and 34 percent, respectively. In fact, Easley won all five quintiles, while Kerry barely won the lowest growth quintile, one that lost VAP between 2000 and 2004.

Gov. Easley's impressive and comprehensive statewide performance was a direct reflection of his strategy and message, in what was originally a very close race against Republican state senator Patrick Ballentine. Easley insisted on campaigning in every part of the state, and deliberately sought to cut into Ballentine's Republican base. Like Salazar, Easley used his background as a prosecutor to deflect stereotypes of Democrats as insufficiently "tough," and also outflanked his opponent on fiscal responsibility issues. His overall message, closely linking economic growth to better

public education, was especially well-tailored for high-growth areas of the state.

Success Story #3 - Kaine 2005

The best-known recent example of a Democratic statewide candidate winning high-growth areas, and thus winning a tough election, was Tim Kaine's 2005 gubernatorial campaign in Virginia.

Gov. Kaine's win was especially illustrative because his campaign targeted seven high-growth suburban counties and aimed at improving on Mark Warner's winning 2001 performance, a practical necessity since Republican candidate Jerry Kilgore's southeastern Virginia base made matching Warner's vote in that region virtually impossible.

As Figure 8 shows, Kaine's campaign focused on seven suburban battleground counties, three in the Washington, D.C., area, and two each in the Richmond and Hampton Roads regions. Warner had lost

five of the seven counties; Kaine won six. Together, the seven targeted counties represented 41 percent of the statewide vote, up from 36 percent in 2001.

Gov. Kaine's remarkable suburban performance was no accident. A number of factors undoubtedly contributed to it, including voter unhappiness with Kilgore's sharply negative television ads; President Bush's sinking approval ratings; and Kaine's own impressive, faith-based personal story. But Kaine himself, in a recent article in *Blueprint* magazine, credited a message with particular appeal to these voters. Before the campaign began, he said, "I had already decided on a policy platform that held a natural appeal for suburban voters. It included tax relief for homeowners, a statewide pre-K initiative, a balanced approach to growth, and new transportation solutions."

Just as Mark Warner produced an astonishing win in rural southeast Virginia in 2001 with a message emphasizing

FIGURE 8: Kaine Won 6 of 7 Battleground Localities, Off-Setting Lower Performance in Rural Areas

Statewide total: 52% Kaine, 46% Kilgore, 2% Potts

*In 2001, Warner and Earley tied these areas
*In 2005, Kaine won them by a 54% to 44% margin

		2005		2001		
	% of votes	Kaine	Kilgore	% of votes	Warner	Earley
Fairfax County	13.70%	60	38	14.30%	54	45
Prince William	3.4	50	48	3.1	47	52
Loudon	3	52	46	2.4	46	53
Virginia Beach	4.9	49	48	5	46	53
Chesapeake	2.7	50	47	2.8	46	54
Chesterfield County	4.5	45	54	4.3	42	57
Henrico County	4.7	53	45	4.3	51	48

Source: Peter Brodnitz, BSG, 2005

education investments, technology-based rural revitalization, and simply more state attention to the region's problems, Kaine's policy focus on education, tax relief, and local control of development decisions paid off tangibly.

Conclusion

The trends documented in this study do not provide any one-size-fits-all strategy for Democrats now or in the future. But they do, in our judgment, strongly suggest that, overall, Democrats cannot expect demography to turn red areas blue in the immediate future, or

rely on ever-more-intensive base mobilization efforts to squeeze sufficient votes from a limited pool of potential voters. While careful attention to demographic challenges and opportunities is always important, and mobilization drives are invariably critical, expanding the Democratic base by persuasion must assume a more central place in future Democratic strategy.

A strategy of expanding the base into expanding territory can enable Democrats to maximize gains in election years, like this one, that are especially promising. And in close contests like the presidential election of 2004, it can turn bitter defeat into victory.

