From ending welfare to banishing deficits and reinventing government,
President
Clinton's Third Way innovations have reshaped America's domestic agenda. But
what about
U.S. relations with the rest of the world? Is there a Third Way in international
affairs?
Though less sharply defined than its domestic counterpart, a new synthesis
on foreign
and security policy is beginning to emerge. Its outlines were evident in the
U.S.-led
intervention in Kosovo - a policy consciously based on a mix of moral values and
security
interests with the parallel goals of halting a humanitarian tragedy and ensuring
NATO's
credibility as an effective force for regional stability.
The new outlook is based as well on several core premises about the post-Cold
War
world:
- That economic integration and competition have moved to center stage in
global politics.
- That encouraging the spread of political and economic freedom around the
world serves
America's strategic interests.
- That U.S. diplomacy should combine military strength with multilateral
means of
advancing our aims in a multipolar world.
This blending of values and interests, economic and security concerns, and
national
strength and international cooperation is at the heart of Democratic Realism, a
new
foreign policy framework we have proposed for the 21st century.
In the decade since the Berlin Wall fell, two big events have weakened the
internationalist consensus that shaped and sustained U.S. policy from the 1940s
on. One
was the shift from a known Soviet menace to a world of smaller but more diffuse
and
unpredictable threats. This has led some Americans to conclude that the
globe-girdling
alliances and institutions we built after World War II now confer more burdens
than
benefits on the world's sole remaining superpower.
The second event was the accelerating emergence of the "new
economy" based on
new information technologies, communications networks, and global markets
that never
sleep. The economic volatility and insecurity unleashed by globalization have
sparked a
backlash against expanding trade and deepening economic integration.
With communism safely consigned to history's dustbin, many Republicans in
particular
are withdrawing from the internationalist camp. Congressional Republicans
opposed U.S.
intervention in the Balkans, with GOP House Whip Tom DeLay going so far as to
denounce
NATO's bombing of Serbia as "Clinton's war." They have also slashed
funding for
U.S. international operations and international peacekeeping efforts, blocked
payment of
America's arrears to the United Nations, and killed the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. At
the same time, the GOP has voted to increase defense spending over Pentagon
requests and
has pressed for a comprehensive missile defense system. Its actions prompted
National
Security Advisor Sandy Berger to accuse Republican congressional leaders of
favoring a
"survivalist foreign policy."
As neo-isolationism assails U.S. global leadership from the right, a virulent
new
strain of protectionism erodes it from the left. Egged on by labor and left-wing
activists
who see globalization as a plot by multinational corporations to exploit cheap
labor and
escape tough environmental laws, most congressional Democrats voted against
the 1993 North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since then, they have refused to
grant President
Clinton - a fellow Democrat presiding over the strongest U.S. economy in 30
years - the
power to negotiate major new trade agreements and put them on a legislative
"fast
track." Joined by right-wing protectionist Pat Buchanan, who is seeking the
nomination of the independent Reform Party, the anti-globalists have brought
progress on
trade liberalization to a screeching halt in the United States and are threatening
to
disrupt a crucial meeting of the 134-nation World Trade Organization later this
month in
Seattle.
Democratic Realism seeks to counter the growing trends toward
neo-isolationism and
"globaphobia." In an update of the liberal internationalism of
Woodrow Wilson,
Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and John Kennedy, it calls for the bold
exercise of
American power - on both the economic and security fronts - to shape the new
international
system that is finally emerging from the aftermath of the Cold War.
Like their predecessors a half-century ago, today's progressive
internationalists are
both tough-minded in defending our national interests and unashamed to affirm
America's
special mission as a beacon of individual liberty and democracy for the world.
Recognizing
the reality of interdependence, they envision new structures of global cooperation
aimed
at keeping the peace, spreading prosperity, and confronting common problems
that spill
over national borders.
Americans have learned from hard experience that energetic global
engagement better
protects our far-flung interests than does standing aloof from the world and
hoping we can
somehow dodge the fallout when foreign economies or regimes collapse, wars
break out, or
civil strife rages in other countries. They know they need not make the false
choices of
the left-right debate: multilateralism vs. unilateralism; a moralizing foreign
policy or
one motivated solely by power politics.
