DLC | Blueprint Magazine | June 30, 2003 Two Cheers for Democracy By Kevin Croke Table of Contents THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad by Fareed Zakaria W.W. Norton, 256 pp. $24.95 Is there any such thing as too much democracy? Most students of politics would say no. But one analyst, Fareed Zakaria, writes otherwise, citing a crucial difference between liberal democracy and illiberal democracy. And the distinction may make a critical difference in the kinds of policies the United States should follow in the world, he argues. Zakaria notes that the American form of government is liberal democracy, and liberalism -- basic rights, limits on government, fair courts, and separation of powers -- is ultimately more important than democracy. But because Americans don't usually realize this, they make mistakes when they try to bring democracy to other nations -- such as Iraq today. The bad news is that an increasing percentage of democratizing nations are drifting into illiberal democracy. Their leaders are chosen in reasonably fair elections, but once elected, these rulers seize as much power as they can, stifle dissent, and trample citizens' rights. Slobodan Milosevic won elections and was broadly popular in Serbia, but he ran a cruelly illiberal state. Illiberal democracies can also be found in Venezuela, Ghana, Peru, Indonesia, Belarus, Ukraine, most of Central Asia, the Palestinian territories, and Russia. But, looking to history, Zakaria sees a hybrid solution to this Manichean mess. He calls it liberal autocracy. Such regimes have leaders who are un-elected but nonetheless respect their citizens' rights and uphold the rule of law. "Despite the limited political choice they offer," Zakaria writes, "countries such as Singapore, Jordan, Malaysia, or Morocco provide a better environment for life, liberty, and happiness of the citizens than the illiberal democracies of Venezuela, Russia, or Ghana." Going a step further, Zakaria contends that these liberal autocracies contain the seeds of their own reform, usually capitalism. Economic growth creates an independent middle class that seeks political influence. As governments are forced to bargain with this new bourgeoisie, the balance of power begins to shift. Independent courts, established to enforce contracts, become a venue for citizens to exercise newfound power. In 1984, Zakaria points out, Chinese citizens brought zero civil lawsuits against the government; by 1997, they had brought more than 90,000. Successful new democracies of the post-war period -- South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Chile, for example -- have emerged from liberal autocracy in the pattern Zakaria describes. Illiberal rulers, by contrast, abet corruption and weaken competing sources of power. There is often little to stop them from relapsing into dictatorship -- the common pattern in Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. It shouldn't surprise us that liberalism must come before democracy today, Zakaria argues, because it's always been that way. In the West, he maintains, liberal institutions -- parliaments, courts, and constitutions -- emerged out of centuries-long power struggles between church and state, nobility and monarchs, various Christian sects against each other, and the rise of capitalism. Even so, most Western European nations couldn't establish true democracy until after World War II. Non-Western nations that followed this model, like South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, have managed to create and sustain healthy liberal democracies. But where the pattern has been reversed, as in sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia, parts of Latin America, and Russia, illiberal democracy has been the result. Reform first. What does Zakaria's theory say about the multiple challenges of the Middle East? Unlike some of the neocon romantics, he rejects the idea that the United States must push for rapid democratization in the region. "Elections in many Arab countries would produce politicians who espouse views that are closer to Osama Bin Laden than those of Jordan's liberal monarch, King Abdullah," he notes. The first step, instead, must be economic reform. But there's another big problem -- oil. Windfall oil wealth has let many Arab regimes skip the difficult reforms that lead to liberalization and economic growth. It has allowed autocrats to stay autocratic -- illiberal. The United States, he argues, must push such regimes to liberalize. Egypt could be a candidate for reform because it is culturally central to the Arab world, has little oil, and receives massive U.S. aid. The other candidate, of course, is Iraq. Hastily arranged elections, followed by a quick exit, would be catastrophic for Iraq, he says. Since Iraq is a religiously and ethnically divided society, demagogues and Islamic parties would be poised to take power. At minimum, a five-year American presence will be necessary, and, just as important, Iraq will need a creative and sustained approach to building liberal institutions. To this end, Zakaria calls for a revival of constitutionalism, the art of devising intricate government structures to institutionalize separation of powers. This vital step is often neglected, he laments, because its importance is not immediately obvious: "Elections are easy to capture on film. But how do you televise the rule of law?" One problem with Zakaria's analysis is that it's really economic liberalization that he's interested in. He gives relatively short shrift to civil society (except for political parties). But what, then, should be done about an autocrat who liberalizes the economy but brutalizes his society? Augusto Pinochet comes to mind. Zakaria doesn't address this contradiction; he praises Chile's economic reforms and notes that "Pinochet did eventually lead his country to liberal democracy." But at what cost? Left-wing critics will accuse Zakaria of supporting autocracy and trying to impose economic neo-liberalism. Would-be visionaries on the right will accuse him of the don't-rock-the-boat realpolitik that led some realists to oppose the breakup of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and to support leaving Saddam Hussein in power after the first Gulf War in the name of stability. Zakaria's response is that he, too, seeks liberal democracy, but that to succeed, liberal democracy must be built on a foundation of constitutional liberalism. Kevin Croke is editorial assistant of Blueprint.