At first glance, these seem like grand times to be a Bush Republican.
The president found his mission defending America and avenging terrorist
attacks. The recession is over, and the economy seems to be coming back.
The Enron scandal has done little to dent his soaring approval. It's hard
to find anyone in either party who thinks President Bush is vulnerable
in 2004, perhaps not even all those Senate Democrats gearing up to run
against him.
Ah, but no matter how mighty his poll ratings, Bush and his party have
an Achilles heel: It's their penchant for corporate power. In the end,
the success of Bush's presidency will turn on how long Americans tolerate
that weakness, and on whether he can find a way to rise above it.
Many of my Republican friends tell me that Bush put that issue to rest
by signing a campaign finance reform bill he had campaigned against. Indeed,
that hope may be the only way the Bushies talked themselves into finally
accepting it. But the corporate influence on this administration will
long outlive the demise of soft money. The president and vice president,
the Treasury and Commerce secretaries, and an army of political appointees
came from the corporate world, and no doubt plan to return to it.
More important, the corporate imperative has become a way of life for
many Republicans in Washington, driving not only how they make a living
but also how they gather, organize, communicate, and think. Social conservatism
is what Republicans talk about at church on Sundays. Corporate conservatism
is what many Washington Republicans practice during the week.
Apart from impeachment and cutting taxes, many of the great causes congressional
Republicans rallied around over the past decade were more corporate than
conservative: defeating tobacco reform in 1998, blocking a patients' bill
of rights and prescription drug coverage, filibustering campaign finance
reform.
This year, the Bush administration has proved so open to corporate pleading
that it was willing to abandon its commitment to free trade and risk a
trade war by imposing steel tariffs. Free market theology equates tariffs
with taxes. But Bush's White House doesn't trust the invisible hand to
carry West Virginia and Pennsylvania in '04. Consequently, the president
embraced new taxes (tariffs) in a cynical move that some would even call
"Clintonian." That would be unfair, however, because President
Clinton was evidently more of a principled free trader than President
Bush! It was further amusing to witness Republican lobbyists with pristine
conservative credentials lobbying for this de facto tax increase.
To paraphrase those words from Robert Bolt in A Man for All Seasons,
"It profits a man nothing to give his soul for the whole world But
for West Virginia!!"
The GOP excoriated Ted Kennedy when he proposed denying a tax cut for
the wealthy that had not yet been implemented. Unlike Kennedy's proposal,
the steel tax will hit hardest middle-income Americans who will pay more
for various products. Maybe that was the point.
The ultimate tribute to big money's hold on the Bush administration is
that even when Bush appears to stand up for the working man, he does it
to benefit corporate America. In an effort to split the Democratic base,
Bush adviser Karl Rove's political operation in the White House has reached
out to organized labor on steel and a host of other issues where labor
is on the same side as management. Note that the White House has undertaken
outreach efforts to the Teamsters union on oil exploration in Alaska and
the United Auto Workers on fuel efficiency standards. There are even reports
that the administration is extending an olive branch to the service-sector
unions on issues such as immigration.
For some time, K Street -- hotbed of lawyers and lobbyists in Washington
-- has set the tone in Republican ranks. Unfortunately, that is not the
tone George W. Bush promised to change.
Republicans had a big problem going into the 2000 election. The anti-government
and anti-communist glue that had bound the conservative movement was dissolving.
Whatever his weaknesses, Clinton had taken away the easy targets for conservative
attacks on Democrats. After years of denying there were any New Democrats
or that there was any Third Way, most Republicans knew they had to change.
They were offered two paths. The first, provided by Sen. John McCain,
was to recapture the legacy of President Theodore Roosevelt, by advocating
government as an agent of "national greatness" and insisting
on reform of government and of corporate influence on government. The
second, provided by Bush (and backed by conservative ideologues, K Street,
and the Christian right), was to change the face of the Republican Party
rather than its ideology. The Republican faithful -- or more accurately,
a few thousand primary voters in South Carolina -- chose the path of least
resistance.
A century ago, another Republican president saw the need for corporate
reform in order to preserve and strengthen American institutions. In the
face of opposition within his own party, Teddy Roosevelt challenged the
"malefactors of great wealth" to reform and change. He helped
them along with anti-trust legislation, campaign finance reform, and industrial
regulation; T.R. was truly a "reformer with results."
