Introduction

Democrats are rightly optimistic about their prospects in the midterm elections of 2006. The poor record of the Bush administration at home and abroad; the inability of a Republican-controlled Congress to address any of the major challenges facing the nation; and the descent of the GOP as a whole into a downward cycle of extremism, corruption, incompetence, and fundamental dishonesty have all laid the groundwork for a political sea-change this November. This climate for change appears powerful enough to overcome the built-in Republican advantages created by partisan gerrymandering, the sheer number of "red states," and the ruthless exercise of the powers of incumbency.

But even if Democrats succeed in making major gains later this year, and even if they achieve such once-distant goals as the recapture of Congress and a clear majority of governorships, building an enduring Democratic majority will require a persistent and strategic effort, beginning with the presidential election of 2008.

There have been three distinct if nonexclusive schools of thought about how Democrats can break through the partisan parity of recent years and achieve that sort of long-term majority.

One theory is that demographic trends will ultimately produce a Democratic majority -- a theory often associated with high expectations about Hispanic population growth, and an assumption that Republican policies will continue to keep minority voters, unmarried women, and socially moderate professionals disproportionately in the Democratic column.

A second theory is that perfecting state-of- the-art voter mobilization techniques and making heavy investments in the infrastructure for maximizing "base" turnout can boost the Democratic vote sufficiently to create a national majority. This theory is typically associated with the belief that Republican victories in 2002 and 2004 were primarily attributable to superior GOP mobilization efforts.

And a third theory is that Democrats must increase their geographical and demographic reach, particularly in fast-growing areas of the country, through message-based persuasion, expanding the Democratic base.

The DLC undertook the present study in order to test these three theories against recent voting trends as exhibited in the past two presidential contests, with a special emphasis on rates of growth in the voting-age population, and the partisan distribution of votes in fast- and slow-growing areas of the "battleground" states.

Our major findings are:

1. There is a very strong correlation nationally and in many states between Republican voting performance and voting-age-population (VAP) growth rates, in large and small counties, suburbs, exurbs, "fringe" areas, and small towns. To put it simply, and with some important exceptions, Republican areas are growing rapidly while Democratic areas are not. In 2004, Republicans benefited crucially from an expanding pool of potential voters in their base areas, while Democrats suffered from a shrinking or stagnant pool of potential voters in their base areas. For the immediate future, demography will not of itself create a Democratic majority.

2. The evidence from 2004 shows that voting-age-population growth in Republican areas, not voter mobilization, was the single most important factor in helping the GOP boost its vote from four years earlier. Conversely, Democratic turnout efforts, especially in large cities, were very successful, often producing sharp increases in total votes and Democratic votes despite reductions in the VAP.

3. Successful Democratic mobilization efforts, given prevailing growth trends, may soon reach the point of diminishing returns if not combined with broader geographical voter targeting and a message-driven effort to hold down or eclipse Republican margins in fast-growing areas.

4. To win close national elections in the future, Democrats must expand their base with outreach and persuasion to voters in fast-growing areas. Otherwise, even the most exceptional Democratic voter mobilization techniques and investments will struggle to produce more votes from fewer potential voters.

5. It is not hard to find examples of "success stories" in which non-presidential Democratic candidates have performed well in Republican-tilting high growth areas through a combination of strategic targeting and a message congenial to voters in such areas. Ken Salazar's 2004 Senate campaign in Colorado, Mike Easley's gubernatorial re-election campaign in North Carolina that same year, and Tim Kaine's 2005 gubernatorial victory in Virginia are all good examples of Democrats who were able to expand the party base in fast-growing areas.

The bottom line is that Democrats should not rely solely on demography or mobilization to win close elections at the national level and in many states. Later this year, the DLC will release new public opinion research examining the characteristics and views of persuadable voters in high-growth areas, and the progressive messages and policies best suited to reach them. But for the moment, we believe it is important that Democrats look at the country as it is, and as it is likely to be, and dedicate themselves to an effort to expand their ranks into what has previously been considered "enemy territory."