Appendix 1: Total USA by Geography by Kerry % 2004 by Racial VAP

Geography	Kerry % by County 2004	Voting Age Pop. 2000	VAP NH*										VAP NH* White 2004 %			
			VAP NH* White 2000 % Amer. 2000	VAP NH* African Amer. 2000 %	VAP NH* Hispanic 2000 %	VAP NH* Hispanic 2000 % Amer. 2000	VAP NH* Native Asian/PI 2000	VAP NH* Ethnic 2000	VAP Other 2000	VAP Other 2000 %	Voting Age Pop. 2004 White 2004					
Exurban	45.0 and Less	15974901	13801835	86.4	1079530	6.8	721875	4.5	112239	120294	139128	371661	2.3	17733916	15099830	85.1
Exurban	45.0 to 55.0	4339481	3636028	83.8	333333	7.7	251506	5.8	21277	55995	41342	118614	2.7	4622784	3821972	82.7
Exurban	55.0 Plus	1132963	934656	82.5	139181	12.3	27236	2.4	4350	15901	11639	31890	2.8	1187391	977559	82.3
Large City and Inner Suburb	45.0 and Less	13557535	7949901	58.6	1186697	8.8	3381833	24.9	107605	698512	232987	1039104	7.7	14801451	8278833	55.9
Large City and Inner Suburb	45.0 to 55.0	12616856	8191998	64.9	1735746	13.8	1824577	14.5	73239	567668	223628	864535	6.9	13351489	8268383	61.9
Large City and Inner Suburb	55.0 Plus	19329695	12048590	62.3	3807019	19.7	2024890	10.5	61631	1037823	349742	1449196	7.5	19352169	11747399	60.7
Metropolitan and Suburban	45.0 and Less	29636948	23751686	80.1	2448360	8.3	2340223	7.9	158966	593536	344177	1096679	3.7	32336429	25220342	78.0
Metropolitan and Suburban	45.0 to 55.0	31746708	24950332	78.6	2716546	8.6	2549322	8.0	118310	970678	414475	1503463	4.7	33459325	25615713	76.6
Metropolitan and Suburban	55.0 Plus	25610983	17693205	69.1	3509039	13.7	2612664	10.2	91195	1248007	456873	1796075	7.0	26438203	17693619	66.9
Micropolitan	45.0 and Less	15351584	13169036	85.8	1086817	7.1	746915	4.9	121268	93081	134467	348816	2.3	16009964	13645626	85.3
Micropolitan	45.0 to 55.0	4627460	3943456	85.2	344839	7.5	179463	3.9	84324	32946	42432	159702	3.5	4838899	4096776	84.7
Micropolitan	55.0 Plus	1990520	1265421	63.6	292957	14.7	204259	10.3	53277	93718	80888	227883	11.4	2052531	1301802	63.4
Rural	45.0 and Less	9741077	8542698	87.7	585030	6.0	375789	3.9	127969	26187	83404	237560	2.4	10095896	8821816	87.4
Rural	45.0 to 55.0	3534948	3018833	85.4	316073	8.9	91435	2.6	72968	10205	25434	108607	3.1	3648543	3111134	85.3
Rural	55.0 Plus	1137007	748986	65.9	234101	20.6	67824	6.0	72632	3961	9503	86096	7.6	1169373	773843	66.2
Urban	45.0 to 55.0	2361547	495148	21.0	297464	12.6	1049096	44.4	2560	352366	164913	519839	22.0	2467073	486187	19.7
Urban	55.0 Plus	16025183	5923873	37.0	2955554	18.4	4465514	27.9	38569	1750479	434127	2223175	13.9	16353641	5879468	36.0
Total		208715396	150065682	71.9	23068286	11.1	22914421	11.0	1322379	7671357	3189159	12182895	5.8	219910077	154840302	70.4

