It's hardly a secret that the Bush Administration is mulling a variety of military and political options for toppling the genocidal regime of Saddam Hussein. Rarely does a day go by without reports of internal debates in the Department of Defense and the White House about different scenarios for producing a regime change in Iraq. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is currently in Turkey on a mission to reassure our most important ally bordering Iraq that we do not intend to create an independent Kurdish state if Iraq collapses. Our intentions in Iraq are a constant source of anguished debate among our European allies, and among the Arab states that are, however tepidly and reluctantly, supporting our battle against Al Qaeda.
It's time to bring the debate over what to do about Iraq out of the shadows and into the public. As DLC Vice Chairman Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) said yesterday in the New York Times: "I am convinced that a regime change in Iraq is in the best interest of the United States and also our allies. But if they [the Administration] are putting the green light on this, they'd better bring this over and start talking to us. They can't just say, 'Trust us.'" Administration consultations with Congress on Iraq should not be limited to after the fact notification of policy decisions. Those policies will only be successful if the Administration forms a partnership with Congress that will sustain what may turn out to be lengthy political, diplomatic and military actions over a long period of time.
Tauscher is not, of course, arguing for public disclosure of military operational plans. But the Administration had best get serious about building understanding of and support for its basic approach to regime change in Baghdad -- in Congress, among the American people, and in capitals around the world. There's absolutely no good reason to keep our case for moving against Saddam a secret, or our goals a mystery.
On different occasions the President himself has justified action against Saddam on widely differing grounds: his possible complicity with Al Qaeda and his definite complicity with other terrorist networks; his past use and current development of weapons of mass destruction; his defiance of every international rule and protocol for civilized behavior, including his evasion of U.N.-sanctioned weapons inspections; and most famously, in the President's State of the Union Address, his status as a charter member of an "Axis of Evil" of rogue states. It's time for the President and other Administration leaders to make a clear and consistent case why neither the United States nor the rest of the world can tolerate a continuation of Saddam's rule.
In our view, this is a case that can be made clearly, consistently, and compellingly, both to the European allies who supported an international coalition to topple Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, and to those Middle Eastern countries who have first-hand experience of Saddam's reckless behavior over the last several decades. Saddam Hussein stands at the intersection of our two greatest fears: weapons of mass destruction, and anti-American terrorist networks. He's not only developed such weapons, but he's used them. He's launched repeated wars against his own people, and two ruinous wars against his neighbors. And he's very accustomed to dealing with terrorists, whose tactics and goals he so often shares. Saddam Hussein is vastly more dangerous than Slobodan Milosevic ever was, and is probably more dangerous today than he was in 1991. This is the case the President needs to start making here and abroad, week after week.
The Administration needs to be equally forthcoming about its goals in any military action towards Iraq. We think the only acceptable outcome would be a stable, democratic regime that will radically change the balance of power in the Middle East, replacing the most militantly dangerous state in the region with a nation that will complement its neighbor Turkey as a role model for democratic change, civilized behavior, tolerance, and peaceful progress towards integration into the global economy. This objective seems to be, as a matter of fact, what Wolfowitz is assuring the Turks that we have in mind. Why not talk about it to the American people and the whole world?
The military case for secrecy about our basic approach to regime change in Iraq is equally suspect. Either of the two main military options under discussion -- a massive, Gulf-War-scale invasion by U.S. ground troops aimed at the military conquest of Iraq, or a more limited air- and special-operations campaign designed to support indigenous opposition forces, as in Afghanistan -- will take considerable time to develop and will require extensive public diplomacy, especially if we are going to depend on an Iraqi opposition whose unity, military potential, and democratic intentions are far from sure.
Moreover, any strategy for regime change in Iraq should employ the certainty of decisive military action in the future to encourage fundamental changes in Baghdad today. At a minimum, we should use the credible threat of military action to deter any irresponsible behavior by Saddam to exploit the instability in the Middle East during the interim. And it's entirely possible that Iraq's terrorized military and political elites might be convinced to undertake a regime change themselves if confronted with the alternative of a suicidal war with the United States.
In any event, the habitual secrecy of the Bush Administration will hinder, not help, its military, political and diplomatic preparations for action against Saddam Hussein. The American people, and both our friends and foes around the world, need to understand clearly why we must act, what we ultimately hope to accomplish, and why these steps are in the best interests of the United States and a more peaceful world.