But the model for the Bush candidacy was the president that T.R. rebelled
against, President William McKinley, who ran as the favorite of the new
industrial titans of the late 19th century. The architect of the McKinley
campaign was Ohio political boss Mark Hanna (who is Rove's role model).
Hanna virtually made McKinley president through the marriage of the robber
barons' money and the illusion that his candidate was a different kind
of Republican.
The Bush campaign was predicated on the marriage of big money with old-fashioned
noblesse oblige under the cover of "compassionate conservatism."
Even though he ran as a "different kind of Republican," Bush
was careful not to upset the corporate theology of the Republican Party.
That doctrine animated his tax cut proposal, which was as economically
regressive as it was fiscally irresponsible. As president, one of Bush's
first initiatives was repealing the inheritance tax -- a legacy of T.R.
Alas, the modern robber barons, who rule the Republican Party, smiled.
Since T.R. left the Republican Party in 1912, it has not been exactly
breaking news that the GOP has close ties to business. For Republicans
to succeed, they have had to overcome the perception that they favored
the big guy over the little guy.
For a while, the rise of the modern conservative movement helped Republicans
put a Main Street face on a Wall Street party. Conservatives broadened
the appeal of Republicans by attacking liberal elites on issues such as
crime, welfare, and national security. The advent of the Reagan Democrats
proved that Republicans could break the perception that they were beholden
to big money.
By the late 1970s, big government was far more unpopular than big money.
The tax revolt was the most visible symbol of the rebellion against the
excessive growth of the government. When President Ronald Reagan vowed
to cut taxes, the middle class cheered along with the traditional wealthy
allies of the Republican Party. Reagan was, in a sense, a conventional
tribune of conservative themes of lower taxes and limited government.
But he also struck a definite populist chord.
What broadened the traditional Republican coalition to include blue-collar
Democrats and neo-conservatives was Reagan's promise to restore American
greatness. His attacks on the Soviet "evil empire" resonated
among traditional working-class Democratic constituencies. Reagan had
a fundamental populist appeal to rank-and-file Democrats as one who would
curb the excesses of liberalism run amok.
The 1990s, however, were a different story. Reagan's successor, President
George H. W. Bush, was unable to maintain Reagan's populist popularity.
In the midst of the recession in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War,
the Republicans once again became identified with indifference to the
plight of the working American. Bill Clinton successfully ran as a different
kind of Democrat and was able to recapture some of those Reagan Democrats.
The Clinton administration's early lurch to the left enabled Republicans
to rally a revitalized conservative coalition. Main Street Christian evangelicals
united with K Street big-money lobbyists to produce the Republican Revolution
in 1994.
Upon taking over Congress, however, the Republican leadership opened
its doors to the business community to advance an aggressive deregulation
agenda. Conservative activists moved into the Republican establishment,
many of them becoming business lobbyists themselves. They traded their
polyester for Brooks Brothers. These once-populist right-wingers found
that they could do well while doing good.
The social conservative agenda gave way to the business wish list. Abortion
and school prayer divided the Republican coalition, and there was little
movement on either front.
Meanwhile, Republicans dramatically overreached by shutting down the
government in 1995, and Clinton consistently outmaneuvered them. The welfare
system had long served as the symbol of big government that did not work.
By signing welfare reform into law, Clinton was able to take the steam
out of the anti-government movement that had partially animated the conservative
insurgency.
George W. Bush's success in 2000 was largely a result of presenting himself
as a "different kind of Republican" in contrast to the anti-government
Gingrich crowd. By advancing a reform agenda on nontraditional Republican
issues such as education, candidate Bush appeared more the compassionate
conservative than the corporate handmaiden. Meanwhile, at a time of peace
and prosperity, the Gore populist attack on Bush's ties to big money never
gained traction. The cultural issues were also magnified as the country
divided into blue and red states over the perceptions of cultural liberalism
and Clinton's personal misbehavior.
Upon assuming office, the Bush administration aggressively pursued a
pro-corporate agenda. This agenda should be distinguished from the traditional
conservative agenda. There was no talk of limiting government. Rather,
the Bush administration proposed to expand the number one target of the
Gingrich revolutionaries -- the Department of Education. Nor, was there
much movement on the old agenda of the religious right. Even the president's
faith-based initiative received a lukewarm response in social conservative
circles. Defense conservatives were also disappointed that Pentagon increases
took a backseat to tax cuts for the wealthy.