*NH - Non-Hispanic

Source: NCEC Services

Appendix 1 Continued

Amer. 2004	VAP NH*		VAP		VAP NH*		VAP NH*		VAP NH*		VAP NH*		VAP NH*		Raw VAP Change		% Vap Change		VAP NH*		VAP NH*		VAP NH*		VAP		VAP			
	African	Hispanic	Hispanic	Native	Asian/PI	Ethnic	VAP Other	VAP Other	2000	2000%	African	African	African	Hispanic	Hispanic	2004	2004	White 2004	White 2004	Amer. 2004	Amer. 2004	Hispanic	Hispanic	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	
1230297	6.9	956806	5.4	129812	193808	123395	447015	2.5	1789642	11.2	1297995	9.4	150767	14.0	234931	32.5	75354	20.3												
361013	7.8	312371	6.8	23270	72250	31902	127422	2.8	274803	6.3	185944	5.1	27680	8.3	60865	24.2	8808	7.4												
143926	12.1	32463	2.7	4732	20102	8605	33439	2.8	59999	5.3	42903	4.6	4745	3.4	5227	19.2	1549	4.9												
1304768	8.8	4055698	27.4	122274	880238	159639	1162151	7.9	1333288	9.8	328932	4.1	118071	9.9	673865	19.9	123047	11.8												
1900207	14.2	2215086	16.6	80805	729322	157688	967815	7.2	765494	6.1	76385	0.9	164461	9.5	390509	21.4	103280	11.9												
3854212	19.9	2258109	11.7	65578	1238473	188391	1492442	7.7	22474	0.1	-301191	-2.5	47193	1.2	233219	11.5	43246	3.0												
2786992	8.6	3030145	9.4	179382	838610	281023	1299015	4.0	2791271	9.4	1468656	6.2	338542	13.8	689922	29.5	202336	18.4												
2987142	8.9	3130313	9.4	131934	1295964	298251	1726149	5.2	1840102	5.8	665381	2.7	270596	10.0	580991	22.8	222686	14.8												
3814827	14.4	3048245	11.5	99779	1528150	253588	1881517	7.1	956559	3.7	414	0.0	305788	8.7	435581	16.7	85442	4.8												
1120597	7.0	884560	5.5	132146	116090	101958	350194	2.2	661953	4.3	476590	3.6	33780	3.1	137645	18.4	1378	0.4												
362423	7.5	213965	4.4	89097	43769	32863	165729	3.4	213893	4.6	153320	3.9	17584	5.1	34502	19.2	6027	3.8												
294684	14.4	224924	11.0	54372	122296	54449	231117	11.3	62011	3.1	36381	2.9	1727	0.6	20665	10.1	3234	1.4												
600996	6.0	440321	4.4	136123	36902	59554	232579	2.3	369130	3.8	279118	3.3	15966	2.7	64532	17.2	-4981	-2.1												
322376	8.8	105496	2.9	79361	13558	16593	109512	3.0	115212	3.3	92301	3.1	6303	2.0	14061	15.4	905	0.8												
235516	20.1	73958	6.3	75509	5213	5317	86039	7.4	32366	2.8	24857	3.3	1415	0.6	6134	9.0	-57	-0.1												
310765	12.6	1148351	46.5	2985	423598	95186	521769	21.1	172533	7.3	-8961	-1.8	13301	4.5	99255	9.5	1930	0.4												
2999217	18.3	4805895	29.4	48104	2020538	156444	2225086	13.6	328458	2.0	-44405	-0.7	43663	1.5	340381	7.6	1911	0.1												
24829888	11.2	28936706	12.2	1455263	9578881	2024846	13058990	5.9	11789188	5.4	4774620	3.2	1561582	6.8	4022285	17.6	876095	7.2												

