Adapted from the book The Way to Win: Taking the White House in 2008
by Mark Halperin & John F. Harris
(Random House, 2006)
Building a durable centrist
majority largely by transcending
ideology and
splitting the difference
when possible remains the
essence of Clinton Politics. Bill
Clinton saw the job of the president
as being a national synthesizer. He
aimed to select the best ideas from
all parts of the ideological spectrum
and reassemble them in ways that
met the practical needs of an electorate
interested in results instead of
ideology. He embraced some traditionally
conservative goals, such as
balanced budgets and the elimination
of a 1930s-era welfare system,
but tried to preserve liberal principles
in the implementation. He
took some traditionally liberal
goals, such as expanding access to
higher education, but pursued them
through conservative means, such
as tax credits. He was convinced
that many of the disputes of the
modern political arena were artificial,
deliberately manufactured, or
at least exaggerated, by candidates,
operatives, and interest groups inclined
to exploit conflict, not facilitate
consensus.
Bush Politics is a political strategy
based on expanding executive power,
drawing sharp ideological divides
between the parties, defying rather
than compromising with adversaries,
marginalizing the Old Media, and
exploiting the New Media. George
Bush sees himself as a national clarifier.
In the main, he and Karl Rove believe
the disputes that animate American
politics are deep and genuine. While
preaching the virtues of civility, Bush
is willing to split the country over
what he considered to be basic points:
Are taxes too high or too low?
What is the proper balance of force
versus persuasion in America's relations
with the world? Are liberal
interests disproportionately influential
as measured against the views
of the majority?
For Bush, dividing the electorate
is an acceptable avenue to a consequential
presidency, one that will
make the country's policies and
institutions more conservative than
they have been for generations.
Shortly after the 2004 election,
the advantages of Bush Politics
seemed particularly evident. Bush
had indeed divided the country,
but on terms favorable to him and
his values. He had spent much of
his first term signing laws and executive
orders that moved the country
in a more conservative direction,
routinely backed by the fervent
support of a bare majority of
Congress, rather than by overwhelming
public enthusiasm.
Yet in the days before the 2006 election,
the defects of Bush Politics were
acutely evident. Bush Politics works
only when it is harnessed to clear policy
successes. Bush's impassioned base gave
him 51 percent of the country in 2004,
but the campaign strategy of confrontation
guaranteed that a hefty
chunk of the losing 49 percent was
equally impassioned in their scorn.
This exposed Bush and Rove to constant
risk that the percentages would
reverse themselves, as they did in the
2006 election. Republicans turned on
Bush in ways that would have been
unthinkable a few months earlier. The
backlash was evident on right-wing
blogs, on talk radio, and on Capitol
Hill. Liberals watched with glee.
Many of the White House's setbacks
seemed to flow from an attempt to
apply Bush Politics within the executive
branch. While it can be a brutally
effective strategy for winning elections,
Bush Politics entails risks for the long
haul. Clinton Politics, with its emphasis
on high approval ratings and its
constant shifting and improvisation,
may be less emotionally satisfying for
partisan loyalists and less conducive to
producing major ideological change,
but it is a reliable means of maintaining
a politically resilient presidency.
Bush Politics is incompatible with
Bush's professed desire to change the
tone in Washington. A president committed
to making national politics
more civil must expect to occasionally
pay a price, to take a hit from the
opposition, and to refrain from delivering
a blow, even if a good opportunity
appears.
Even as Bush's support faltered in
2006, Bush Politics remained an attractive
political strategy for many people,
Democrats as well as Republicans.
Impatient with the cautious, defensive-minded
maneuvering that they correctly
associate with Clinton Politics, many
left-wing partisans are eager for their
own side to embrace the confrontational,
unapologetic brand of politics
associated with Bush and Rove. What
some want is a liberal version of Bush
Politics. Let's finally get tough and do to
them what they did to us, many
Democrats bellow. They are persuaded
that fulfilling a liberal agenda,
including ending the war in Iraq, paying
for universal health care coverage,
and raising taxes on the wealthy and
corporate interests, requires such a
posture. Even Clinton's achievements
do not impress many Democrats who
have been radicalized by the Bush
years.
It seems possible that both parties
in 2008 will have nomination contests
in which Bush Politics faces off
against Clinton Politics. Every candidate
will make a fundamental choice:
Do they wish to base their candidacy
on unifying themes and crossover
appeal between the parties? Or do
they wish to accept the divisions in
the electorate as essentially unbridgeable
and strive to win an ideological
and partisan argument?
***
More than any other election
before it, the 2008 showdown will
be fought in the shadow of a new
and fierce phenomenon in American
politics: the Freak Show.
The Freak Show is about the
fundamental changes in media
and politics that have converged
to tear down old restraints in
campaigns and public debate.
The power of the Freak Show
has developed through the destabilization
of political journalism
practiced by the so-called Old
Media, which includes the
broadcast television networks,
major newspapers, and national
weekly news magazines. The relative
decline of the Old Media has been
caused partly by the rise of the New
Media, which includes the Internet,
talk radio, and cable television. These
changes have contributed to polarization.
While polarization is not a new
phenomenon in American history,
the Freak Show is new. Its incentives
for divisiveness are embedded deeply
in political and media culture. These
incentives -- for publicity, for influence,
for money, for votes -- favor
more extreme and uncompromising
positions, provoking the ruthless
tearing down of adversaries.
Opponents are portrayed not simply
as wrong but as morally flawed.
The engines of the Freak Show
operate at the center of national politics,
not just at the margins. The
anger and negativity of the Freak
Show have supplanted the genuine
and productive arguments that
should be at the center of national
politics.