In survey after survey, Americans have supported our country's leadership in
the world
while rejecting go-it-alone-ism. The latest Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
poll
found that 61 percent of the public favors active U.S. engagement in the world.
Far from
sharing the right's suspicion of multilateral action, the public expresses a strong
preference for it: 57 percent feel the United States should take part in U.N.
peacekeeping
operations, and 72 percent say the United States should not respond to a foreign
crisis if
it lacks support from other nations. The public also strongly supports the
Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty recently rejected by Senate Republicans (see Mark Penn's Poll,
page 72).
This suggests that most Americans favor international cooperation to reduce
common
security threats and are not prepared to seek refuge in the illusory safety of
"Fortress America."
Despite its often reactive and hesitant conduct of U.S. foreign policy, the
Clinton
administration has embraced many of the core tenets of Democratic Realism. For
example,
its staunch support for open markets and trade expansion under common global
rules has
underscored the intimate link between U.S. economic leadership abroad and our
prosperity
at home. Its calls for democratic enlargement and NATO expansion have
explicitly tied our
security to the gradual spread of free enterprise and democratic self-rule. And its
willingness to intervene in humanitarian crises from Somalia to the Balkans
shows not only
America's determination to lead but also its commitment to what British Prime
Minister
Tony Blair has called a new doctrine of international community:
"By this I mean the explicit recognition that today - more than ever
before - we
are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed
by
international collaboration, and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to
the
direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavor. Just as
within
domestic politics, the notion of community - the belief that partnership and
cooperation
are essential to advance self-interest - is coming into its own; so it needs to find
its
own international echo. Global financial markets, the global environment, global
security
and disarmament issues: none of these can be solved without intense
international
cooperation."
Where Do We Stand? The Emerging World Order
At the turn of the last decade, following the collapse of communism and the
successful
allied operation against Iraq's Saddam Hussein, President Bush proclaimed a
New World
Order. In fact, only toward the end of the decade, riding the wave of the
information
revolution, did a new order begin to assert itself. It is based not on the old
balance-of-power equation, but on the key pillars of globalization, democracy,
American
pre-eminence, and collective problem-solving.
Globalization has replaced ideology at the center of international
relations.
The Cold War order was organized around the clash of opposing theories about
the best way
to order human affairs. Its successor is organized increasingly around
globalization - the
growing economic, political, and intellectual integration of nations by the time-
and
distance-compressing forces of microchip technology, real-time satellite
communications,
the Internet, and international commerce.
Although globalization is more than an economic phenomenon, a nation's
power today is
more likely to be denominated in the coin of economic and technological
dynamism than in
tanks, missiles, and manpower. In the Information Age, countries with
second-rate
economies will not be able to field first-rate defense forces. Russia's plight
highlights
this dramatic shift in the geometrics of power. Moscow still has enough nuclear
weapons to
destroy America many times over and make the rubble bounce. But in economic
terms, Russia
is much less imposing, ranking with Peru and South Africa in per capita
wealth.
The global information economy is changing the nature of international
politics in
another, perhaps more profound, way by devaluing some of the things nations
have
traditionally fought over: territory and natural resources. In the new economy,
intangible
knowledge is increasingly the wealth of nations. That means the new requisites
of world
power and influence are open, dynamic economies, a strong scientific-technical
base, and
highly skilled and motivated workers. Of course, material resources still matter
and
America will continue to regard access to oil as a vital national interest. But
history's
trajectory can be seen in the widening gap between tiny but dynamic Israel and
its larger
Arab neighbors, oil-rich but impoverished and technologically backward.
Democracy is the prevailing political standard. As the
horrifically
destructive 20th century closes, we seem to have reached the end not of history
but of
ideology. Having withstood convulsive challenges from a succession of
"isms,"
liberal democracy has emerged with unrivaled moral prestige. The democratic
camp is larger
and stronger than ever in history. This does not mean that all other countries
will now
evolve in lock step toward Western-style democracy or that the United States
should try to
export its version of democratic capitalism. It does mean that, for the early 21st
century
and perhaps longer, the prevailing political norms will be consonant with our
own. Ideas
once seen as peculiarly "Western" are now embraced by ordinary
people the world
over who see in them the best hope for lives of dignity, liberty, and
opportunity.