Appendix 2: Comparison of Ken Salazar and John Kerry Votes in 2004

Quintile*	State	County	Voting Age Pop. 2000	Voting Age Pop. 2004	Raw VAP Change 2000-2004	2004 Kerry	2004 Kerry %	2004 Salazar	2004 Salazar %	Salazar 04 - Kerry 04 %	Salazar 04 - Kerry 04
I	CO	Adams	259901	277339	17438	69122	51.2	76101	57.9	6.7	6979
I	CO	Arapahoe	357613	383148	25535	110262	48	120225	53.2	5.2	9963
I	CO	Broomfield	27045	30809	3764	10935	47.7	11940	53	5.3	1005
I	CO	Douglas	120289	166725	46436	39661	33	45425	38.4	5.4	5764
I	CO	Eagle	31871	35061	3190	9744	53.3	10110	57	3.7	366
I	CO	El Paso	374449	401175	26726	77648	32.5	81403	35	2.5	3755
I	CO	Garfield	31910	35212	3302	9228	45.3	9959	50.3	5	731
I	CO	La Plata	33974	36822	2848	13409	53.4	13989	57	3.6	580
I	CO	Larimer	191739	206716	14977	68266	47.4	73204	52	4.6	4938
I	CO	Mesa	87188	96844	9656	19564	32	21718	36.3	4.3	2154
I	CO	Montrose	24488	27450	2962	4776	29.9	5603	34.9	5	827
I	CO	Pueblo	104926	112013	7087	35369	53.2	39687	60.3	7.1	4318
I	CO	Weld	129903	159242	29339	31868	36.4	37320	43.7	7.3	5452
II	CO	Archuleta	7391	9022	1631	2141	37.3	2531	45.3	8	390
II	CO	Chaffee	13041	13821	780	3766	43.6	4229	49.7	6.1	463
II	CO	Delta	21148	22968	1820	4224	30.3	5060	37	6.7	836
II	CO	Elbert	13869	16488	2619	2834	25.3	3497	31.9	6.6	663
II	CO	Fremont	36641	38143	1502	5933	32.5	7053	39.2	6.7	1120
II	CO	Jefferson	393570	396223	2653	126558	47.4	137554	52	4.6	10996
II	CO	Montezuma	17274	18352	1078	3867	35.6	4773	45.5	9.9	906
II	CO	Morgan	18919	19766	847	3039	30.9	3938	40.7	9.8	899
II	CO	Park	11105	13065	1960	3445	41.9	3696	46.1	4.2	251
II	CO	Routt	15239	16657	1418	6392	55.1	6771	60	4.9	379
II	CO	Saguache	4237	5127	890	1594	57.8	1817	67.1	9.3	223
II	CO	Summit	19459	20279	820	8144	60.3	8205	62	1.7	61
II	CO	Teller	15233	16529	1296	3556	30.5	3740	32.9	2.4	184
III	CO	Alamosa	10898	10995	97	3017	48.7	3937	64.6	15.9	920
III	CO	Conejos	5701	5963	262	1894	50.4	2624	69	18.6	730
III	CO	Custer	2715	3070	355	739	30.8	902	38.4	7.6	163
III	CO	Gilpin	3751	3849	98	1807	57.6	1815	59.8	2.2	8
III	CO	Grand	9731	10441	710	3243	43.2	3560	48.4	5.2	317
III	CO	Gunnison	11457	11568	111	4782	57.9	5280	64.8	6.9	498
III	CO	Las Animas	11520	11834	314	3300	50.8	3783	58.8	8	483
III	CO	Logan	15446	15900	454	2491	28.8	3114	36.5	7.7	623
III	CO	Moffat	9432	9840	408	1355	24.2	1966	36	11.8	611
III	CO	Ouray	2901	3270	369	1278	47.7	1315	49.7	2	37
III	CO	Rio Blanco	4399	4584	185	566	19.1	871	30.3	11.2	305
III	CO	Rio Grande	8919	9145	226	2006	36.8	2854	52.6	15.8	848
III	CO	San Miguel	5431	5879	448	2876	72.7	2858	74	1.3	-18
IV	CO	Clear Creek	7219	7254	35	2989	54.2	3179	58.6	4.4	190
IV	CO	Costilla	2747	2743	-4	1170	67.4	1363	78.6	11.2	193
IV	CO	Crowley	4479	4527	48	478	32.2	608	42.5	10.3	130
IV	CO	Dolores	1440	1397	-43	333	29.8	498	46.2	16.4	165
IV	CO	Hinsdale	636	660	24	236	39.9	279	48.5	8.6	43
IV	CO	Huerfano	6215	6219	4	1663	49.4	1969	59.1	9.7	306

