As Washington juggles bureaucratic boxes in the rush to build a new Homeland
Security Department, Congress and the president are overlooking one very
important point: Homeland security begins at home.
Creating a department of domestic defense is a good idea, and President
Bush was right to get behind Sen. Joe Lieberman's proposal after months
of resisting it. But there's a big hole in the White House plan to put
everything "under one roof," as the president described it in
his proposal to Congress. While his plan goes a long way toward consolidating
the federal government's domestic security functions, it does precious
little to strengthen local law enforcement -- the front line of homeland
defense. And for all its bureaucratic reshuffling, it ignores the biggest
bureaucratic problem of all -- how to compel the CIA and FBI to share intelligence
and be more accountable for results.
Nearly two-thirds of the new agency's proposed $37.5 billion budget and
a whopping 92 percent of its estimated 170,000 personnel are dedicated
to improving two federal functions: border and transportation security.
To be sure, keeping potential terrorists from getting into the country
and stopping them from hijacking airplanes are crucial elements of homeland
security that must be strengthened. Other existing federal initiatives
slated for the new department are also worthy, such as disaster preparedness
programs to help communities plan for and respond to terrorist attacks.
But no matter how much we rearrange the federal bureaucracy's organizational
chart, terrorists won't always be stopped at the nation's door. And when
they get past the border, or if they are already here, it's not enough
simply to help communities brace for the worst.
Instead of repeatedly scaring us with announcements that another terrorist
attack is "inevitable," as FBI Director Robert Mueller has said,
the administration should enlist every asset at every level to prevent
it. To confront the threat of terrorism at home, America needs a new strategy
that goes beyond the president's top-down vision of homeland security.
The goal of domestic defense isn't to help Americans get used to terrorism.
Our goal must be to deter, disrupt, and defend ourselves against it.
If we needed any more proof that Washington alone can't solve this problem,
the homeland security debate in the nation's capital this summer provides
it. After Lieberman described the devastating stream of revelations about
the FBI and CIA's lack of communication as "the most glaring failure
of our government leading up to Sept. 11" and called for congressional
action, what was the Bush administration's response? Instead of using
its political capital to solve the intelligence problem, the administration
insisted on putting off any effort to solve the intelligence crisis until
it is done with legislation to rearrange the other bureaucratic boxes.
That clears the way for a presidential signing ceremony in the Rose Garden
this fall. Unfortunately, it gives the terrorists another year -- or perhaps
longer -- to exploit our greatest vulnerability. Once again, the Bush administration
may be letting the big one get away.
We have to tackle the intelligence failure head-on-and fast. A new flow
chart is not enough. We must take bold steps that recognize how much the
world has changed and how deeply our way of life is threatened. Like every
other democracy on earth, the United States needs to establish a domestic
security force. Rather than wait for the FBI or CIA to change ancient
bad habits, we can deploy an elite squad custom-built for the job: a new
Domestic Defense Division that would resemble Britain's successful MI5.
We could call ours 3D.
The sole mission of 3D should be to prevent and preempt terrorism at
home. It should be a larger and more capable counterterrorism force than
any yet imagined by the FBI. Rather than hiring hundreds of new agents
and support personnel to work more terrorism cases or reassigning hundreds
of agents from white-collar crime and illegal drug cases, as the last
two FBI directors have done, 3D should be at least 5,000 agents strong
and include top security talent from the CIA, FBI, and the ranks of state
and local law enforcement. Unlike the CIA, 3D should be allowed to conduct
surveillance and collect intelligence inside the United States in order
to fulfill its mission. And unlike the FBI, 3D's investigations and enforcement
actions should be driven by what it takes to stop terrorism, not by what
it takes to make a case in court.
But the price for greater latitude should be greater accountability.
First, 3D's work should be watched over not just by its director, but
by an oversight board consisting of the top officials from the CIA, FBI,
National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security
Council, and Department of Homeland Defense. Second, 3D should be required
to adopt a computerized management system like the New York City Police
Department's Compstat, forcing it to keep rigorous and real-time information
on the progress of its work. Not only could reports from this database
be used by 3D to grill individual supervisors on their activities and
performance, but it could be used to compel information sharing as well.
Third, as with Britain's MI5, a special tribunal of distinguished federal
judges should be established to monitor and consider any citizen complaints
against 3D.
The FBI will no doubt resist such a proposal, insisting that it can solve
the intelligence problem sooner or later on its own. But maintaining the
status quo is not an option, and neither is tinkering at the margins.
Civil libertarians, in turn, will object to opening the door to domestic
spying. To be sure, we must closely monitor this new division to guard
against abuse. But we shouldn't let the ghost of J. Edgar Hoover spook
us from doing what it takes to defeat real, immediate security threats.
By now, we should recognize what other democracies already have: that
the first civil liberty government must protect is its citizens' safety.
Although 3D will give America the affirmative capability to deter and
defend against terrorism at home, it can't do the job alone. As Police
Chief Edward Flynn of Arlington County, Va., has remarked, "Terrorism
may think globally, but it acts locally." That's why Washington must
strengthen the American homeland's first line of defense and response -- its
650,000 state and local law enforcement officers.
Since Sept. 11, state and local enforcement officers have served on the
front lines of the domestic war on terrorism. Maintaining high-alert status
longer than ever before, these officers have responded to countless threats
and reports of suspicious activity; provided increased security at airports
and other transportation hubs; hardened soft targets such as power plants,
federal facilities, and high-rise buildings; and even assisted federal
law enforcement in interrogating thousands of individuals from countries
with links to terrorism.
