Remarks as delivered
Thank you very much. You know, Woodrow Wilson once said, "A political party is worth little more than that for which it stands." And I think what this is about today, why I'm excited about it, is we have a group of people here today who've put together this paper, this outline of progressive internationalism that, quite frankly, is, along with some other things that are happening in this town and this country, are invigorating for an old guy like me who's been around for 31 years in the United States Senate. I might add, although there's only five senators that have been there longer than me, still more than half are older than me. (Laughter.)
The fact of the matter is that this is particularly encouraging -- it's an indication that some very serious, very experienced Democrats are doing the hard thinking on national security issues that is needed. And they're trying to make it understandable to the American people and the political leadership of our party in a way that, quite frankly, we haven't done sufficiently over the last 20 years.
I've often said that notwithstanding the fact we've had individuals like President Clinton and other leaders who have advanced these notions and policies, the intellectual energy in this town and in academia has mostly been on the right over the last 20 years. Although that does not mean there's not a group of Democratic progressives who are intellectually competent and of like mind, we have not organized ourselves in a way to be able to begin to present a counteroffensive; not only a political counteroffensive but an intellectual counteroffensive. It has been missing -- it's been missing, quite frankly.
And for many years the perception, maybe even the reality, was that intellectual ferment has been on the right through a variety of think tanks, foundations, institutes and so on. And today we're witnessing the impact of the hardliners in the Republican Party who have now reached the apex of their power. They actually get to be in charge. That's very bad news for the United States of America and our interests but it's very good news for us being able to expose the paucity of their ideas and the obvious -- the obvious shortcomings in their thinking.
The neoconservatives -- and I don't say that in a pejorative sense, I don't say it like the Christian Coalition -- are very bright folks. These are folks -- patriotic Americans -- who have spent the bulk of their lives trying to figure out how to make America more secure and in turn make America more prosperous.
But they have a very cabined view -- a very cabined view of the world, our role in the world. They've acquired now genuine political power in this White House, the Pentagon, and within the State Department.
Earlier this week I had a chance to speak at a national security forum sponsored by another operation that's springing up here in town, the Center for American Progress. It's new, it's energetic and it's a high-profile Democratic think tank that's getting off the ground, whose voice I predict will be increasingly heard in Washington and throughout the country. And this effort launched here today is further proof that Democrats are not only extremely concerned about the direction of American foreign policy but they have creative and commonsense ideas that can appeal to the American people and put us in a much better circumstance around the world.
I don't think we should mince words. Conventional political wisdom, as borne out by the polling data, to make the point my colleague from Indiana has made, is that the American people over the years have trusted Republicans more than Democrats with national security questions and national security issues. The shorthand they've used is the Republicans are viewed as a party of strength. But I'm convinced that now that the neoconservatives are in power and implementing their ideas, their rigid ideology is running head-on into reality, and it's proving to be bankrupt in so many ways. And it's obvious to average Americans how bankrupt it is.
The American people can see the enormously high price we're paying for our unilateral action, for our arrogance, and for this doctrine of preemption, which is yet to be defined, I might add. They use the term all the time; I've never heard a single one of them define what they mean by preemption. It is a necessary option that we've had available to us since the inception of the republic that they've turned into a doctrine they have yet to define. But they have an overall attitude that the American people have picked up, one that exudes arrogance and disdain for the views of the international community.
Some of the folks here should take partial responsibility and blame for the speeches I've been making over the last year and a half because they have influenced me, directly and indirectly, and I've hired some from their cadre -- which is even more dangerous. I asked my staff to gather up for me the dozen or so most read, most referred to, and most respected neoconservative works put together over the last decade and a half, and I actually spent the time reading them all. The problem with those of us who are in politics, and are engaged in elective office, is we're used to hearing people say, and occasionally say ourselves, things that we don't mean. So we are not accustomed to believing someone when they come out with what appears to be on its face a very bold and sometimes almost fanciful sounding idea.
What I've come to learn is these guys mean what they say. The neoconservatives mean every word they say. And I would suggest to some of you to read what they have been writing. You're seeing it in play now in terms of their policy, but it's even more stark if you think about what will be in the offing with four more years of the same, if it were to occur. I'm convinced that the neoconservatives now in power -- at least those who have been accepting their advice, like the president of the United States -- are becoming aware that there's an enormously high price to be paid for the implementation of some of their ideas. And the fact of the matter is they have no plan B. As doubts grow about the direction that this administration is taking our nation, Americans are asking themselves, are these policies making us more or less secure?