Appendix 2 Continued

IV	CO	Jackson	1174	1128	-46	210	22.8	352	39.2	16.4	142
IV	CO	Kit Carson	5870	5793	-77	729	21.1	1106	32.6	11.5	377
IV	CO	Mineral	661	751	90	227	37.2	338	55.9	18.7	111
IV	CO	Phillips	3277	3369	92	582	25.3	804	35.8	10.5	222
IV	CO	San Juan	446	482	36	253	53.9	320	68.1	14.2	67
IV	CO	Washington	3623	3557	-66	455	18.2	742	30.2	12	287
IV	CO	Yuma	7054	7125	71	1064	23.5	1488	33.8	10.3	424
V	CO	Baca	3412	3220	-192	483	22.3	848	40.5	18.2	365
V	CO	Bent	4573	4337	-236	785	37	1124	53.9	16.9	339
V	CO	Boulder	224451	216178	-8273	105564	67.2	106481	69	1.8	917
V	CO	Cheyenne	1589	1502	-87	198	17.7	330	30.2	12.5	132
V	CO	Denver	432870	421209	-11661	166135	70.4	169580	73.7	3.3	3445
V	CO	Kiowa	1202	1107	-95	172	19.5	295	33.9	14.4	123
V	CO	Lake	5712	5591	-121	1623	56.3	1778	62.6	6.3	155
V	CO	Lincoln	4631	4507	-124	503	21.7	682	30.2	8.5	179
V	CO	Otero	14853	14406	-447	3164	39	3963	49.5	10.5	799
V	CO	Pitkin	12394	12285	-109	6335	69.5	6135	68.8	-0.7	-200
V	CO	Prowers	10138	9851	-287	1308	27.8	1987	43.1	15.3	679
V	CO	Sedgwick	2122	1982	-140	374	27.8	512	39	11.2	138
I	CO	Total	1775296	1968556	193260	499852	42.1	546684	47.1	5	46832
II	CO	Total	587126	606440	19314	175493	44.6	192864	49.7	5.1	17371
III	CO	Total	102301	106338	4037	29354	43.8	34879	52.8	9	5525
IV	CO	Total	44841	45005	164	10389	36.4	13046	46.5	10.1	2657
V	CO	Total	717947	696175	-21772	286644	67	293715	70.2	3.2	7071
	CO	Total	3227511	3422514	195003	1001732	47.6	1081188	52.4	4.8	79456

*Counties broken into 5 equal groups

Source: NCEC Services

Appendix 3: Comparison of Mike Easley and John Kerry Votes in 2004

Quintile*	State	County	Voting Age Pop. 2000	Voting Age Pop. 2004	Raw VAP Change 2000-2004	2004 Kerry	2004 Kerry %	2004 Easley	2004 Easley %	Easley 04 - Kerry 04 %	Easley 04 - Kerry 04
I	NC	Alamance	99646	104754	5108	20686	38.3	27435	51.6	13.3	6749
I	NC	Brunswick	57634	66797	9163	14903	39.4	21156	56.9	17.5	6253
I	NC	Buncombe	161201	167855	6654	51868	49.7	58863	59.2	9.5	6995
I	NC	Cabarrus	97281	107737	10456	19803	32.7	29276	49	16.3	9473
I	NC	Catawba	107293	112736	5443	18858	32.3	25656	45.6	13.3	6798
I	NC	Chatham	38245	44093	5848	12897	50	14917	60.3	10.3	2020
I	NC	Davidson	111468	116528	5060	17191	29	27050	46.4	17.4	9859
I	NC	Durham	172105	181227	9122	74524	68.3	79929	74.2	5.9	5405