But undermanned police departments can't keep up this vigilance forever.
Even before Sept. 11, many law enforcement agencies, including New York
and Los Angeles, were experiencing a cop crunch -- losing officers faster
than they could recruit new ones and struggling to maintain their force
levels. Since then, police departments throughout the country have met
the increased demand for security, but only by requiring officers to work
12-hour shifts and postponing any leave time. As a result, overtime costs
have hit record highs this year, just as most city and state budgets were
falling short on revenues.
The president's response to the cop crunch has been to slash federal
funds for police hiring and allocate them to other homeland security purposes.
Instead of giving our domestic troops the resources they need to meet
heightened security concerns, the Bush administration is forcing us to
choose between fighting crime and securing the homeland. That's a false
choice. America shouldn't have to sacrifice its hard-fought gains in the
war on crime to fight the war on terror.
There's strong new evidence about the danger of the president's proposed
cuts in state and local law enforcement funding. In the 1990s, violent
crime declined by a quarter and the murder rate hit its lowest level since
the 1960s. But in June, the FBI reported that the crime rate increased
in 2001 for the first time in nearly a decade. In particular, crime went
up after Sept. 11, when police departments were being asked to do more
with less.
In a recent briefing to Seattle officials, the local FBI office declared
the city an "easy target" for terrorism. A central concern,
it said, was the issue of law enforcement staffing levels, which contributed
to the perception that terrorists could operate undetected in the city.
Congress should reject the president's cuts outright and take action
to ease the cop crunch. It should start by boosting police force levels
by 10 percent. State and local law enforcement agencies need the extra
manpower to fight the two-front war on crime and terror, and this increase
would add another 65,000 police officers to their ranks. Congress also
should grant emergency overtime relief to communities that have been hard-hit
by uncontrollable costs since Sept. 11.
If the government is going to enlist state and local law enforcement
officers in the war on terrorism, it also needs to provide them with the
technology and tools they need to be safe. As the first to respond to
the scene of any terrorist attack, state and local police are the canaries
in the coal mine. But chances are they don't have and can't afford the
equipment and protective gear to ensure their own safety or that of the
public. Mayors estimate that only 10 percent of cities have the proper
equipment and gear to respond to a biological attack.
Nor do most local police have the equipment they need to communicate
with one another or with other first responders. When the Pentagon was
attacked on Sept. 11, more than 20 police and fire departments responded
to the scene, and none of their radios were compatible. Moreover, the
local cellular telephone network was jammed and unavailable. Personnel
on the scene finally were able to communicate through the use of a mobile
emergency command center, a sophisticated piece of communications equipment
that is tailor-made for such situations but too expensive for most local
police to own.
These are just two examples of the tools local law enforcement needs
to respond to a terrorist attack. But other dual-use technologies and
equipment can be used to fight both crime and terrorism. Certain protective
gear can be used both for responding to a chemical attack or raiding a
methamphetamine lab. Crime mapping systems can be used for problem solving
and crime analysis or for identifying potential terrorist targets and
planning emergency response strategies. Integrating databases and introducing
the use of wireless devices can both improve law enforcement and quicken
terrorism response. Congress needs to invest in all of these technologies.
Congress also needs to take the lead in building an integrated justice
information system for all of the nation's law enforcement. Before Sept.
11, several of the hijackers had run-ins with state and local law enforcement -- two
were arrested for drunken driving, one had an outstanding arrest warrant,
and still another was ticketed for speeding. If federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies had an information system that linked key criminal
justice databases, these individuals might have been apprehended sooner.
But this integrated information system doesn't need to be online for
law enforcement agencies to do a better job of information sharing. There
are steps the federal government could take right now to improve the flow
of information. First, it could expand use of the FBI's principal criminal
justice database, the National Crime Information Center, to meet state
and local law enforcement's immediate demand for more information. Generally,
the NCIC is restricted to law enforcement officers conducting background
checks on criminal suspects. But just as the FBI recently added suspected
terrorists to NCIC, Congress could add other relevant categories, such
as immigration violations, and also relax restrictions on NCIC's role
so that it could be tapped for legitimate homeland security purposes.
Second, Congress should end the FBI's failure to communicate with local
police once and for all. It should amend the recently passed USA Patriot
Act, which provides for greater sharing of intelligence among federal
law enforcement agencies, to grant state and local law enforcement access
to the same information. Moreover, there is simply no good reason for
the FBI to hold back on security clearances for state and local law enforcement
executives. They clearly have a "need to know" sensitive information
before a terrorist attack occurs, not after the fact. Congress should
mandate that the FBI provide appropriate clearances to state and local
law enforcement officials.
America started winning the war on crime when police officers got out
from behind their desks and finally agreed to be held accountable for
results. Winning the war on terrorism will require the same resolve. Federal
agents must break their bureaucratic mindset and accept responsibility.
Political leaders from the president on down must recognize that the measure
of their success is not whether they do something but whether it works.
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman has argued that the Sept.
11 attacks represented less a failure of intelligence than of imagination,
and that the nation simply couldn't fathom the possibility of such evil
ever occurring -- and certainly not on American soil. But the nation failed
on both counts: either to gather and make the best use of the intelligence
necessary to prevent such a terrorist attack from ever taking place or
to anticipate and prepare for the magnitude of the threat posed to the
nation.
If lawmakers in Washington don't want to repeat these mistakes, they'll
look beyond the president's "one roof" proposal and take the
bold steps we need to deter, defend against, and disrupt terrorism at
home. It's time to put security, not bureaucracy, first.