The bottom line for Americans -- the question made famous every quadrennial election by Ronald Reagan -- is, "Are you better off today than you were four years ago?" It has a slightly different cast to it today, but it's as profound as it was then. It is, are we more secure today than we were four years ago? I doubt whether many Americans would suggest that they believe the policies we have embarked upon in the programs have made them feel more secure than they did before this administration -- before or immediately after 9-11.
I firmly believe that we Democrats have the capacity to demonstrate a much better approach -- a coherent plan and a wiser strategy for America. Most Americans want no part of politics practiced at the extremes, including the conduct of foreign policy. As this document stresses, which I hope you'll all read, the right place is, quote, "the vital center between the neo-imperial right and the non-interventionist left" -- end of quote. We want to see America exercising its strength and leadership. It will not be shy about exercising its responsibilities to combat terror, tyranny, genocide or oppression. We want to use our unparalleled power constructively and in the service of the values we say we hold so dear -- not just military power, but diplomatic power, economic power, and our moral suasion. An effective foreign policy must be much more than the exercise of military force, a hammer to solve all problems. We need to use every tool in the toolkit, which we have not been using.
As you know, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld likes to send internal memos that are dubbed "snowflakes." Well, last week one of them failed to melt before it floated into the public domain. Some cynics even suggest he deliberately had it float into the public domain. But I don't know how it got in the public domain, but it was startling to most. Most of the media focused on the parts of the memo that talked about "mixed results" with regard to al Qaeda, and the "long, hard slog" still ahead in Iraq. Those are important points, but to me, the most outstanding and astonishing part of the memo was Secretary Rumsfeld's admission that we still lack a long-term strategy for winning the war against terrorism. He asked -- not Joe Biden -- he asked, quote, "Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and radical clerics are recruiting and training?" Continuing the quote, "Does the U.S. need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists?"
Well, these are exactly the right questions to be asking. The only thing is, they're being asked about two years too late. And the short answer to that last question, "Do we need to fashion a broad, integrated plan," the answer is a resounding, yes, we need to fashion a broad, integrated plan. That's exactly what I think this work offers: a comprehensive strategy to make us all more secure, consistent with our values and with this country's extraordinary potential. The authors call this strategy progressive internationalism. In the speeches that I've made over the last year or so I've called it enlightened nationalism. But by whatever title, whatever label you put upon it, we reach the same conclusions and offer very similar prescriptions.
Simply put, this is a moment of extraordinary opportunity for the United States, and also a moment of extraordinary responsibility. American leadership is badly needed worldwide. Consider the threats not just to us, but to old friends in Europe, new partners like Russia, rising powers such as China and India, and modernizing countries in the Middle East, Latin America and Asia. The challenges we face are the same. They're terrorism, WMD, proliferation of WMD, rogue states, ethnic conflict, international crime and drug trafficking, the spread of infectious diseases, environmental degradation, and economic dislocation.
This is the first time in my career, and as a student of history, where it is not a zero sum game around the world. I think George Bush will be judged most harshly by the lost opportunities, the opportunities he squandered in the face of the aftermath of 9-11 to bring the world together in common purpose. Not one of these threats I mentioned has any respect for borders. Not one -- not one can be met solely with military force. America has an extraordinary opportunity to make common cause on these common concerns by working with others, not by walking alone; by building alliances with international institutions, as my friend Senator Bayh has indicated, not disparaging them; but also by insisting to those who preach the value of international rules of the road to understand they must be enforced. Those rules must be enforced when they're flouted, otherwise they're of no value.
If we adopt the broad priorities set out in this paper, if we fashion a strategic approach to our security that's been recommended by these fine people here today, I think we can seize the opportunity before us and bring the world together in a way it hasn't been in over a hundred years. I hope all of you will read this work with the same care that went into it. And I would suggest to you that this is the first foray of the Democratic Party into the real debate. The real debate is, what is our answer? What is our answer to an obviously failed foreign policy? This is the outline of that prescription and provides a great deal of detail.
I thank you for listening and I thank my colleagues here for giving me the honor of introducing this document, along with Senator Bayh, to all of you.