I	NC	Forsyth	232845	241453	8608	63340	45.7	77829	56.9	11.2	14489
I	NC	Franklin	35302	40217	4915	9286	44.6	12577	60.9	16.3	3291
I	NC	Guilford	321209	332462	11253	100042	50.5	119965	61.5	11	19923
I	NC	Harnett	66485	74141	7656	11563	35.6	16510	51.6	16	4947
I	NC	Henderson	70621	75124	4503	15003	34.9	19361	45.8	10.9	4358
I	NC	Iredell	91338	101940	10602	18065	31.8	26449	47.4	15.6	8384
I	NC	Johnston	90141	103805	13664	17266	31.9	26275	48.7	16.8	9009
I	NC	Mecklenburg	521205	569307	48102	166828	51.8	186801	59.4	7.6	19973
I	NC	New Hanover	126715	136726	10011	35572	44	43421	54.3	10.3	7849
I	NC	Pitt	102244	106996	4752	24924	46.6	30722	58.5	11.9	5798
I	NC	Union	88923	110910	21987	17974	29.6	24355	41.4	11.8	6381
I	NC	Wake	470249	533429	63180	169909	48.9	205535	59.7	10.8	35626
II	NC	Carteret	47086	49664	2578	7732	30.4	11606	47.3	16.9	3874
II	NC	Currituck	13583	16780	3197	2909	32.6	4167	48.8	16.2	1258
II	NC	Dare	23556	26386	2830	6136	39.6	8746	57.6	18	2610
II	NC	Davie	26380	29018	2638	4233	25.5	6541	40.3	14.8	2308
II	NC	Duplin	36258	38039	1781	6923	41.9	9502	57.9	16	2579
II	NC	Gaston	143491	146017	2526	20254	31.9	28960	46.1	14.2	8706
II	NC	Granville	36910	40397	3487	9057	48.8	11699	63.5	14.7	2642
II	NC	Haywood	42810	44692	1882	11237	43.6	15434	59.8	16.2	4197
II	NC	Hoke	23615	27332	3717	5794	52.4	7347	67.6	15.2	1553
II	NC	Jackson	26824	28416	1592	6737	47.8	8057	57.8	10	1320
II	NC	Lincoln	47905	51134	3229	9434	32	13654	46.7	14.7	4220
II	NC	Moore	58228	62095	3867	13555	35.4	18210	48.5	13.1	4655
II	NC	Nash	65216	67512	2296	15693	41.7	23385	61.8	20.1	7692
II	NC	Pasquotank	26214	27797	1583	6984	51.4	8146	62.5	11.1	1162
II	NC	Pender	31555	34872	3317	6999	41.1	9040	53.7	12.6	2041
II	NC	Randolph	97851	101950	4099	12966	25.6	20634	40.6	15	7668
II	NC	Robeson	87514	89926	2412	17868	52.9	24462	71	18.1	6594
II	NC	Rowan	98165	101281	3116	16735	32.4	24508	48.3	15.9	7773
II	NC	Sampson	44633	46020	1387	9649	43.4	12830	57.5	14.1	3181
II	NC	Wilson	54947	56579	1632	14206	46.6	18267	60.6	14	4061
III	NC	Alexander	25369	26521	1152	4618	29.7	7061	45.5	15.8	2443
III	NC	Ashe	19557	20358	801	4477	38	6132	52.7	14.7	1655
III	NC	Avery	13831	14492	661	1805	24.1	2516	34	9.9	711
III	NC	Beaufort	34436	34991	555	7025	36.1	11285	58.1	22	4260