The supreme challenge for any
presidential candidate is keeping control
of his or her public image in the
face of the Freak Show's destructive
power. Successful candidates have a
strategy for insulating themselves
from the Freak Show (and, when
possible, for exploiting it against their
opponents). For both idealistic and
realistic reasons, the best way to
accomplish this is to have something
important to say. The Freak Show is
the enemy of ideas. But ideas are also
the enemy of the Freak Show.
Politicians are seeking to navigate
a wild new age in our democracy, a
challenge in which every American --
including the next president of the
United States -- has a stake. The Freak
Show was a decisive factor in Bush's
2004 win. Bush was running for reelection
at a time when polls showed
many voters were not satisfied with
the general direction of the country
and his job approval ratings were
below the levels at which a president
is considered safe to retain the office.
Bush's strategists knew their candidate
would be in danger if the election
was viewed primarily as a referendum
on the previous four years.
The race had to be seen as a choice
between Bush and Sen. John Kerry.
The principal goals of the Bush campaign,
therefore, were to persuade
undecided voters that Kerry was an
unacceptable alternative and to energize
core supporters who were devoted
to the president and disliked the
senator. The Bush team pursued
those targets by harnessing the poisonous
strength of the new political-media
environment.
This strategy almost certainly
would not have worked in a past era,
when the major newspapers and television
networks of the Old Media
controlled the climate. A primary
characteristic of Freak Show politics is
the deterioration of Old Media filters.
In the past, the Old Media tended to
sift and suppress the angriest and
most sensational elements of politics,
using its editorial sensibility to shape
voters' judgments. But in the modern
era, the power of the Old Media has
weakened, challenged by the ideologically
driven news organizations, websites,
and pundit-provocateurs that
make up the New Media.
The simultaneous stumble of the
Old Media and the rise of the New
have had a disproportionate impact
on the two warring sides in American
politics. While there are plenty of
conservatives who have been singed
(or even burned at the stake) by the
Freak Show, on the whole, these
changes have been beneficial for conservatives
and bad for liberals, since
the New Media overwhelmingly
favors conservatives. There is no liberal
equivalent of the Fox News
Channel, or Rush Limbaugh, or the
Drudge Report, all of which have significant
audiences and a demonstrated
ability to promote controversies
and story lines that affect the Old
Media. The Left, enraged by Bush's
presidency and humiliated by the
Right's successes in message control,
lately has moved to promote its own
New Media agents, especially bloggers.
In the same manner as their conservative
counterparts, these liberal
voices seethe with contempt for what
they regard as the hypocrisy and
incompetence of the Old Media.
The Left, likewise, has embraced
its own brand of Freak Show politics,
with a similar emphasis on accusation
and ideological fervor. There is no
reason to expect, however, that by
2008, the Left will have altered the
fundamental balance of the right-leaning
Freak Show.
The New Media's bias toward
Republicans is unfair. But the New
Media's growth was fueled by a
widespread perception on the right
that the Old Media's favoritism
toward Democrats, while less overt,
was itself unfair. An Old Media tilt to
the left existed for decades before the
Freak Show, and still exists, albeit
with diminished potency. The Right
took its grievances and embraced a
brand of New Media journalism that
was less responsible and more blatant
in its personal and ideological prejudices.
Alarmed by this challenge to its
primacy, the Old Media too often
responded not with a recommitment
to high standards, but by allowing
the New Media to commandeer the
Old Media agenda. This downward
cycle has defined coverage of recent
presidential campaigns, and it will be
even more pervasive in the next one.
Twisted incentives. In the Age of
the Freak Show, centrist values such
as rhetorical restraint, ideological
moderation, and compromise with
opponents are increasingly impoverished.
Extremist values such as
rhetorical invective, ideological purity,
and partisan loyalty are richly
rewarded. To be sure, it is rational to
seek power, fame, and wealth. But
the cumulative effect of these incentives
and the actions they inspire is a
political system constantly staggering
toward the irrational.
The Right's New Media infrastructure,
unlike the Left's, is large
enough that conservative partisans
can receive all their news from it --
effectively de-legitimizing and
marginalizing any Old Media story
line to which they object. Old Media
journalists can challenge Republican
politicians, but these politicians can
choose to ignore them, confident
that their supporters will pay no
heed to the criticism, and that they
have effective venues to make their
case. And there has been no more
effective venue for promoting the
Freak Show agenda in presidential
politics than the website run out of
the Miami apartment of Matt
Drudge, the impresario of the
attacked-based personality-obsessed
politics that is the Freak Show's signature.
According to Nielsen Net Ratings,
the Drudge Report website
receives between 180 and 200 million
page views a month, along with
around 3 million unique visitors.
Drudge's readers count on him to be
a clearinghouse for the latest bizarre,
or inflammatory, or salacious stories
moving in the world of news or popular
culture, and especially in politics.
Among those who regularly
click on the page is Karl Rove.
Members of the Gang of 500 --
which, according to the New Yorker,
includes "the campaign consultants,
strategists, pollsters, pundits, and
journalists who make up the modern-
day political establishment" --
all read the Drudge Report. If the
greatest challenge of any person
seeking the presidency is keeping
control of his or her public image,
and the great obstacle to this control
is the Freak Show, then Matt
Drudge is the gatekeeper. In this
sense, he is the Walter Cronkite of
his era.
In any case, the die is cast: The next
presidential election will take place in a
Freak Show environment more virulent
than anything Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush ever faced. With 16
straight years of polarizing presidents,
new bloggers
and websites popping
up daily, a poisoned
tone in Washington, unshackled
interest groups,
campaign finance laws
that help channel money toward shadowy
sources, and the further decline
of the Old Media's commitment to
serious news coverage -- with all that,
plus a wide-open race with no incumbent
president or vice president running
-- the 2008 election is sure to be
one in which nearly every hand reaching
for the brass ring will be wearing
brass knuckles.