One of the major arguments against a U.S. attack on Iraq is that it would
damage prospects for a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and increase regional instability. In fact, the very opposite may be true
if -- and this is an admittedly big "if" -- Saddam Hussein
is overthrown and replaced by a government that demonstrably improves
life for the Iraqi people.
To understand why the path to improving the regional situation may in
fact go through Baghdad, one must first grasp several basic realities
that are often poorly understood.
The first reality is that the Arab-Israeli peace process as it has existed
for the past decade is over. Yasser Arafat's rejection of peace and resorting
to violence in 2000 convinced the overwhelming majority of Israelis that
he would never make a deal, that his ultimate goal is Israel's destruction, and that continuing to take risks for peace in
this situation would endanger the country's very existence.
Moreover, the hostile international reaction against Israel showed the
unreliability of the foreign promises that would underpin any negotiated
agreement. Even after the unprecedented concessions Israel offered in
2000 at Camp David and then accepting the Clinton plan, the Europeans
largely failed to recognize how hard Israel tried to make peace or to
acknowledge its right to self-defense in facing a terrorist war launched
against it. This was a disappointment for Israel, almost on a scale with
the terrorist attacks themselves.
The nearly simultaneous rejection of Israeli peace proposals based on
major concessions by the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, and Syria suggested
that the conflict with Israel was simply too useful for Arab regimes to
give up. Whipping up anti-Israel sentiment remains a major tool for Arab
dictatorships to retain power despite their corruption, incompetence,
and oppressiveness.
The second reality is that the momentum of domestic reform in the Arab
world has stalled. Political deadlock between ruling oligarchs and Islamist
dissenters prevents any advance for democracy, human rights, civil liberties,
a free enterprise market system, and, therefore, better relations with
the United States. Dictators have silenced moderate reformers, leaving
virtually all the oppositionist role to the radical Islamists. Ironically,
the Islamists share the rulers' disdain for the very measures of reform
and moderation that are needed to solve the Arab world's problems.
The third reality is that almost all Middle Eastern leaders are dictators
who are primarily motivated by power politics rather than ideology or
popular sentiment. They view the United States through that lens. If America
seems strong, they avoid confrontation, and in some cases, seek to persuade
the United States, the world's sole superpower, to support them. When
America seems weak, the moderates distance themselves and the radicals
become aggressive.
Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, Syria's
Hafiz al-Asad, Iraq's Saddam Hussein, terrorist leader Osama bin Laden,
and others all shared that same philosophy for many decades. Arabs (and
Iranians since 1979) have been taught daily that the United States is
evil. This message has been delivered systematically in schools, mosques,
and the state-controlled media and has come from every other direction
for years. Despite the talk of public opinion forcing certain, especially
anti-American, policies, it is the palace that rules, sets the dominant
world view, and usually ignores the "Arab street."
Even Egypt, which has received $2 billion a year in U.S. aid, and Saudi
Arabia, shielded by U.S. soldiers from Saddam's aggression in 1991, systematically
spread anti-Americanism among their own people to insulate them from the
appeals of reform or Westernization.
The political opposition in these countries, dominated by Islamist groups,
not only shared but amplified these anti-American views. While the rulers
condemned America for interfering in their affairs, the opposition claimed
America was keeping the repressive rulers in power. In both cases, there
were few examples and little evidence for such claims.
What was most important was the fact that throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
the impression grew that the United States, for all its military and economic
might, could be confronted with impunity. Those favoring this course argued
that the world's sole superpower was actually a cowardly, feeble paper
tiger. Qadhafi, Asad, Saddam, bin Laden, and at times, Arafat suggested
that if only the United States was hit by determined governments or terrorists,
it would crumble.
Those advocating anti-American action -- instead of just nasty words -- cited
a long list of events which persuaded them that the United States was
ripe for a fall. These included the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, its failure
to rescue the Shah of Iran, its alleged flight from terrorists in Lebanon
and Somalia, the supposed decadence of its society, domestic opposition
to tough action, the failure to destroy Saddam in 1991, and many others.
The September 11, 2001, attacks were explicitly intended to intimidate
America and prove its vulnerability in order to encourage Muslims to fight
it. By invading Afghanistan and overthrowing its Taliban regime, the United
States partly countered this effort. Yet bin Laden's probable escape and
continued al Qaeda activity fans doubts in the region about America's
strength and resolve.
But if the United States overthrows Saddam, it would be harder to sustain
such doubts. Rulers may still stoke anti-American propaganda -- precisely
because they fear the appeal of American and reformist arguments -- but
they will shrink from any real confrontation with U.S. power.
Thus, toppling Saddam would change the Middle East equation in a positive
direction in at least four ways: It would end Iraq's financial support
for Palestinian terrorists; undermine the Arab side's belief that it has
a radical, violent alternative to a negotiated settlement; further discredit
Saddam's closest Middle East ally, Yasser Arafat; and change the perception
of the United States as too weak to force any compromise from Arabs or
Palestinians.
A U.S. victory in Iraq, especially one that resulted in a stable, more
representative government, would unnerve radical regimes. And if Iran,
Syria, Libya, and Lebanese Hezbollah reduced their terrorist activity
to avoid becoming America's next target, terror and bloodshed would decline.
Arafat would also be scared by the defeat of his favorite Arab leader.
In 1990, he thought Saddam would bring him victory, telling Saddam at
a March 1990 Baghdad rally, "We will enter Jerusalem victorious.
You will enter with me, riding on your white stallion." Saddam told
Arafat, "We shall not need any more any concessions or political
efforts" because Iraq's "air force and accurate missiles"
would defeat Israel. On January 7, 1991, Arafat told a Baghdad rally on
the eve of the U.S. attack that "Iraqis and Palestine [will be] together,
side by side," fighting the Americans.
Saddam's overthrow by the United States would likely persuade Arafat
that, at least for tactical reasons, he should accept a cease-fire and
end the current bloodshed.
Finally, if a post-Saddam Iraq is not viewed in the Arab world as a U.S.
puppet and offers more freedom and better living standards, it would be
a huge win for the cause of moderate reform in the region. In fact, it
could trigger the third great revolution in recent Middle Eastern history.
The first took place in Egypt in 1952, with the end of colonialism and
the rise of Arab nationalist movements and regimes. As these governments
failed and the promise of pan-Arabism dimmed, Islamists sought to fill
the void. The second big revolution started in Iran in 1979 and saw fundamentalist
ferment spread from Algeria to Sudan to Indonesia. Now, widespread disillusionment
with Islamism could open the door to modern ideas about economic and political
freedom. Iran could be the country most immediately affected, encouraging
the large but frustrated reform movement and producing a wave of pro-American
feeling there.
Just as the U.S. victory in the 1991 Gulf War set the stage for the Oslo
peace process, a successful campaign to overthrow Saddam could also be
a catalyst for new and more positive developments in the Middle East.
That experience should remind us that while armed conflict is always fraught
with peril, a military victory coupled with a successful post-war reconstruction
effort in Iraq would more likely strengthen than weaken America's hand
in dealing with the Middle East.
Blueprint keyword: Extra Iraq
