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Ideas




The Third Way
International

DLC | The New Democrat | May 1, 1999
New Democrats, New Labour
By Robert Philpot

Two years after his historic election victory, British Prime Minister Tony Blair remains his country's most popular leader since World War II. Blair's New Labour government is on equally solid footing: His government leads the opposition Conservative Party by record figures in the opinion polls.

Yet in November 1994, at roughly the same point in his own first administration, President Clinton's approval ratings were sagging and the Democrats had handed control of Congress to the Republicans for the first time since Dwight D. Eisenhower was in office.

The midterm fates of Britain's first Labour government in 18 years and the first Democratic president in 12 years are intimately related -- and highly instructive. While the American public in 1994 chastised Clinton, fairly or not, for failing to govern as the New Democrat he campaigned as in 1992, Britons are rewarding Blair for remaining true to the pledge he delivered on the doorstep of 10 Downing St. two years ago: "We campaigned as New Labour, and we will govern as New Labour."

Clearly, New Labour has learned an important lesson from Clinton's early miscues: Always govern as you were elected.

Closely Bound Fates

The rise of New Labour is closely bound up with the rise of the New Democrats. Like the Democratic Party of the 1980s, the Labour Party was shipwrecked on the rocks of the electorate's disapproval. Like the Democrats, Labour in the 1980s was perceived as weak, divided, and extremist. As Philip Gould, a senior adviser to Blair, remarked recently: "Labour had not merely stopped listening or lost touch: It had declared political war on the values, instincts, and ethics of the great majority of decent, hard-working voters."

Too many voters believed Labour could not be trusted to run the economy; that despite its well-intentioned desire to reduce unemployment and poverty, its inability to control spending, taxes, and inflation would ultimately prove disastrous. Labour's tax and welfare policies suggested an indifference to the value of work and even an inability to understand that most of its working-class supporters aspired to a middle-class standard of living.

Labour's support for unilateral nuclear disarmament was ruthlessly exploited by the Conservatives, who suggested that the party was unpatriotic and unwilling to defend Britain against the Soviets. Labour's weakness on defense also found a parallel on the home front: Would the party stand up to its allies in the labor movement and prevent a return to the strike-ridden days of the 1970s?

Like George Bush's election in 1988, John Major's in 1992 provided the impetus for change within Labour's ranks. Faced with weak opponents and an underlying desire on the part of many voters for change, Labour should have won in 1992. That it did not reflected the fact that despite party leader Neil Kinnock's attempt to haul Labour back to the political center, many British voters continued to harbor deep fears about the party.

For Labour's modernizers -- led by Blair and Gordon Brown, now chancellor of the Exchequer -- Labour's defeat coupled with Clinton's 1992 victory provided irrefutable evidence of the need for renewal. Slowly under the leadership of Kinnock's successor, John Smith (who died suddenly in 1994 after heading the party for two years), and then at breakneck speed under Blair, Labour has learned the lessons not only of its own defeats, but also of the New Democrats' early victories and setbacks. Blair's political instincts would always have led him in the direction of modernization. But Clinton's victory in 1992, the Democrats' difficulties in 1994, and the President's return to his New Democrat roots and re-election in 1996 validated Blair's beliefs.

Slaughtering a Sacred Cow

The modernization battle has not been easy. Clinton's arrival in the White House was met in Britain by warnings from the old left that Labour should not go down the path of "Clintonization," which they deemed all shadow and no substance. Moreover, having denied that Labour could learn anything from Clinton's victory in 1992, many on the British left were keen to prove that there were clear lessons in his stumble in 1994: Try and govern from the center and you'll alienate your traditional supporters, allowing your opponents to triumph.

Blair disagreed. Throughout the 1992 presidential election campaign, Clinton was able to back his claim that he would deliver change by pointing to the way he had changed his party's platform. With the slogan "New Labour, New Britain" emblazoned behind him, Blair's first speech to the Labour Party conference as leader in 1994 was a variation on this theme. As the speech drew to a close, Blair signaled his determination to rewrite Clause IV of Labour's constitution. For 80 years, that clause had committed the party to "the common ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange."

In practical terms the clause was meaningless: Few in the Labour Party seriously believed that a pledge made in 1918 was either deliverable or desirable. But symbolically, rewriting Clause IV was crucial. If Blair could slaughter a few of Old Labour's sacred cows, he would not only demonstrate his seriousness about change but also remain true to his belief, expressed by Gould, that "if a political party is not founded on ideas which have the power to dominate the political agenda, it is unlikely to win a convincing or sustainable electoral victory."

The new Clause IV adopted by the party in 1995 was in many ways the equivalent of the 1992 Democratic Party platform drafted by New Democrats. In place of government ownership, Labour promised "a dynamic economy" built upon the "enterprise of the market and the rigor of competition." Under Blair, Labour was now committed to building a "community in which power, wealth, and opportunity are in the hands of the many, not the few." The language of community and opportunity had long been popular on the left -- and rightly so. Less popular, however, was a new theme reflected in Blair's rewritten Clause IV: "The rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe." Opportunity, responsibility, community -- the mantra of the New Democrat movement -- had become the battle cry of New Labour.

Redrawing Political Dividing Lines

Critics suggest that Blair and Clinton's talk of a Third Way is a recent development designed to give their policies the cloak of intellectual respectability. In reality, their search for a new political model began well before they rose to power. Like his American counterpart, Blair long ago rejected the "false choices of left and right," as the Democratic Leadership Council, with then-Arkansas Gov. Clinton as its chairman, phrased the matter in its seminal 1991 New American Choice Resolutions.

