President Bush has made several gestures since his narrow re-election victory about his willingness to reach out to Democrats, overcome partisan divisions, and serve as "President of all the people." And there is a debate brewing among Democrats on Capitol Hill about how to respond.
New Democrats in principle are always open to bipartisanship as an avenue for dealing with the great national challenges, and for combining the best ideas from both parties. But we have been here before, and the question is whether the Bush administration and its supporters in Congress are genuinely willing to embrace true bipartisanship. It seems like a good time to republish our analysis of the very different definitions of "bipartisanship," and our pessimistic but accurate predictions of the type George W. Bush and his party embraces, from January 9, 2001.
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Ten Kinds of Bipartisanship
George W. Bush's transition has been surrounded by a mist of unfocused talk about bipartisanship, which is said to be, along with an uncompromising commitment to his conservative campaign agenda, the most important principle guiding the first days of his administration. We thought it might be useful to bring a little clarity to the subject by outlining 10 distinct types of bipartisan coalitions that have been put together over the years, and then considering which types we might see in the near future.
This strategy, pursued most successfully by President Ronald Reagan in his initial budget in 1981, involves uniting one party in Congress and then picking off sufficient members of the other to put together a majority.
As the name suggests, this strategy begins with a bloc of like-minded moderates from both parties and gradually adds members from each side until a majority is achieved. The NAFTA, GATT and China PNTR trade bills during the Clinton administration were enacted by center-out coalitions.
This variety, typically used by incoming presidents during their "honeymoon" period, involves the aggressive, direct stimulation of public opinion to push members of the opposing party, especially those from states or districts where the president is popular, to come across the line.
By contrast, the Inside-Out Coalition is put together through selective deal-making among members, and then sold to the public as a coherent product. Also known as "logrolling," the Inside-Out strategy reached its zenith in the last highway reauthorization bill crafted by the King of Asphalt, the now-retiring Rep. Bud Shuster (R-PA).
(Rare and messy.) This is a variation on the Inside-Out Coalition, but on a grand scale, involving horse trading among the leadership of both parties and aimed at a near-universal consensus. The infamous 1990 budget agreement, which led President George I to violate his no-new-taxes pledges, is an example of a Big Barbecue.
This coalition traditionally emerges in support of the president during military actions, or, occasionally, during economic emergencies. The budget summitry that briefly emerged after the 1987 stock market plunge is an example of the latter.
This strategy was the standard operating procedure in Congress during the period between the New Deal and the Great Society when there were large numbers of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats, and ideology replaced party loyalty on many issues. Such coalitions still emerge on some issues, such as international trade, where coalitions of pro- and anti-trade Democrats and Republicans are common.
On some issues, especially agriculture and energy policy, regional factors regularly trump party. There are some signs of regional fault lines on trade and technology policy as well.
It's not common to think of it this way, but partisan stalemate represents a bipartisan decision to maintain the status quo until the electorate provides a decisive election and the clear governing majority -- an event that the two parties have now been waiting for since 1980.
This strategy, which is not, of course, genuine bipartisanship, involves a sustained campaign to convince the public that the opposing party is the only obstacle to bipartisan progress, and that one's own party has an agenda that represents the real interests of all Americans. President Clinton's success in projecting his agenda as representing "progress, not partisanship," was the key to his recurring victories over Congressional Republicans in budget showdowns.
Which of these 10 types of bipartisanship are likely to be pursued by the new Bush administration?
The answer isn't yet clear, but it's important to remember the defining dilemma the president-elect has posed for the Republican Party. From the moment he announced his candidacy, George W. Bush has tried to achieve the maximum feasible change in the image of the Republican Party through the minimum necessary change in its ideology and agenda. He campaigned to "change the tone in Washington," to create a "different kind of Republican Party," and to pursue a new ideology of "compassionate conservatism," but was the unquestioned candidate of the conservative "base," and embraced a platform that was mostly composed of the age-old demands of the conservative movement.
Given that dilemma, you'd have to guess that he'd like to redeem his pledge to pursue bipartisanship as quickly and as cheaply as possible so that he can then pursue his orthodox conservative agenda. That means he will promote the types of bipartisanship that involve the fewest real concessions to the opposition: Base-In Coalitions to pick off a few Democrats; Outside-In Coalitions to bring public pressure on the opposition; perhaps Inside-Out Coalitions on the Texas model to cut Democrats in on legislative deals; and above all, the Partisan "Bipartisanship" of constantly claiming that he embodies the genuine interests of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.
If that's the case, Democrats who are interested in real bipartisanship should refuse to accept the cheap variety, and raise the price for bipartisan cooperation. Then George W. Bush will finally be forced to choose between his rhetoric and his agenda, and we'll find out how different the real Republican Party actually is.
