Iraqis are now embroiled in a make-or-break struggle to put
together their first truly legitimate government since Saddam
Hussein's ouster. The success or failure of America's costly project
of regime change hangs in the balance.
After three years of intensifying violence, it's clear that our best
hopes for quelling the insurgency lie in the realm of Iraqi politics, not
U.S. military action. The key is to separate Sunni insurgents who see
themselves as defending Iraqi honor
and sovereignty from jihadist fanatics
who will never be reconciled to the new
political order. That will require political
deals that only Iraqis can make. The
United States can still play an important
supporting role in Iraq's experiment
in self-government, but it's time
for Americans to move off center stage.
This is not a call for pulling out of
Iraq. On the contrary, the debate in
Washington over deadlines for troop
withdrawals is a typically solipsistic
exercise that misses the point. The crucial
question is not how fast U.S. forces
leave, but whether Iraqis will subordinate
their ethnic and sectarian loyalties
to a new national identity. For nearly a
quarter-century, Saddam was the state
and the state was Saddam. Now, as they
watch their former dictator stand trial
for his crimes, his terrorized and brutalized
former subjects must shake off
their habitual passivity and reinvent
what it means to be Iraqi.
Saddam played cruelly but cunningly
on Iraq's deep-seated sectarian divisions
to maintain his power. The internal
jockeying among Iraq's major ethno-religious
groups, not the presence of
foreign troops, is the greatest obstacle
to the re-establishment of Iraqi
sovereignty. Getting the Americans out,
in fact, is one thing most Iraqis can
agree on, though they differ over the
timetable. They know that no homegrown
government will ever be fully
accepted, at home or in the region, if it
wields its authority in the shadow of
U.S. guns. By the same token, a new
Iraqi government would win instant
credibility by engaging Washington in
negotiations over withdrawing
American and coalition troops. This
would powerfully reinforce the Shiite-Kurdish message to disgruntled Sunnis:
If you really want to get rid of the occupation,
politics will get the job done
more quickly and easily than bombs
and bullets.
Instead of rushing to extricate ourselves
from Iraq, the United States
needs to give the new Iraqi politics time
to work. It will not be easy for the new
parliament to overcome the virulent
strain of identity politics that has
sparked communal violence and prevented
Iraq's fractious parts from fusing
into a larger whole. And if Sunnis
believe they can get what they want -- a
rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops -- simply
by waiting, they will have little
incentive to participate in good faith in
the new government. That's why a
gradual U.S. troop withdrawal, instigated
by the Iraqi government rather
than by the Pentagon or Congress, will
best serve our interests.
The election in December set the
stage for the political drama now
unfolding in Iraq. On the plus side, it
was the third national election in a single
year, no mean feat for a country
beset by the most savage insurgency in
memory. Turnout was 70 percent, up
from 58 percent in the January 2005
election, which most Sunnis boycotted.
This time, Sunnis, encouraged by most
of their political, tribal, and religious
leaders, participated en masse.
Although jihadists predictably condemned
the elections as an infidel plot
and murdered some Sunni politicians,
most insurgents took the day off.
It would be a mistake, however, to
read the Sunni about-face as a break
with violence or an unqualified
endorsement of the new Iraqi political
order. Sunni candidates typically
demanded an immediate end to the
hated occupation and promised to protect
their tribes and co-religionists from
Shiite and Kurdish domination. In
truth, though, Sunni voters were no
more parochial than other Iraqis.
Shiites and Kurds also voted their
group identities, while more secular
and nationalistic parties that were
expected to show some crossover
appeal -- such as former prime minister
Ayad Allawi's list -- did poorly.
The election brought Sunnis face to
face with a discomfiting reality: In a
democratic Iraq, they are distinctly a
minority. Long accustomed to thinking
of themselves as Iraq's rightful rulers,
Sunnis are now reduced to holding 20
percent of the seats in the new parliament.
The quick resumption of insurgent
attacks after the election suggested
that many Sunnis are playing a double
game that's all too familiar in the Arab
world: pursuing their interests in the
new political arena while continuing to
offer at least tacit support to violent
resistance.
Will Sunnis now join with the
Shiites and Kurds to form a unity government,
or will they seek to sabotage a
political settlement from within? Will
they make a clean break with the
jihadis, or use them as a counter in the
struggle for mastery of post-Saddam
Iraq? The answer will depend in large
measure on whether the Shiites and
Kurds are willing to make the concessions
and compromises necessary to
give elected Sunnis a significant role in
the new government. Over time, this
new class of elected leaders could supplant
the Baathist diehards as champions
of Sunni dignity and interests -- but
only if they can deliver tangible benefits
to their constituents.
The parliament's current efforts to
form a unity government pose the first
big test of Iraqis' willingness to reach
across ethnic and religious lines. Next
will come an equally momentous political
challenge: fulfilling promises to
Sunnis to amend the constitution
approved in a nationwide referendum
last October.
At stake is the essence of Iraqi
nationhood after Saddam. In fact,
Iraqis now face questions that parallel
those Americans wrestled with after
independence. What is to be the relationship
between mosque and state?
Should the new Iraq have a strong central
government, or should it be a federation
of distinct ethno-religious
regions?
This may prove to be the most contentious
issue of all. The Kurds already
have set up a virtual state within a state
in the north, and the largest Shiite
party insists on a similar arrangement
in the south. This would leave Sunnis
stranded in central and western Iraq,
regions that happen to be mostly
devoid of oil. Not only would such a
loose confederation be likely to aggravate
the Sunni insurgency, it would also
invite meddling by Iraq's neighbors:
Turks unhappy with a de facto Kurdish
state on their borders, Iranians eager to
help their Shiite brethren set up a second
Islamic republic, and Sunni Arab
leaders anxious to restore the fortunes
of their historically dominant counterparts
in Iraq.
