China's record of weapons sales, technology transfers, and nuclear energy assistance, particularly to Iran and Pakistan, has been a key security concern for the United States over the last decade. Now, with legislation to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations status (PNTR) pending in the Senate, Senators Fred Thompson (R-TN) and Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) have introduced the "China Non-Proliferation Act", S. 2645. This bill would provide an annual review mechanism of, mandatory penalties for, and an escalating scale of response to Chinese proliferation of nuclear and other weapons. While national security concerns will remain a central element of the U.S. relationship with China, the approach in this legislation handcuffs presidential discretion in foreign policy, unnecessarily singles out China, is a redundant addition to existing U.S. laws and multilateral treaties, and is a blunt instrument that will undermine rather than advance efforts toward reducing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons. We need a tough but smart approach toward non-proliferation.
Critics in Congress charge that the Administration has turned a blind eye to China's proliferation activities. They point to evidence such as the Rumsfeld Commission report of July 1998. It concluded that:
"China poses a threat as a significant proliferator of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and enabling technology. It has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid fuel ballistic missile program and has supplied Pakistan with a design for nuclear weapons and additional nuclear weapons assistance. It has even transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. China's behavior thus far makes it appear unlikely it will soon effectively reduce its country's sizable transfers of critical technologies, experts, or expertise, to the emerging missile powers."
On the other hand, the Clinton Administration argues that China has taken a number of steps in recent years that suggest it is reassessing its weapons sales and assistance policies. Among other things, China in 1992 promised to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 1993, China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); in 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and in 1997, China joined the Zangger Committee, which coordinates nuclear export policies among NPT members. In 1998, China committed to prevent the export of equipment and technology that could in any way assist programs in India and Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons.
In truth, the Chinese record on proliferation is mixed, requiring a flexible and nuanced approach on behalf of the United States. For example, in May 1997, the United States imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities for assisting Iran's chemical weapons program and encouraged the Chinese government to strengthen its export control system to prevent such transfers. In August 1993, the United States imposed sanctions on Chinese entities for shipment of missile-related equipment to Pakistan. Following negotiations, China agreed in October 1994 to a global ban on sales of Missile Technology Control-Regime (MTCR)-class ground-to-ground missiles, which is a stricter commitment than the MTCR requires. These instances show that developing a successful China policy, one of the greatest challenges faced by the United States in the next century, will require a combination of rewards and sanctions, or "carrots and sticks."
In an effort to respond to China's proliferation activities, Senators Thompson and Torricelli have introduced the "China Non-Proliferation Act", S. 2645. Unfortunately, this bill is all sticks and hampers the President's ability to develop and use the carrots when necessary. It would provide an annual review mechanism and escalating scale of responses to future Chinese proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missile technologies, and advanced conventional weapons. Under the legislation, if any person, company, or group in China violated international nonproliferation treaties or agreements or U.S. export laws in ways that contribute to proliferation, the President would be required to impose sanctions both on the proliferator and on China.
The President would also be required to impose a non-trade sanction on the Chinese, chosen from a list of escalating sanctions, with these measures increasing in both degree and number over time if the proliferation was not stopped. The President could exercise a waiver if he or she felt that the imposition of sanctions was detrimental to U.S. national security. But, if the President used this authority to avoid imposing mandatory sanctions, Congress would have an expedited review procedure common in other laws to allow members to introduce legislation compelling the President to impose a sanction.
While the legislation is rightly concerned with monitoring and responding to China's proliferation activities, the approach taken is both redundant and counterproductive to current U.S. anti-proliferation policy. Our current approach is to enforce U.S. export control laws and encourage China to adhere to international anti-proliferation norms. Passing new unilateral anti-proliferation legislation, targeted specifically at China, will undermine our attempts to engage China and influence their direction in regional security issues. In addition, this approach has some specific drawbacks:
The bill is an unnecessary addition to existing U.S. non-proliferation laws. There are a number of existing arms control and non-proliferation laws that target proliferation actions by Chinese and American firms and individuals and address many of the concerns raised by the Thompson legislation. In addition, since China is by no means the only threat for nuclear and other weapons proliferation, any additional measures should be targeted at all nations involved in proliferation, not specifically at China.
The legislation marks a shift toward U.S. unilateralism. While the legislation rightly allows for penalties to be imposed on the specific firm or individual violating the law, it also requires the United States to impose sanctions on China as a whole if any violations are found. More disturbing are the bill's provisions that would impose these penalties on China for violating international agreements to which China is not yet a party, and for sale or transfer of indigenously developed and produced goods and services, even inside China itself. This unilateral use of sanctions will not necessarily achieve the desired outcome of ending proliferation, could lead to retaliation, and will likely undermine U.S. relations with our allies. Indeed, the stipulation that the United States impose sanctions or penalties on any company found to be violating international non-proliferation treaties that China has not yet signed has no basis in international law, and is strongly opposed by all our important allies.
The penalties are too broad and give a false impression of escalation. Even some of the bill's Tier 1 measures (required to be imposed even if only one individual is found to be breaking the law on one occasion) are very broad and include penalties such as suspending all U.S. foreign assistance to China or prohibiting all U.S. bank loans or bond offerings for Chinese state-owned or affiliated businesses. Such sanctions would undermine other important U.S. objectives, such as stable economic development in China, and would target firms and individuals not involved in proliferation activities without impacting directly on the problem of proliferation itself. In addition, some of the Tier 1 penalties are arguably stronger than those in Tier 3, resulting in a complex system of penalties with no clear logic of escalation.
The system of mandatory penalties ties the hand of any future Administration. Managing the complex, and often delicate, U.S.-China relationship requires flexibility and careful judgement. Yet, the detailed system of reporting, imposing penalties, and escalating those penalties outlined in this bill effectively ensures a pre-stipulated, micromanagement of U.S.-China national security issues by the U.S. Congress. In addition, the likely outcome of the President employing the waiver on sanctions is an annual congressional vote on imposing sanctions on China (similar to the MFN ritual of the past).
There are important problems providing credible information. The bill calls for an annual report on Chinese proliferation activities. Gathering and collating information on proliferation is a difficult task and fraught with identification and verification problems. It is not clear who would produce this report, how, or with what checks and balances against false claims. False or incomplete information would be particularly costly in this instance because proliferators identified in the report face mandatory penalties. Moreover, this bill creates a system in which the executive branch is reporting on, analyzing, and potentially sanctioning its own activities. Reporting and monitoring of this type should be done by an independent agency or group, with specialist staff and the necessary resources, not by a part of the very executive branch being monitored.
Managing China's emergence as a global power is the biggest foreign policy challenge of the 21st century. The Progressive Policy Institute favors a tough-minded approach of bringing China into the multilateral system while ensuring our vital, national security interests. As China increasingly has a stake in the stability and security of the global economic system, it will increasingly define its own security interests in non-proliferation in ways compatible with the United States and our allies. Furthermore, China is playing an increasingly active and constructive role in Asian security and stability. Engagement by the United States can influence China's future orientation and determine whether it will help or hinder U.S. interests.
There are legitimate concerns about proliferation: reports of the transfer of missile equipment and technology to Iran and Pakistan, and transfers of dual-use items that could be used by Iran in its chemical weapons program. In response, the United States should continue to implement U.S. law, including past imposition of sanctions related to China's export of missile technology and chemical weapons. The United States should continue to monitor China's activities closely, and work toward a common understanding on effective export control policies, and strengthen existing national export control systems. Tough-minded engagement is key to advancing non-proliferation objectives.