Appendix 3 Continued

III	NC	Caldwell	59266	60326	1060	9999	32.1	14061	45.7	13.6	4062
III	NC	Camden	5200	6514	1314	1339	35.1	1929	52.5	17.4	590
III	NC	Cherokee	19299	20053	754	3635	32.6	4807	44.7	12.1	1172
III	NC	Clay	7147	7712	565	1628	33.7	2015	43.2	9.5	387
III	NC	Cleveland	72069	73450	1381	14215	38.5	20204	54.9	16.4	5989
III	NC	Greene	14182	15292	1110	2665	41.2	3684	57.5	16.3	1019
III	NC	Hertford	16878	18103	1225	5141	63.6	5982	74.8	11.2	841
III	NC	Macon	23748	25132	1384	5489	36.7	7156	49	12.3	1667
III	NC	McDowell	32533	33400	867	5330	33.5	7740	49.3	15.8	2410
III	NC	Person	27073	27920	847	6198	40.9	9204	61.4	20.5	3006
III	NC	Polk	14635	15220	585	3787	42.4	4746	52.7	10.3	959
III	NC	Stanly	43579	44360	781	7650	30	11454	46.3	16.3	3804
III	NC	Stokes	33761	34623	862	5767	29.8	9323	47.9	18.1	3556
III	NC	Surry	54439	54954	515	8304	32.1	12655	50.7	18.6	4351
III	NC	Wilkes	50816	51712	896	7862	29.1	12377	45.2	16.1	4515
III	NC	Yadkin	27640	28230	590	3451	22.6	6434	41.6	19	2983
IV	NC	Alleghany	8604	8754	150	1922	40	2699	58.9	18.9	777
IV	NC	Bladen	24330	24788	458	6109	49.7	8086	67.5	17.8	1977
IV	NC	Burke	67776	68178	402	11728	38.3	15112	47.9	9.6	3384
IV	NC	Caswell	18049	18256	207	4539	48.3	5747	62	13.7	1208
IV	NC	Gates	7713	8204	491	2121	52.4	2668	66.1	13.7	547
IV	NC	Jones	7716	7915	199	1893	42.1	2670	59.1	17	777
IV	NC	Madison	15463	15740	277	4234	45	5135	55.9	10.9	901
IV	NC	Mitchell	12366	12580	214	2080	26.8	2691	35.2	8.4	611
IV	NC	Montgomery	20142	20633	491	4313	42.9	5640	56.5	13.6	1327
IV	NC	Onslow	111017	111226	209	11250	30.3	17499	48	17.7	6249
IV	NC	Pamlico	10208	10345	137	2335	38.8	3361	56.8	18	1026
IV	NC	Perquimans	8758	9206	448	1971	39.9	2594	53.9	14	623
IV	NC	Rockingham	70453	70812	359	14430	38.7	21199	57.9	19.2	6769
IV	NC	Rutherford	47939	48290	351	8184	33.4	12062	50.7	17.3	3878
IV	NC	Scotland	25881	26387	506	6386	55.4	6595	62.9	7.5	209
IV	NC	Transylvania	23362	23649	287	6097	39.4	7538	50.1	10.7	1441
IV	NC	Warren	15271	15462	191	5171	64.5	5992	75	10.5	821
IV	NC	Watauga	35739	35988	249	11232	47	12392	53.8	6.8	1160
IV	NC	Wayne	83687	84123	436	15076	37.7	20652	51.5	13.8	5576
IV	NC	Yancey	13998	14360	362	4434	47.3	5275	56.5	9.2	841
V	NC	Anson	18897	18830	-67	5413	58.8	6591	72.3	13.5	1178
V	NC	Bertie	14610	14593	-17	4938	61.8	5737	73.6	11.8	799
V	NC	Chowan	11050	10975	-75	2406	44.8	2961	58.9	14.1	555
V	NC	Columbus	40680	40780	100	10343	49	13454	64.7	15.7	3111
V	NC	Craven	68940	67645	-1295	14019	37.3	18938	51.4	14.1	4919
V	NC	Cumberland	218361	217749	-612	45788	48.2	59168	62.7	14.5	13380
V	NC	Edgecombe	40539	40035	-504	12877	61.2	15960	76.7	15.5	3083
V	NC	Graham	6238	6312	74	1272	32.1	1813	47.5	15.4	541

Appendix 3 Continued

V	NC	Halifax	42365	41540	-825	11528	58.8	14604	74.6	15.8	3076
V	NC	Hyde	4640	4415	-225	1048	45.9	1391	62.3	16.4	343
V	NC	Lee	36455	36065	-390	7657	39.3	11044	57.6	18.3	3387
V	NC	Lenoir	44569	43462	-1107	10207	44.1	12898	56.4	12.3	2691
V	NC	Martin	19060	18688	-372	5102	48.9	7174	68.8	19.9	2072
V	NC	Northampton	16718	16622	-96	5584	63.7	6604	76	12.3	1020
V	NC	Orange	94243	93557	-686	42910	67.4	45681	73.1	5.7	2771
V	NC	Richmond	34567	34410	-157	8383	52.1	10697	67.3	15.2	2314
V	NC	Swain	9818	9931	113	2419	48.3	2939	59.2	10.9	520
V	NC	Tyrrell	3209	3301	92	731	46.1	1006	64.7	18.6	275
V	NC	Vance	31330	31394	64	8762	56	11177	70.8	14.8	2415
V	NC	Washington	10156	10022	-134	2969	54.4	3668	68.3	13.9	699
I	NC	Total	3062150	3328237	266087	880502	45.9	1074082	57	11.1	193580
II	NC	Total	1032741	1085907	53166	205101	37.9	285195	53.2	15.3	80094
III	NC	Total	595458	613363	17905	110385	34	160765	50	16	50380
IV	NC	Total	628472	634896	6424	125505	40.3	165607	54.1	13.8	40102
V	NC	Total	766445	760326	-6119	204356	52.1	253505	65.4	13.3	49149
	NC	Total	6085266	6422729	337463	1525849	43.8	1939154	56.5	12.7	413305

*Counties broken into 5 equal groups

Source: NCEC Services