What's more, Iraq's groups don't
divide neatly along geographic lines,
raising the nightmarish prospect of ethnic-
cleansing campaigns in areas shared
by Shiites, Kurds, Turkmen, and Sunni
Arabs. The major groups aren't monolithic,
either. Both the Shiite and Sunni
communities have significant minorities
that favor an Islamic theocracy.
Kurds are split into two regional parties
with a long history of violent feuding.
And everywhere, tribal and family ties
often seem far stronger than political
loyalties.
Given the fissiparous nature of Iraqi
society, democracy is not only possible,
it's possibly the only credible alternative
to Saddamism. That's an easy sell for
Shiites, for whom democracy means a
long-denied political empowerment,
but a tough one for Sunnis, many of
whom, according to a pre-election survey,
think they might be better off
under a friendly strongman.
Iraqis will have to blaze their own,
culturally distinct, trail to self-government.
But the United States should
use its still considerable leverage to
broker the political deals necessary to
form an inclusive government -- one
that transcends communal identities
and protects the rights of minorities,
yet is strong enough to govern. For
example, we should work with Iraqi
authorities to:
Bring more Sunnis into the national
army and police. A national army
composed mainly of Shiites and Kurds
will have a very hard time putting down
a mostly Sunni insurgency. The United
States should continue to press for a
reasonable de-Baathification program
that excludes Saddam's accomplices but
doesn't bar some of Iraq's most capable
officers merely because they were party
members. By embedding U.S. troops in
increasingly capable Iraqi units, we can
also help guard against human rights
abuses and revenge killings. As a further
confidence-building measure, we
should press the new government to
appoint Sunnis with clean hands to
key security posts, especially in the
defense and interior ministries.
Build functioning national institutions. The political center in Iraq is
unlikely to hold without a minimally
competent central government in
Baghdad. In its absence, Iraqis will look
to local and regional authorities dominated
by their own religious and clan
leaders to protect them and provide
basic services. The new national government
needs stronger institutions for
collecting taxes and duties, managing
the nation's finances and currency, setting
up a stock market and banking system,
modernizing Iraq's oil industry,
and providing basic services like electricity
and water. The new government
will also need help in dealing with such
tricky issues as defining the relationship
between religion and the state, and
between civil law and Sharia or Islamic
law. The U.S. government, which has
about $3 billion left from an $18.4 billion
reconstruction aid package, should
shift its spending from local schools
and roads to building national institutions.
Oil-rich Arab states as well as
international donors, who have yet to
deliver on a promised $13 billion in aid
for Iraq, should also pitch in.
Encourage wealth-sharing. In Iraq,
political power traditionally has been
linked to the control of oil, which
accounts for 85 percent of state earnings.
One of the chief Sunni complaints
is that the new constitution would tilt
oil revenues toward Shiite and Kurdish
regions "deprived" of their due under
Saddam. (See sidebar.) Instead, we
should encourage changes in the basic
law that would send oil revenues to the
national treasury for redistribution to
the provinces on an equal, per-capita
basis -- with a healthy chunk directed
into personal savings accounts for Iraqi's
27 million people. This would give all
citizens a personal stake in the new
regime and reduce the odds that the
new government will be paralyzed by
perennial jockeying for control of oil.
Lower the U.S. profile. Finally, 2006
should also see significant reductions in
U.S. forces in Iraq. As we transfer more
security responsibilities to Iraqi forces,
we should negotiate a phased withdrawal
of U.S. troops with Baghdad.
Some would go home, but some would
go "over the horizon," perhaps to
Kuwait and the Kurdish north. For
some time to come, it will be necessary
for the U.S. military to keep a rapid
redeployment force in the region,
including air power, special forces, and
some heavy ground units. They will
serve as an insurance policy against
insurgent efforts to overwhelm Iraqi
security forces and as a symbol of
America's unflagging commitment to a
unified Iraq.
At the same time, we should concentrate
our counterinsurgency efforts
in and around Baghdad. Home to
roughly one-third of the country's people,
culturally diverse, and historically
the center of Mesopotamian and
Islamic civilization, Baghdad is synonymous
with the Iraqi nation. A visible
reduction in insurgent violence there
would greatly enhance the new government's
prestige and give confidence that
something like normal life is at last possible
in post-Saddam Iraq.
All this will require a political dexterity
that has so far eluded the Bush
administration. For nearly three years,
the president has clung to an idée fixe: that Iraqi politics will fall into place
once the U.S. military has defeated the
insurgency. In reality, it's the other way
around: It will take a breakthrough on
the political front to split nationalist
Sunni insurgents from jihadists like Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi. The administration
should heed U.S. commanders on the
ground, who understand that a diminishing
U.S. military presence can bolster
the new government's legitimacy.
The next six months will challenge
Democrats, too. Instead of
debating deadlines for withdrawal,
Democrats should give politics a
chance. That will require patience
and tolerance for imperfect compromises
and occasional backsliding.
Analyst Anthony Cordesman puts it
well: "One needs to be very careful
about assuming that Iraq's new government
must solve every issue at once, or
that it must find all such answers soon
after the new government is formed.
Compromise, delay, and deferral are
excellent political solutions; so are half-measures
and cosmetic actions. Governments
muddle through because political
realties force them to, and because 'muddling'
is far more stable and uniting than
acting with clarity and efficiency."
Despite President Bush's high-flown
rhetoric, we probably won't see
Jeffersonian democracy emerge anytime
soon in Iraq. But it's too early to
give up on the prospect that Iraqis
can forge a decent, representative
regime that won't pose a threat to
their people or to ours. And if
America can succeed in making Iraq
safe for political pluralism, it will hasten
the day of our departure.