Against this backdrop, conservative demands that the United States
withdraw from its
global responsibilities seem downright perverse. Why, when the tide is running
strongly in
our direction, should the United States turn its back on the world? An
enlightened view of
our national self-interest dictates the opposite: the conscious application of
America's
many strengths toward the goal of building a new international system on a
durable
foundation of democracy, human rights, and economic freedom.
Democratic Realism rejects the cold calculus of realpolitik, which breeds
dangerous
great power rivalries and ignores the crucial role that ideas, values, and social
conflicts within nations have always played in relations among nations.
In addition to its geography and endowments, a nation's political beliefs,
culture, and
internal governing arrangements profoundly affect its conduct in the world. It is
no
accident that despotic regimes that run roughshod over human rights and the
rule of law at
home (Iraq is today's most extreme example) are more apt to engage in
aggressive conduct
abroad. By the same token, 20th-century history shows that democratic
governments,
constrained by public opinion, competing domestic interests, and accountable
political
institutions, are less likely to start wars and more inclined to cooperate with
other
countries and adhere to international agreements and norms. Both Argentina
and Brazil, for
example, abandoned nuclear weapons programs in the early 1990s as they
successfully
underwent transitions from military rule to democracy.
U.S. support for human rights and encouragement of internal political change
in
oppressed societies therefore is not merely an expression of U.S. idealism. It also
serves
our strategic interest in shaping an international environment more congenial to
America's
economic and security interests.
America: first among equals. The events of the last decade,
from
U.S.-led wars in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans to our rebounding economy
and
technological dynamism, have confirmed America's dominant position in world
affairs.
Rarely in history has one nation towered so far above the others - a reality easily
accepted by most Americans, who are sure our intentions are benign, but an
alarming sign
to others, who see an emerging U.S. "hyperpower" with no effective
check on its
ambitions.
An overriding challenge for U.S. diplomacy in the decades ahead will be to
prevent
other powers from uniting against us. The best way to advance our interests
without
provoking anti-American coalitions is to work through thickening networks of
alliances,
international institutions, and rule-based regimes that promote global
cooperation. It's
time to drop breast-beating rhetoric about being the world's "sole
superpower"
and instead think of ourselves as "first among equals," willing to play
by the
same rules we hold others to. A small but symbolically important move in this
direction
would be to pay our U.N. arrears, a step that would give force to our valid
demands for
U.N. reform.
By fostering an international climate of mutual respect and common
purposes, the United
States can work to extend the reach of economic and political freedom without
conjuring
fears of American hegemony. We can also draw on the resources of allies and
international
organizations and win wider legitimacy for our cause - whether it is checking
Saddam
Hussein's quest for weapons of mass destruction, stopping ethnic violence in the
Balkans,
or tackling global warming.
Military strength and alliances still matter. A succession of
small
crises in the 1990s has yielded a clear lesson: While globalization knits together
much of
the democratic world, there are new and powerful tendencies toward
disintegration and
disorder that, if not checked, will spiral out of control. Chief among these are
ethnic
conflicts within, as well as across national boundaries; rogue states such as Iraq
and
Libya; and failed states such as North Korea, Cambodia, and Somalia, which are
unable to
provide basic services or prevent civil strife. International crime, drug dealing,
terrorism, and regional rivalries, such as the long-running feud between India
and
Pakistan, also threaten international stability.
A strategy of Democratic Realism requires that we maintain America's
commitment to
uphold crucial balances of power in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The
United States
must invest the resources necessary to maintain qualitatively superior military
forces
with a global reach. Even more important than the level of spending, however, is
the pace
of defense modernization. The next administration should dramatically
accelerate the
transformation of our Cold War military into a more mobile, flexible, and
integrated force
organized around the new information technologies and operational concepts of
the
Revolution in Military Affairs. At the same time, we should press our allies to
reduce
their reliance on U.S. power and upgrade their own military forces so that they
can assume
more responsibility for keeping order.