Indeed, the early agenda for the Bush administration appeared to be:
comfort the comfortable. Like the Gingrich revolutionaries, the administration
made it clear that what was good for business was good for America. The
administration's energy and environmental program had the fingerprints
of the corporate crowd. Big money's investment in the Bush administration
was being rewarded with big government corporatism.
The centerpiece of the Bush agenda was the tax cut. That plan was steeply
regressive with a small growth component. Prominently featured were a
reduction of the top rate and elimination of the estate tax, a windfall
for billionaires. It was truly a tax cut that a robber baron could love.
The manna for the masses was a $600 rebate.
The tax measure represented the historic nadir of contemporary conservatism.
It is indeed thin gruel to base a movement on $600 rebates and the end
of the death tax!
Since Sept. 11, the president's effective wartime leadership has earned
him widespread popularity. His moral clarity on the war against terror
has a populist appeal that has enabled him to largely overcome the perception
that he is tethered to big money. Indeed, in his courageous and resolute
pursuit of this war, the president is following the model of T.R.'s assertive
nationalism.
But those pesky lords of K Street just won't go away. The fire beneath
the World Trade Center was still burning when lobbyists swarmed the Capitol
to push for a mammoth stimulus bill of corporate tax breaks. With the
administration's blessing, House conservatives held out for billions in
special interest favors. The economy where ordinary Americans live was
forced to recover on its own.
Meanwhile, Enron imploded. Enron became the metaphor for the corrupt
intersection of political money, lax regulation, and the arrogance of
corporate greed. Contrary to some Democrats' claims, the issue is not
one of Bush administration complicity in the fleecing of the stockholders
and the workers. So far, there has been little evidence of administration
misdeeds. Rather, Enron has become a symbol of deregulation excess. The
close relationship between the corporation and many in the Bush administration
only served to highlight the Republican Party's relationship to big money.
There's a cautionary tale in all this. Even though our free market system
is morally superior to any other, an enemy within it threatens its legitimacy.
Those who don the garb of morality and religion in politics cannot shirk
the obligation to condemn financial decadence and immorality. Enron is
a tale of soft money from high-six-figure K Street lobbyists lubricating
the big deals in the nation's capital. This fast cash purchased a toothless
regulatory system that allowed fraud to flourish.
Of course, some Democrats have overreached in their attacks on Enron,
much as the Gingrich Republicans did in their assault on big government.
The Dems have also erred by trying to ferret out a political scandal within
the Bush administration, missing the larger opportunity to champion sensible
corporate reform. The challenge for Democrats is to be pro-reform and
not anti-capitalist; they can't be seen to be against prosperity.
Although Enron has yet to have an adverse political impact on the GOP,
Republicans ultimately have the most to win or lose with the Enron revelations.
One of the populist appeals of modern conservatism was its support of
law and order against the excesses of liberalism. Enron could eventually
highlight the inconsistency that the GOP is soft on wealthy, white-collar
miscreants. Republicans have an interest in not only prosecuting the criminals,
but also closing the loopholes in the law that enabled knaves to flourish.
The White House is not entirely oblivious to the possible political ramifications
of Enron. President Bush has taken very modest steps to address the issue
of corporate accountability. Unfortunately, his initiatives are too tepid
to forestall future Enrons. Still, it is an important concession any time
a Republican administration admits that the market alone does not mend
itself. Prudent government intervention is essential.
By advancing a more aggressive agenda with genuine enforcement guarantees
in the areas of accounting, pensions, and commodity trading, President
Bush could still achieve an important political accomplishment. Such a
Nixon-to-China moment could significantly broaden the Republicans' political
coalition.
Like President Clinton's action on welfare, President Bush could play
against type and reach out to the political center. An innovative corporate
reform agenda could undermine the Democratic attacks that Republicans
are the handmaidens of corporate power. By tackling the issue of corporate
responsibility, he may enrage some on the big money right such as Tom
DeLay, the concierge for the K Street corporate crowd. However, given
the president's popularity, this is clearly a risk worth taking.
Consistency certainly won't stop the administration from pursuing a more
robust corporate reform agenda. This administration has proved that it
can turn on a dime when it comes to political considerations. For years,
soft money was the near sacred sacrament that held together the religious
right and the corporate tycoons. But when the issue of money in politics
gained traction in the wake of Enron's implosion, the administration rushed
to join the campaign finance reform parade.
Therein lies the choice for President Bush: to go through the motions
of reform without really changing his party, or to become a true champion
of the common man by saving capitalism from itself. The war has brought
out his inner T.R., but he needs to leave his inner McKinley behind.