The view that "political dividing lines were put in place entirely to suit [the right]" is at the core of the prime minister's beliefs. The challenge for the left, he argues, is to "place the dividing lines in better and more accurate places. ... The divide on the market is not that the right believes in it and the left doesn't, but between the laissez-faire market approach of the right and the left's commitment to investment in industry and education. ... On tax the dividing line is not between high and low taxes, but rather fair and unfair, coupled of course with the central tenet that 'tax and spend' questions cannot be divorced from the state of the economy."

On both sides of the Atlantic, progressives face the challenge of an electorate that simultaneously desires and fears change. American and British voters feel insecure about the effects of rapid economic globalization and technological advancement. Yet they know it is neither possible, nor desirable, to reverse those trends. In the face of such changes, voters in both nations have recoiled from the chilly winds of the "every man for himself" philosophy of conservatives. They want government to do more to help them cope with economic uncertainty, but mindful of liberal follies in the 1970s and '80s they remain deeply distrustful of robust public activism.

Earning Voters' Trust

These contradictions are not irresolvable. As Clinton argued throughout his 1992 campaign, it is the duty of those who believe in government to show that it can work.

In the lead-up to the 1997 general election and in its first two years in power, New Labour sought to re-establish public faith in the efficacy of government -- and in itself. Taking a leaf out of the New Democrat book, New Labour recognizes that it will not be heard on education, health care and other issues on which it holds the political advantage until it first achieves credibility on crime, welfare, and other issues that voters have distrusted it on in recent elections. Although the party's promises to invest in education and training, reduce youth unemployment, and bring down National Health Service waiting lists resonated strongly with voters, they do not explain the landslide victory of 1997.

Like Clinton in 1992, New Labour in 1997 expressly rejected "tax and spend" economics and pledged a tough line on crime and welfare reform that would instill values of personal responsibility and self-sufficiency. And just as Clinton attempted throughout 1992 to demonstrate independence from Democratic core constituencies, New Labour moved decisively to show that labor unions could expect fairness but no favors from it. A Labour government, pledged Blair, would "treat [the unions] in the same way that [it] ... treated business."

By Election Day, voters not only trusted Labour more than the Conservatives to make the right decisions on health and education, Labour also led on the crucial questions of taxation and managing the economy.

Building a New Majority Coalition

Labour's landslide victory demonstrated powerfully that a modernized progressive party can assemble the kind of electoral coalition of which the DLC has spoken for years -- those in the middle class and struggling to stay there, and those in the working class aspiring to get there. In public opinion polls in 1983 the Conservatives led Labour by 8 percent among the skilled working class. By 1997 Labour had turned that around into a 21 percent lead over the Tories. Furthermore, for the first time ever Labour beat the Conservatives in the battle for middle-class and home-owning voters. More important, even as Labour gained seats in traditionally Tory suburbs and the rural areas of southern England, it also increased its traditionally large majorities in inner-city and working-class northern constituencies.

Since taking power, New Labour has attempted to reinforce this new "working middle-class coalition" by avoiding some of the pitfalls of Clinton's first two years in power. This year, the government begins a large three-year boost in public investment in schools, health, and other public services. The popularity of these new spending commitments -- hinted at, but not promised in 1997-- reflects not simply the fact that New Labour has targeted investment in areas where there is a wide-spread public consensus on the need for more money. Just as important is the fact that the government has spent the last two years proving its commitment to fiscal discipline and embarking on a classic New Democrat "cut and invest" strategy. The budget deficit inherited from the Conservatives has been turned into a surplus, while this year the government began a two-year program of tax cuts for lower- and middle-income families. At the same time, business has been reassured by New Labour's early decision to give the Bank of England control over setting interest rates and by the government's surprising cuts in corporation tax rates since 1997.

But the government's popularity is not simply due to the fact that it has attempted to steer a Third Way course of boosting public investment while eliminating wasteful spending and holding down taxes. New Labour has also recognized the importance of seizing the political initiative on issues such as crime and welfare. Crime legislation has sought to speed up the punishment of young offenders and crack down on antisocial behavior. Spending on the police has been increased.

Having pledged to make welfare reform a priority in 1997, New Labour has adhered strictly to the reciprocal responsibility agenda developed by New Democrats. On the one hand, the government has sought to "make work pay" by cutting taxes for low earners, introducing a Working Families Tax Credit (modeled on the American Earned Income Tax Credit), and increasing spending on child care, training, and education. On the other hand, welfare reform legislation announced earlier this year makes clear that, in the words of Social Security Secretary Alastair Darling, there is "no unconditional entitlement to benefits." The prime minister speaks of a new contract between state and citizen: "We will help you get into work, but in return you have to help yourself." To the consternation of the left, the government is docking the benefits of young unemployed people who refuse to obtain job training, and it proposes to make the benefits of single mothers and other welfare recipients conditional upon their attendance at job center interviews.

Two years after George Bush's crushing defeat, few outside the DLC could have imagined the calamity that befell the Democrats at the hands of Newt Gingrich. Today, New Democrats can take comfort from the fact that their key message -- govern as you were elected -- has not fallen on deaf ears in New Labour.

Robert Philpot is a writer for Progress, a British magazine for Labour Party modernizers. He is also pursuing a doctorate on the rise of the New Democrats in the United States.