Reinventing collective security. Just as America answered
the
challenges of the late 1940s with an array of innovative security institutions and
alliances - of which NATO was by far the most important - we must envision a
new
collective security architecture for the post-Cold War world. Two key elements
are
modernizing NATO for new missions and building a decentralized system of
regional security
organizations.
1. Strengthen and extend the transatlantic core. The new
correlation
of political, economic, and military forces puts the transatlantic community at the
center
of the emerging global system. The United States and the 15 countries of the
European
Union together account for nearly half the world's wealth and about two-thirds of
its
trade and investment. NATO represents by far the world's largest concentration
of military
power, with combined annual defense spending of $449 billion, compared to
Russia's $70
billion or China's $35 billion.
Our goal should be to extend the transatlantic community to the emerging
democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe and eventually to Russia and other former Soviet
states in
Europe. By making market democracy the price of admission to the European
Union and NATO,
we already have given a powerful stimulus to economic and political reform in
those
countries.
In addition to backing the European Union's eastward expansion, the United
States
should encourage NATO's transformation from a strictly defensive alliance into
an
instrument for advancing common transatlantic interests and values in the
region, such as
it did in Bosnia and Kosovo.
NATO must evolve, not simply expand. Before rushing into a second round of
enlargement,
the United States should press for a serious assessment by NATO of the potential
threats
arising from Europe's southern and southeastern flanks. The experience of
Balkan
peacekeeping highlights the need for police forces trained to keep civil order
rather than
fight wars. The United States should also urge NATO to grapple with the most
urgent threat
facing the transatlantic partners today: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical,
and
biological weapons, as well as long-range missiles and other means for delivering
them.
Finally, the United States should welcome the push to develop a European
security and
defense identity within the framework of NATO. With the Cold War behind us,
Europeans are
less likely to accept a subordinate role to the United States in NATO, while
Americans are
more likely to question the need for continuing what amounts to a massive
subsidy to
Europe's defense. By carving out a space within NATO for our European partners
to forge
common foreign and security policies, as well as plans for upgrading Europe's
military
capacities, we can accommodate the interests of both sides in striking a new
balance of
political and military burdens.
2. Bolster regional security arrangements. In a multipolar
world,
regional arrangements - from NATO to a proposed West African Peace Force -
become a new
driving principle of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Since the United States
cannot police
the entire world, we should work to bolster the political and military capacities of
regional security organizations. It will be less costly and often more effective for
the
United States to train and equip local peacekeeping forces than to send our own
forces
abroad. Australia's decision to intervene in East Timor is a promising sign that
regional
powers are willing to shoulder the primary responsibility for ending violence in
their
backyard.
Proclaiming a new "right to intervene" in other countries' internal
conflicts, some have called for organizing a United Nations army to do the job.
But it
would make more sense to encourage a dramatic devolution of power to regional
bodies. For
example, the Clinton administration has offered U.S. help in training a
permanent African
peacekeeping force through its African Crisis Response Initiative. We should view
other
regional bodies such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the
Organization of
African Unity, and the Organization of American States as building blocks for a
decentralized collective security system, operating under the aegis of the United
Nations
and with the support of the major U.N. donors. Such a system would encourage
and support
action by countries with the greatest incentive to quell local conflicts while
defusing
fears that the United States or other advanced democracies are plotting to usher
in a new
era of "human rights imperialism."
Democratic Realism seeks a new balance of American ideals and interests. It
builds on
the time-honored principles of liberal internationalism: At the core of the
post-Cold War
world is a growing zone of democracies committed to relatively open markets and
free
trade, political relations based on agreed-upon rules and norms of behavior, and
institutions to cooperatively manage and enforce those standards. Protecting and
extending
that democratic community serves our security and economic interests while also
expressing
Americans' ingrained belief in our country's historic mission. Deftly executed,
policies
based on Democratic Realism can not only underpin America's vital interests and
continued
global success, but help ensure a safer, more prosperous, and more democratic
world.
Blueprint Keywords: Extra Military, Extra Internationalism, Extra Interdependence
