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Work, Family & Community
Strengthening Families

DLC | Blueprint Magazine | February 7, 2001
Tax Relief for Working Families
By David R. Riemer

Table of Contents

As America replaces welfare with work, we continue to be plagued by the law of unintended consequences. Here's an illustration:

A single mother and the father of her two children have been living together for five years -- now they want to get married. She earns $12,000, he earns $20,000. Because of her low income, the mother will get an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) of $3,888, the legal maximum in 2000. They're confused about the tax laws but want to do the right thing for their children. So they seek advice from a minister and an accountant.

The couple: Should we get married?

The minister: Yes. You love each other. You want to get married. You owe it to your children, your faith, and God to stop living in sin and take wedding vows.

The accountant: But if you do, your earnings for EITC purposes will rise from $12,000 to $32,000, your credit will drop from $3,888 to zero, and you'll be taking thousands of dollars out of the mouths of the children you love.

The couple: Sounds like it would be immoral for us to get married.

The minister: Why does the U.S. government do this to me?

This, in one of its most brutal forms, is a prime example of the marriage penalty. In 2000, Congress passed a bill aimed at eliminating the marriage penalty for people with middle class incomes -- but it was vetoed by President Clinton because of its cost. A fundamental flaw in the legislation was that it barely touched one of our tax code's biggest and most socially damaging taxes on matrimony: the penalty for low--income workers eligible for the EITC.

The EITC is a refundable tax credit that supplements the earnings of low-income workers. President Clinton in 1993 got Congress to approve a dramatic, $21 billion expansion of the credit as the cornerstone of his efforts to "make work pay." As a result, the once obscure tax credit has blossomed into the federal government's largest and most effective anti-poverty initiative. But the way it is structured imposes a heavy fine on marriage for millions of low-income workers with children.

The EITC marriage penalty, in fact, is part of a larger conundrum that has caught the attention of policy analysts and lawmakers: In our largely successful efforts to replace welfare with work, we've unwittingly created a new trap -- a giant earnings tax. Here's how it works: As low-income families earn more money, the value of various public supports -- the EITC, food stamps, and certain state tax breaks -- begins to decline and eventually reaches zero. Meanwhile, low-income families are often required to make co-payments, often a percentage of their income, to retain child care and health insurance. Economists see this phasing-out of public subsidies and phasing-in of co-payments as tantamount to a tax on someone's private earnings and therefore a disincentive to further effort.

The earnings tax affects America's poor and "near poor" working families and even a large segment of the middle class. If a worker earns less than $6.25 per hour or $12,500 per year, work does indeed pay. Earnings get a 40 percent to 60 percent boost from a combination of the EITC, food stamps, and free or cheap child care and health care, which are also augmented by such state tax devices as supplemental state EITCs, Homestead Credits, and exemptions from taxation altogether. This pushes up a worker's disposable income to the equivalent of $8 to $9 per hour, or $16,000 to $18,000 per year. But once earnings rise above $6.25 per hour or $12,500 per year, work doesn't continue to pay for a huge segment of American families. Above $6.25 per hour, earnings increases translate for many into very sluggish growth in disposable income. At certain income notch points, where an extra $1 of earnings spells the loss of an entire benefit or the onset of a copayment, higher earnings actually yield lower overall income. The problem persists until about $15.75 per hour or $31,500 per year -- a spread of $19,000 that encompasses a vast swath of the U.S. population.

The very programs that help workers under $6.25 per hour get above (or closer to reaching) the poverty line simultaneously punish workers making from $6.25 to $15.75 per hour, in the sense of causing their work to not continue to pay. The heart of the problem is the basic structure of the EITC, food stamps, child care and health care subsidies, and various state tax provisions that help the poor. All these programs have one thing in common. They impose a high tax on earnings, hitting hardest those making between $6.25 and $15.75 per hour.

For the EITC alone, the effective tax rate for a working mom with two kids is 21 cents for every dollar earned. Most of the other programs -- food stamps, child care copays, health care copays, and state tax breaks -- impose lower taxes on earnings, but they still pinch. Each program's separate tax on earnings might be tolerable if standing alone. But their combined tax rate is huge. Including the federal payroll tax that automatically takes 7.65 percent of every dollar, the cumulative tax rate often exceeds 50 percent, at times rises to near 70 percent. These high effective tax rates remain in place until as much as $15.75 per hour, at which point the EITC -- and the huge portion of the combined earnings tax it imposes -- disappears. If a wage earner has children, work doesn't pay much. Sometimes it doesn't pay at all.

When two people combine their incomes by getting married, the earnings tax becomes a marriage penalty. Because the EITC is based on total family earnings and drops rapidly when family earnings exceed the start of the EITC "phase-out range" ($12,690 in 2000), a worker with children often ends up worse off if she gets married to another worker. Especially if she's already living with him and they're sharing their incomes and household expenses, getting married frequently means a big EITC loss with few offsetting economic gains. Why marry?

Supporters of the EITC, food stamp advocates, and proponents of expanded child care and health care must begin to talk more openly and honestly about the unintended but very negative side effects built into the very structure of these programs. If we don't curb the powerful work and marriage disincentives that these programs create, then those who don't care about the poor will exploit program flaws to try to block further help for the working poor and the near poor.

Only a radical solution is possible. Just as welfare was so fundamentally flawed that it could not be reformed but required a complete replacement, the solution to the structural defects inherent in these programs is to eliminate entirely the current policy of phasing out benefits. Ultimately, we should also stop imposing co-payments for child care and health care.

The logical starting point is the federal EITC. First, it is the biggest part of the problem. The EITC phase-out rate is the cause of the system's biggest work and marriage penalties. Second, today's bipartisan interest in cutting federal taxes offers a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to fix the EITC's work and marriage penalties as an integral part of a popular middle class tax cut.

While minor adjustments in the EITC have merit, the only way to cure the huge work and marriage penalties built into the credit's phase-out is to abolish the EITC phase-out entirely. Just get rid of it. Let everyone who reaches the maximum credit -- $2,353 for a family with one child and $3,888 for a family with two children -- continue to qualify for the maximum credit whether they're poor, working class, middle class, or wealthy. Extending the maximum EITC credit to the middle class (and beyond) would thus become the heart of the middle class tax cut that Congress enacts.

From a Democratic perspective, this combination of EITC reform with a middle class tax cut is far more equitable than trimming the tax rate. The group that Democrats claim a special concern for, the poor and near poor, benefit twice: Their work is rewarded by rising incomes and their marriages aren't discouraged. But ordinary Americans -- the Democrats' working and middle class political base -- also win big. They get a big tax cut, and they get the exact same dollar tax cuts as the wealthy.

EITC reform also makes sense for Republicans who see it as a vehicle for cutting taxes. It cuts the taxes of the upper middle class. It cuts the taxes of the wealthy. It eliminates the penalty on both marriage and work, which they say they care about.

Obviously, ending the EITC's phase-out will be costly. But Congress seems poised to spend a lot of the surplus on tax cuts anyway. The question is not whether the federal government will cut Americans' taxes, but whether a large tax cut will perpetuate or end the current anti-work and anti-marriage bias of the tax code. Do we keep on punishing the poor and near poor or do we reward them for working and marrying as we lower taxes on the middle class and the wealthy?

If we end the EITC phaseout, everybody wins.

David R. Riemer works as director of administration for the city of Milwaukee. He is the board chair of the New Hope Project, Milwaukee's work-based model for assisting low-income adults, and was one of the architects of Wisconsin's W-2 welfare replacement program.